Wages and work practices in union and open shop construction by Bourdon, Clinton C
WAGES AND WORK PRACTICES
IN
UNION AND OPEN SHOP CONSTRUCTION
by
Clinton Currier Bourdon
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
on December 15, 1982 in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctorate in Philosophy
This is the most complete text of the
thesis available. The following page(s)
were not included in the copy of the
thesis deposited in the Institute Archives
by the author: (title page)
MASSACHUStTS NSTTUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY
0cT 6 208
4~A~8
Abstract
WAGES AND WORK PRACTICES
IN
UNION AND OPEN SHOP CONSTRUCTION
by
Clinton Currier Bourdon
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
on December 15, 1982 in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctorate in Philosophy
ABSTRACT
Craft unions in the construction industry have long enjoyed relatively
high hourly wages and benefits and have played major roles in the
training, hiring, and assignment of construction labor. But in the
1970s they became increasingly threatened by the widespread growth of
nonunion construction firms and labor. This spread of nonunion firms
in the industry permits a detailed comparison of compensation and work
practices in the union and open shop sectors of construction. This
comparison allows a unique analysis of the union impact on both compen-
sation and construction labor market institutions.
A single-equation econometric estimation of the union/nonunion wage
differential in construction using a micro-data base on workers' wages,
characteristics, and union status provided evidence of a union wage
differential in construction exceeding fifty percent. But further
analysis showed that this estimate may be biased upward by the heter-
eogenity of skills and occupations in construction as well as by the
positive correlation of wages and union status. Other observations of
union/nonunion wage differential, based on sample surveys designed to
control for skill level, occupation, and type of construction, revealed
much lower union wage differentials which varied considerably by trades
and geographic area.
Labor market institutions in construction, such as apprenticeship, hiring
halls, and jurisdictions, are often seen as largely restrictive union
practices, or labor market distortions, which serve to maintain high
union wages. Interviews with a sample of union and open shop contractors
showed, however, that (1) similar institutions existed in both sectors
of the industry and thus were not a function of union status alone but
an outgrowth of market structure, firm size, and technology and (2)
these institutions could enhance the efficiency of construction labor
markets by facilitating investment in training, job referrals, and the
retention of a skilled but mobile labor force.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Michael Piore
Title: Profesor of Economics
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1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
1.1 The Study of Unions
The industrial relations and labor economics literature of
the nineteen-fifties is rich in descriptive studies of union behavior
in particular sectors of the economy. Economists such as Segal,
Chamberlain, Slichter, Dunlop, and Levinson wrote detailed studies of
union impact on all aspects of the terms and conditions of employment
in industries as various as trucking, construction, and paper. Lewis'
work in the late nineteen-fifties was, however, the first economic
study of unions which was rigorously analytical and largely quanti-
tative in approach. At the time, Lewis' pioneering study of the
union impact on wages alone was a useful complement to the more
"institutionalist" approach which included a range of other issues
in its analysis. Among these other issues were work rules and
featherbedding; labor and product market structure; jurisdictional
definitions; technological change; and management interests and
ideology.
Ever since the publication of Lewis' book, however, economic
analysis of union impact has focused almost entirely on the union/non-
union wage differential issue. The development of micro data bases
unavailable to Lewis, first on an industry then on an individual
level, facilitated the use of regression analysis to control for
other than the "pure" union impact on wages. Currently, single-
equation regressions which estimate the common proportional impact of
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unionism on wages by industry group, while controlling for personal
characteristics of workers (as a proxy for productivity), are the
mainstay of the dwindling literature on union impact and behavior.
This near degeneration of the literature into simple
regression-running cannot be ascribed solely to the quantitative
perversity of modern economics. Occasional attempts to include
various institutional or structural variables in union wage equations,
such as the industry concentration ratio, have not been very suc-
cessful. Nonetheless, the possible impacts of unions on non-wage
aspects of the employment relation, either deleterious or beneficial,
have continued to remain largely unstudied or analyzed. In contem-
porary economic analysis unions are now simple, homogeneous
organizations ('unionism is unionism' as Reder put it in a critique
of Lewis) with a single argument in their utility function: to
raise wages above a competitive norm. If successful, and labor
supply is excessive due to the higher wages, then unions may only
become interested in non-wage institutions in order to restrict
worker entry and ration employment.
Despite what Ashenfelter calls this neoclassical "consensus"
that has been reached both on how to approach the study of unions
and on their wage impact there are odd strands in the literature
which challenge the common view. Three most important of these are
the following:
(1) Endogenous Unions: the standard approach to the
analysis of union impact is to assume unions are an exogenous,
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independent force which acting alone raise wages. The common ex-
pression of this theory is a single equation regression where wages
are a function of both human capital variables (Xij) and union power:
Wi = bo + Z bj Xij + bl Ui + ei
j
so that unionism is simply a dummy variable (Ui) affecting the wages
of a particular worker i. Ashenfelter and Johnson, drawing on some
of the institutional literature of the 1950's, show that since unions
provide non-wage services to workers (e.g., grievance procedures)
they may be demanded by higher wage or income workers. (In other
words, union services have a high wage or income elasticity.) If this
is the case, the single-equation estimates of union impact will be
biased since, while measuring the impact of unionism on wages, they
will be also capturing some of the influence of wages on unionism.
In a two- and three-stage least squares estimation of simultaneous
equations relating wages to unionism and vice versa, Ashenfelter and
Johnson found the union coefficient in the wage equation, though
positive and substantial, was insignificant. They concluded that
the simultaneous relationship of unionism and wages had been under-
emphasized. Yet, their findings have not been elaborated on - partly
due to the difficulty of specifying the simultaneous equations.
(2) Labor-management Cooperation: The contemporary economic
model of unionism stresses the adversary role unions play in wrestling
higher wages from profits (in concentrated industries) or from consumers
(in competitive industries). What this model overlooks is the beneficial
role unions may play in the management and organization of workers in
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some companies and industries. On the basis of at least some writing
and field research, one could hypothesize that unions provide services
not only to workers but to corporate management. Indeed, if as Dunlop
claims, "the net effect of collective bargaining is to increase pro-
ductivity through a higher quality of the labor force" unions may aid
consumers as well. Apparently, economists may have overemphasized
the adversary role of unions, focusing solely on their presumable
rational strategies to raise wages and ignoring the contribution they
make to personnel management and productivity. Unions may do this by
organizing and helping administrators design and administer personnel
procedures, job training, health and safety programs, etc. Of course,
continuing labor strife in various industries, concern over "management
rights," and continuing employer opposition to perceived extensions
of union power through legislation are clear'evidence that unions,
whatever their possible productivity contributions, are not welcomed -
never mind sought out - by management. Nonetheless, there is scattered
evidence in the idustrial relations literature that labor-management
relations can be harmonious and mutually beneficial. (There is even
a radical literature that argues that union leadership actually
serve management interests against the rank and file.) Perhaps a
succinct quote from a British worker (from industrial relations field
research on productivity bargaining) can point towards a slight
expansion of the purely adversary model of unions:
"On the job we work as a team. When it
comes to money we're on different sides. It's
as simple as that."
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(3) Unions and Productivity: Freeman's recent work on
the impact of unionization on the quit rate and on voiced discontent
is the only new quantitative work on union impact which is not
entirely wage oriented. Freeman finds that unions lower the quit
rate while raising voiced dissatisfaction. If skills and training
are firm-specific, then a lower quit rate should lower training
needs and total labor costs to firms: thus, unions raise efficiency.
Freeman hypothesizes that the way unions lower quit rates is by
acting as a collective voice for workers. This results in a fuller
expression of worker preferences and the achievement of some col-
lective benefits, particularly those with high fixed costs, possibly
unobtainable in a marginal world of competitive labor markets.
The addition of these strands of the literature to the
standard neoclassical model of union complicates but does not neces-
sarily contradict the usual economic approach to unions. No one would
argue that unions do not seek to improve the terms and conditions
of employment, of which wages are clearly an important part; only
that this is only part of what unions do. Attention to only wage
effects, or even only to adversary bargaining, misses other, equally
important elements of union behavior. These other elements are
crucial in any comprehensive understanding of the net costs and bene-
fits of unions in labor market. In short, contemporary neoclassical
economics portrays unions simply as a labor market distortion in
contrast to a hypothetical competitive labor market. The reality of
union behavior and impact is more complex because in actuality the
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characteristics of both labor markets and the employment relations
often diverge from a competitive ideal.
1.2 Craft Unions in Construction
The building trades unions in the construction industry are
an excellent candidate for a less narrow (or neoclassical) and more
"institutional" study of unions. Their high hourly wages supposedly
represent the fruits of tremendous union market power. Their power
over hiring and training institutions which supposedly control labor
market entry in construction, while never empirically demonstrated,
is legendary. In addition, they appear to represent one of the
vestiges of classic craft unionism in the economy, with the connota-
tions that nomenclature carries for worker interest in and control
over occupational definition, work rules, and technology.
To begin to describe the impact the building trades have on
the labor market and labor-management relations in construction, two
types of empirical research were undertaken. The first of these was
the creation of a wage questionnaire to be mailed to a random sample
of union and non-union construction contractors in two SMSA's. This
questionnaire was designed to allow not only the reporting of hourly
wage and benefits by occupation and nominal skill level, but also to
include data on firm characteristics, in order to permit wages to be
related to product and firm attributes in the industry. The second
type of research was the design and application of an open-ended
interview schedule for a small sample of union and open shop contractors
in the same cities. The schedule was developed in order to report and
-7-
compare labor-management practices in five areas (occupational
definition and work assignment; work rules and technology; skill
levels and definition; hiring; and training) for union and nonunion
contractors in the same product markets and of equivalent firm size.
The purpose of this research approach was two-fold: first, to identify
systematically the actual non-wage impact of the unions on the industry
across a wide range of issues, without relying on hearsay, polemic,
or generalization from particular (and usually extreme) incidents;
and second to permit as rigorous a comparison as possible between
union and nonunion labor market behavior, so as to control for supposed
influences of the unions alone.
It is important to note that the field research focused on
the collection and analysis of data on wages and on management
descriptions of labor market behavior in either a union or nonunion
context. No attempt was made to directly identify union goals (i.e.,
utility function) or bargaining strategies or to compare management
and union points of view. The research was seen as simply an initial
step in understanding labor markets in the construction industry and in
gathering some empirical information on the unions' role in it. This
data, and hypotheses derived from it, were to serve as a basis for
subsequent discussion and research on union objectives, policy, and
strategy.
The findings of the research can be summarized in the
following points:
(1) Construction is a highly differentiated industry, whose
activities range in size and complexity from residential rehabilitation
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to nuclear power plant construction. In the two metropolitan areas
studied, the survey results showed that nonunion firms were strongly
represented - even predominant - in residential construction and in
small scale commercial building. Union firms were larger, both in
average employment and in dollar volume, and were concentrated in
larger scale commercial building and heavy and highway construction.
(2) The interviews with contractors revealed that due to
the product differentiation within the industry, similar occupational
and skill nomenclature (e.g., "journeyman carpenter") can represent a
broad range of actual tasks and competence. Although the union sector
of the industry is much more formal in its occupational definition,
through jurisdictional boundaries, and in its skill and wage structure,
these structures are by no means rigid. Informal, idiosyncratic
variations in tasks and workers' skills are commonplace, particularly
in contexts - such as small-scale work or more rural areas - where
the formal structures are awkward and inefficient. In the nonunion
sector, however, there are few if any commonly accepted occupational
definitions or skill gradings: management is free to arrange and re-
arrange tasks into firm-specific occupations in order to fit the type
of work in which the firm specializes. In some cases, this flexibility
results in the large-scale substitution of semi-skilled labor called
"helpers" for skilled workers on routine parts of many craft jobs. In
other cases, it results in more broadly, but thinly, trained men as
"general building mechanics" to do a myriad of odd jobs for general
contractors. Since some nonunion firms specialize in only one type
of work, such as cement slab construction or drywall installation,
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occupations grow up around these intermediate products, in contrast to
union jurisdictions which tend to be more material-oriented. At the
same time, many open shop firms, particularly mechanical subcontractors,
are virtually identical to union firms in both wage and occupational
structure. Also, the organization of firms in the industry, with a
common separation into general and specialized subcontractors, help to
maintain some consistency in occupational and skill categories.
(3) The complexity of occupational and skill definition
poses obvious problems for evaluating union/nonunion wage differentials.
If union carpenters are not the same in terms of tasks and skills as
nonunion carpenters, in part due to the technological and materials
differences between products in the industry, then wage comparison be-
tween them will be biased by unobserved skill (productivity) variations.
In the standard approach to estimating the pure union wage impact,
the wage equation contains several human capital variables as proxies
for the productivity determinants of the (unobserved) competitive
wage. Yet, in estimates of this type of equation undertaken on the
Parnes data file for craftsmen, foremen and kindred workers in con-
struction and in other industries, the usual human capital variables
were insignificant in construction. As expected, however, the union
wage impact in construction was substantial: ranging from fifty-five
to nearly seventy percent for different years and regions. Since the
variables which usually control for skill differences were both small
in size of coefficients and statistically insignficant at conventional
confidence levels, the interpretation of this union/nonunion wage
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differential as a pure monopoly rent is suspect. It is undoubtedly
some combination of skill differences and union market power.
The wage survey was also designed to give a more detailed
picture of union and nonunion wage structure and differences. Gross
comparisons of mean wages for union and nonunion "journeymen" (as
defined by respondents) in similar types of construction evidenced
wage differentials for roughly forty percent - with substantial
variations around this for different trades. Nonunion wages were
found to be relatively similar between residential and commercial
construction, while union rates were virtually identical for most
commercial and heavy and highway work. The few special union rates
for residential construction were much lower than the commercial
rate and were comparable to nonunion rates in those product markets.
Tabulation of the data by firm size showed that two-thirds of the
large open shop firms paid higher wages than their smaller counter-
parts and that these wages were only twenty percent or so below the
union scale. Other characteristics of the union/nonunion wage
structure, such as the contrast between the common hourly rate for
union mechanics and the extreme dispersion of open shop rates, were
also observed. Hourly benefit levels were also reported and tabulated,
despite the difficulty in estimating these for open shop workers due
to the informal and varying nature of their firms' policies. Approx-
imately fifty percent of the open shop journeymen in the sample
received benefits and the level of these was roughly half the hourly
rate of employer contribution to union plans.
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There is no simple interpretation of the findings of the
wage survey. The combination of major differences in product type,
firm size, and wage levels between the union and nonunion sectors
suggests that some of the wage differences are explained by worker
skill variations rather than by pure union power. For the most part,
the type and scale of work undertaken by open shop contractors is
different enough from union work that the nonunion wage cannot be
identified as the shadow price of union labor. At worst, the exact
size of the union wage premium in construction must remain unknown;
at best, it might be judged to be roughly ten to twenty percent
above the "competitive" (i.e. open shop) alternative, a differential
not out of keeping with estimates of union impact in other sectors,
although substantially lower than that estimated econometrically.
Non-wage Impacts
(4) Formal training systems are virtually identical in
union and nonunion construction. Multi-year apprenticeship programs
are the most important source of skilled manpower in the mechanical
trades. The similarity in format and content of these programs is
due primarily to government certification requirements, which tend
to impose a union structure on the industry, but is also a function
of the commitment of specialty subcontractors, and their associations,
both union and nonunion, to developing a skilled labor force. Open
shop resistance to standard apprenticeship programs comes largely from
general contractors who desire either more broadly or more narrowly
trained workers which do not fit into the usual union classifications.
-12-
The main innovation in training in the open shop sector has been the
expansion of "task training" methods in large-scale construction.
This system trains new hires in an on-the-job context in a number of
specialized tasks which are sub-specialties within a trade or occu-
pation. This type of training permits very large nonunion contractors
to subdivide labor into smaller skill categories (at lower wages) on
long-term, large-scale construction projects.
Interviews with union contractors confirmed the findings of
other field research that apprenticeship programs are not a major
barrier to entry into the construction labor force. There is enough
informal entry in most trades to provide a flexible and responsive
labor supply.
(5) Technology, both in terms of machines and materials
used, is virtually identical in both union and nonunion sectors.
Despite the publicity given to union opposition to prefabricated
materials or other labor-saving innovations, little consistent or
successful resistance was found. Where unions did oppose particular
materials, it was either due to the lack of a union manufacturer or
was a very small part of a general assembly.
Union work rules, also infamous for their inefficiency,
were found to have little, if any, deleterious impact on costs in
large scale construction and to be informally modified or ignored on
smaller scale work. There were particular exceptions to this pattern;
some trades like the ironworkers and the operating engineers were
generally condemned for their featherbedding rules and behavior, but
on the whole the formal restrictions were not onerous.
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What was reported as most costly and bothersome to union
contractors was not the formal structure of union work rules but
the informal problems with worker attitudes and union politics. In
their own view, management of union firms suffered more from inter-
and intra-union disputes and from uncertainty about union enforcement
of contract provisions than it did from many other aspect of union-
management relations.
(6) Hiring systems were found, with some exceptions, to be
equally informal and non-restrictive in both union and nonunion
sectors. Usually, men were hired directly by contractors through
referrals from their foremen or other employees. Union contractors
viewed the hiring hall not as a restriction on their labor supply but
as an important institution in transferring men between firms and
projects. It permitted them to assemble and rapidly employ a crew
when they needed more mechanics than could be hired quickly by informal
or formal means. Open shop firms also relied on informal hiring
methods, supplemented by newspaper want ads and government employment
agencies. But these firms felt constrained in undertaking larger
scale projects due to their lack of access to an external skilled
labor pool. For this reason, two open shop contractor associations
have begun referral systems to meet the needs of their firms and
workers.
For union contractors, the main problem with the hiring
hall was the lack of skilled or qualified men available through it.
Many contractors used the hall only as a last resort, and even then
tried to request workers by name, due to low skill levels of workers
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coming out of the hall. Apparently, the best workers stay permanently
with firms or circulate on the basis of informal referrals. As a
consequence, out-of-town contractors who had neither a local pool of
contracts or a good relationship with the union business agent were
forced to take the worst men from the hall.
(7) The market context in which the survey was done make
it difficult to evaluate, even qualitatively, the competitive nature
and prospects of the nonunion sector of the construction industry. The
apparent rapid growth of the open shop seemed to stem from the boom in
construction in the late 1960's. At the time, the union sector was
fully occupied in major industrial and commercial building, particu-
larly in center city areas, leaving low-rise, smaller scale commercial
activity in the suburbs to nonunion firms. But the deep recession in
construction in the early 1970's affected both sectors of the industry.
The open shop was by no means prospering disproportionately at the
time the survey was undertaken - despite their apparent competitive
advantage in the smaller scale building and alteration work which
continued through the recession.
In addition to these cyclical impacts on the extent of union
organization in the industry, there appeared to be some signs of a
secular trend towards increased nonunion activity. In Massachusetts,
for example, areas and types of construction which ten or twenty
years ago had been union were now entirely nonunion. This was partic-
ularly true of the smaller cities outside of Boston metropolitan area
and of residential work throughout the SMSA and state. One possible
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explanation for this change may be found in construction technology.
Many open shop firms seemed to be engaged in a relatively routine
and specialized on-site assembly process of prefabricated components.
This substitution of materials for skilled labor allowed them to use
unskilled or semi-skilled workers at lower wages who were either
attached to the firm or hired from the external market. Subcon-
tracting of various specialized building systems, as well as many
basic components, also allowed firms to remain small and specialized.
In other words, a change in technology had permitted the industrial
organization of the industry, organized around a group of small
specialized firms, to substitute for larger firms with a more skilled
and mobile labor force. However, this type of organization was viable
mainly in residential and small-scale commercial work. Larger pro-
jects, with unique building attributes and volatile labor demands,
were still the domain of the union contractor. Although the turmoil
in the industry in the mid-1970's reflects both the impact of the
recession and the greater competitiveness of the open shop, there still
are major areas of virtual union monopoly in different types of con-
struction. This monopoly is apparently due less to union restrictive
power - either institutional, political, or physical - than it is to
the unions' ability to organize and maintain a pool of skilled and
mobile workmen as a resource for large, complex and uncertain construc-
tion projects.
Overall, two general conclusions from the contractor interviews
can be made:
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(1) Labor-management and labor market institutions in
union and open shop construction vary more by product market and
firm size than they do by union status. In general, union rules on
jurisdictions, skill level, technology and work practices, hiring and
training are neither as inefficient nor as inflexible as they have
been portrayed. For the most part, these union institutions help
make large-scale construction more efficient by organizing and
maintaining an external pool of skilled labor for many firms to use.
In smaller scale union construction, the rules are often overlooked
or loosely interpreted to fit the context. While open shop contractors
have the unchallenged advantage of "the right to manage," their
practices, again with some significant exceptions, do not differ
substantially from union operations on comparable work (if any). The
major advantage of the open shop firm is internal flexibility on the
assignment and control of work. Their major disadvantage is the lack
of access to an external labor pool which enable them to bid on large-
scale work.
(2) The apparent growth of the open shop sector has brought
a convergence in many types of labor market institutions. Open shop
firms, through associations, are creating and adopting hiring referral
systems; apprenticeship training; and even common occupational clas-
sifications and wage rates. To some extent this convergence is due
to government pressure (e.g., approving only "traditional" apprentice-
ship programs); in other cases, such as referral systems, it is due
to the needs of the firms themselves. Important innovations in open
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shop work have been the widespread use of helpers as less costly,
semi-skilled mechanics and the attempted creation of new occupational
classifications which cross traditional jurisdictions (e.g., general
building mechanic) for particular types of work. Other major open
shop innovations are the activities of some large general contractors
in training and using a more specialized, narrowly trained workforce
for routine tasks on large-scale industrial construction.
1.3 External Labor Markets and Endogenous Unions
In the neoclassical model of unions, the primary goal of
the organization is to increase the economic rent of its members by
bargaining for higher wages and benefits (or other pecuniary conditions
of work) and then rationing the labor supply in order to protect the
disequilibrium position. The costs unions impose are thus seen as a
rational outcome of some bargaining strategy which is a trade-off
between income and employment goals. One crude measure of union
success (or impact) is the resulting union/nonunion wage differential.
The field research on the building trades' unions was not
designed to be a direct test of this neoclassical view. Yet the
results of the investigation, while not clearly contradicting this
model, make it seem simplistic to the point of irrelevance. While
higher wages, benefits and better working conditions are clearly
goals of the building trades unions, the extent to which they attain
these goals, it appears, cannot simply be measured by the union/nonunion
wage differential. There are too many other influences on this
variable for it to be used an an indicator of union market power. In
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other words, in industries like construction where there are consid-
erable variations in product types and workers skills, the nonunion
wage cannot be taken to even approximate the shadow price of union
labor. For the most part, the nonunion sector of the industry has
represented either a small competitive fringe around the union sector
or a concentration of firms in a special branch of the industry -
like residential construction. Thus, measurement of the magnitude
of the true union wage premium and of its impact on costs of con-
struction might better be undertaken by other means. This would
include the analysis of the shadow price of particular skill classes
of labor under given market conditions, itself a very difficult
task, or the empirical study of the unit costs of labor for identical
construction projects. Neither of these types of research has been
undertaken, either in construction (with one minor exception) or in
other industries. Without them, the exact magnitude of the "pure"
union wage premium must remain indeterminate.
Economists who erroneously rely on the size of the union/
nonunion wage differential as a proxy for the union wage impact go
on to hypothesize - if not conclude - that the building trades main-
tain a wage premium through the operations of restrictive labor
market institutions: the hiring hall; apprenticeship programs; etc.
The field research did not substantiate this view. These, as well as
other non-wage impacts of craft unions, appeared to be less restrictive
than flexible and functional. Either the unions do not have the market
power to operate these institutions restrictively or the rent they
extract through bargaining is not great enough to make labor supply
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restrictions necessary. But in stressing the institutional costs and
impacts of unionism, on the basis of a rational bargaining model,
economists do overlook many real costs unions can impose through
political disputes and idiosyncratic and uncertain enforcement of
rules. Apparently, management - as opposed to academic - resentment
of unions stems less from their contractual gains in wages, benefits
and rules than from the potential disruption of hierarchical power in
the workplace or jobsite.
The greatest drawback of the neoclassical model, however,
is its comparison of the presumed results of union impact with the
hypothetical efficiency of a competitive labor market. In a compar-
ative static model, with homogeneous labor and spot wage contracts
between workers and employees, any institution such as a union is
clearly a distortion. In actuality, however, the nature of labor
markets and employment relations do not conform to competitive
assumptions. Williamson, following the decription of internal labor
markets by Doeringer and Piore, has shown how institutional struc-
tures can enhance efficiency in the context of common organizational
failures. For Williamson, real labor markets have endemic problems
of uncertainty; small numbers bargaining; and information and tran-
sactions costs. These markets characteristics, coupled with the
"bounded rationality" of the participants, make employment relations
based on spot contracts, contingent claims contracts, and the like
infeasible and unlikely. The alternative, an internal labor market,
is an institutional structuring of the employment relations which
permits a flexible, yet robust, wage-effort bargain. Workers accept
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hierarchy, direction, and demands for differing degrees of work
effort in exchange for implicit contracts of present and future
benefits.
In construction, due to the geographical fragmentation of
the industry, very few firms are large enough to create and maintain
an internal labor market of skilled workers. Rather, the crucial and
unique labor problem facing the industry is how to organize a casual
labor market for skilled workers external to various firms. In this
context, workers and employees alike need common market institutions
to standardize and regulate the employment relation. Rigid occupa-
tional definitions (craft jurisdictions), skill classifications,
and wage levels both reduce uncertainty in training and job
characteristics for workers as well as provide general standards and
criteria for all firms in the industry. An alternative way of organ-
izing such a labor market, perhaps through consecutive spot contracts
negotiated by individual workers, might break down due to the high
level of transactions costs involved and the uncertainty introduced
by small numbers bargaining under differing market conditions.
Other labor market institutions in construction, such as hiring
halls, also provide services to both workers and employers alike.
Workers, faced with a high probability of unemployment, may find a
central labor exchange more efficient than individual job search;
while employers, needing to hire and fire large numbers of skilled
workers over different intervals, require a source of referral for
both hiring and placement. In sum, due to the geographic variability
and uncertainty in construction demand, few firms are large enough
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to create an internal labor pool of skilled workers with firm-specific
skills and occupations. On their own, however, competitive firms
might have some difficulty in agreeing on and organizing shared
external labor market structure.
Nonetheless, the industrial organization of much, but not
all, of the construction industry necessitates some form of external
labor market. Skilled workers in the industry, facing both the
uncertainties and transactions costs caused by rotating jobs, have an
incentive to create and maintain certain market institutions. These
are the key elements of the non-wage impacts of the building trades
craft unions: jurisdictions; skill classification; hiring halls;
etc. All of these institutions structure a labor market in a way
valuable to both firms and workers. Indeed, they are often operated by
joint management and labor committees; historically, the employers
have even cooperated in the unions' initiation and maintenance of such
structures. Thus, an interpretation of these institutions which
stresses their role as solely serving the unions' distributive interest
in controlling and reducing the labor supply is misguided. While such
labor monopoly may occur, the field research showed that it is not
endemic or perhaps even typical. Rather, the craft labor market
institutions can play an efficiency-enhancing role of organizing a
casual labor market.
In contrast, during the nineteen-fifties and early sixties,
the open shop sector in construction was largely confined to either
residential building in many areas of the country or very large-scale
industrial and heavy construction in the South. Both of these types
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of construction allow a labor market to be organized on a firm
specific basis, either through the coordination of subcontracting
by many very small firms, as in residential work, or by an internal
labor market, made possible by the local stability of demand gen-
erated by multi-million dollar, multi-year projects. In the late
sixties and to the present, there has been an apparent growth in the
open shop sector to the point where it now competes for medium and
large-scale commercial work with union firms. To some degree the
recent competitive success of the nonunion firms has been due not
simply to lower wages but to the adoption of a different wage and
occupational structure than union firms. By remaining outside of
the craft institutions of the union sector, open shop firms have
been able to use more specialized, narrowly trained mechanics in
unique, noncraft occupations and to substitute less skilled workers
for routine aspects of skilled work. However, the growth of many
open shop firms has recently been constrained by the lack of an
external labor pool of skilled workers, of predictable skills and
wages, which can be obtained for temporary employment on larger
projects. This constraint has been met by the attempt to create
many common labor market institutions, hiring halls and apprentice
training in particular, similar to those found in the union sector.
It is not clear that these institutions will be operable or success-
ful, but they do represent a convergence of the type of labor market
structures between the union and open shop sectors.
In sum, craft unions are not simply a labor market dis-
tortion in an otherwise competitive labor market. In the context of
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the particular characteristics of the construction industry, the
union plays a much more complex role. By helping to maintain and
operate certain market institutions, it serves both the efficiency
goals of firms and the efficiency and distribution goals of skilled
workers. Whether such labor market structures can be organized
without either unions or formal worker participation remains to be
seen.
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2. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF UNION IMPACT
"...the central problem of (measuring union/
nonunion wage differentials) is adjusting the
wage data used for the effects of factors
other than unionism that are correlated with
the wage effect of unionism."
H.G. Lewis
Ever since the major impacts of industrial unionism began
to be felt in the late 1940's, economists have struggled with the
difficulty of measuring the union/nonunion wage differential. That
is, what is the percentage increase in wages, if any, that is attribu-
table solely to unionization? As the quote from Lewis implies, this
seemingly simple problem is actually quite complex; perhaps, as
later research would show, even intractable. The economic literature
since Lewis' summary work encompasses some variety in analytic approach,
using different data sources, and different time periods. The result,
as usual, is a multitude of differing estimates of union wage impact,
with an (almost) general consensus that the impact is statistically
significant, positive, and anywhere from negligible to over 30 percent.
The qualification on general consensus arises from the belief of some
economists that unions have no significant exogenous impact at all on
wages. The reputation and work of these economists is substantial
enough that the issue of a union wage impact is by no means settled.
But, like many "old" issues in social science, they are never settled;
interest and research just fade away.
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The following discussion of the work on estimating
union/nonunion wage differentials is divided into three sections.
The first section describes the results of the research using single-
equation estimates of union impact. The second section criticizes
the theoretical specification of the single-equation approach and
presents a simultaneous equation analysis. The third section questions
the whole emphasis on the average wage impact of unionism and raises
issues of union's impact on the wage structure; on non-wage aspects
of work; and on other aspects of union influence.
2.1 Union Wage Impact: Lewis and Critiques
H.G. Lewis' book on union wages capped a decade of economic
research on estimating the effect of "unionism" upon relative wages.1
The book not only summarized most, if not all, of previous research;
it also reported on new findings generated by theses directed by
Lewis at Chicago. Also, Lewis' summary work apparently influenced
the direction of most subsequent research on economic issues of
unionism. The major questions asked by Lewis on the first page of
the book are the same ones that recur in the economic literature from
1963 on. These questions are:
By how much has unionism increased the average
wage of union labor relative to the average wage
of all labor, both union and nonunion? Reduced
the average wage of nonunion labor relative to the
average wage of all labor?
1 H. Gregg Lewis, Unionism and Relative Wages in the U.S. (University
of Chicago Press, 1963).
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To what extent has unionism affected, in
different proportions, the average wages of
different industries?
How variable were the effects of unionism
on relative wages from one date to another
during the last forty years? How much of this
variability can be explained by changes in the
rate of inflation of the general price level
of general money wage level? By changes in the
degree of unionization of the labor force?
How much higher or lower is the relative
inequality in average wages among industries
than it would be in the absence of relative
wage effects of unionism? The amount of
relative inequality in the distribution of
wages among all workers?
Lewis' answers to these questions can be presented quite
briefly. He found that the average relative wage effect of unionism
was to raise union wage above nonunion wages by 15 to 20 percent in
1923-29, by more than 25 percent in 1931-33, by 10-20 percent in 1939-
41, by 0-5 percent in 1945-49, and by 10-15 percent in 1957-58. At
the least, these estimates establish that the average wage impact has
varied considerably over time - usually as Lewis notes in Chapter 9,
widening in recessions and contracting in expansions. In addition,
Lewis found on the basis of a review of numerous studies, that the
average union wage impact differed considerably between occupations,
industries, and geographic areas. The impact was greatest in
manufacturing and least in service industries. Occupations such as
barbers, motormen, and building craftsmen fell in between at levels
of five to twenty-five percent.
Though Lewis' work is seen as a landmark, substantial
criticism of it has and can be made. Reder's review article of the
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book summarized, in a slightly confused way, the difficulties in
Lewis' treatment. 2 Reder's work previsaged much of the research that
was to follow. Reder noted that Lewis compared average wages in two
different groups of workers: those who were completely or substantially
unionized and those who were not. Obviously, the two groups would be
chosen from the same industry so that, as Lewis puts it, "the true
relative wage effect index, Ri, measures the effect of unionism on
the average relative wage of a group of labor of given relative
quality at given relative non-pecuniary terms of employment."3 Since
the labor force data available to Lewis were not sufficiently detailed
to permit precise specification of worker quality, he noted that
"unionism itself may have effects on relative labor quality and
relative wage effects." Reder's critique of Lewis' work focused on
these possible biases in estimating the union wage differential.
Reder identifies the two main types of bias that may occur: (1)
collinearity and/or specification errors and (2) simultaneity. His
discussion notes both of these but interweaves their effect. For
example, Reder restates Lewis' measurement of union impact as a
functional relationship where W=f(L,Q,U) and W is the observed average
wage of a labor group; L is the relative quantity hired of that group,
Q is a quality index; and U is a measure of the relative extent of
union membership. (This last variable, though obviously crucial, was
2 Melvin Reder, "Unions and Wages: The Problems of Measurement,"
Journal of Political Economy, April 1965.
3 Lewis, op. cit., p. 45.
-28-
often difficult to measure in most early studies when union membership
data by industry were scarce.) Reder then derives the "true relative
wage effect" as
DW = dW - 4 W dL + DW dQ
TO alI 7[L TI l@Q ali
Thus, the impact of unionism on wages is a function of
changes in wages alone corrected by the changes in unionism for the
demand for labor (both positive and negative) and by any "quality
effect" caused by (or simply correlated with) unionism. Because these
latter two impacts are usually unobserved, Lewis could only make ad hoc
judgment as to the direction and size of the bias introduced into
3W dW
estimates of @U when _dU is used as its surrogate.
One of these issues of bias, correcting for elements of
labor force quality that may be correlated with unionism, became the
central issue in most of the subsequent economic analyses of union
wage impacts. Multivariate regression analysis, using micro-data
sets on worker characteristics, was used to solve one of the problems
Reder noted.
Initially, Reder was skeptical that this type of analysis
could be done: he notes,
"To introduce this dimension (labor quality)
implies the existence of a factor continuum
with a manifold infinity of factors, minutely
differing from one another in every relevant
aspect. The empirical relevance of such a
construction shuld be established rather
than presumed."
4 Reder, op. cit., p. 191.
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The later results, only partly resolving Reder's uneasiness are
described below. Subsequently, the second type of bias which Reder
noted is discussed. This bias results from the possible simultaneous
determination of union and other impacts on wages. If only high wage
groups tend to become unionized or if unions first induce quality and
then wage changes in a labor force once organized, then the wage
impact of unionism will be wrongly attributed to unions rather than
other forces. This type of approach is not common in the literature -
only two economists have considered it - yet it seems particularly
attractive to labor economists and industrial relation experts. This
is discussed in the second section below.
2.2 Single Equation Estimates
The now standard approach to estimating a union/non-union
wage differential is exemplified by the recent work of Oaxaca and of
Ashenfelter.5 They develop a model for estimating union wage impact
in a single equation, multi-variate form which, first, recognizes and
controls for worker characteristics which may bias the wage impact
attributed to unionism and, second, treats the observed wage as a
function of unobserved union and competitive influences. To control
for worker characteristics, the usual human capital variables reflecting
age, race, sex, schooling, health and part-time employment are
5 Ronald Oaxaca, "Estimation of Union/Nonunion Wage Differentials
Within Occupational/Regional Subgroups" Journal of Human Resources,
Fall 1975, and Orley Ashenfelter, "Union Relative Wage Effects:
New Evidence..." unpublished mimeo, Princeton University, May 1976.
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included. A variable reflecting size of urban area is also included
to control for cost of living differences. To reflect the union
impact on wages, Oaxaca develops a union dummy variable and a constant
term which reflects a combination of the competitive wage and so-
called spill-over and threat of unionism. For example, the diagram
below shows the common assumption that unions raise wages in a market
above the competitive level W*, to Wu. (See Figure 1) In so doing,
they cause unemployment which spills over into the organized sector
and, drives down the wage to WO. Thus the differential, WU/Wo, does
not reflect the union impact over W*, which is unobserved, but on the
observable non-union wage Wo. This tends to overstate the "pure"
union wage impact. However, some observers of labor markets have
hypothesized that unorganized employers might devise ways, largely by
raising wages, to forestall union organizing attempts. This so-called
"threat effect" of unions on wages would raise W0 and diminish the
observed union wage impact.
Figure 1 - Union Impact on Wages
Wu
DL Wo \D | DL
UnorganizedOrganized
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As a result, the observed union age differential is the outcome of
some resolution in a particular labor market, of forces raising and
depressing Wo. Oaxaca develops this argument in the following way.
Let the relation between the non-union wage and the competitive wage
be expressed as:
(1) in (Wn) = in (Wc) + in ( Snc + 1)
where Wn is the non-union wage and Wc is the competitive wage. Then
6nc can be greater or smaller than 1 due to either threat effects or
spillover effects, respectively. But ln(Wc) can be replaced by
observable determinants of the competitive wage:
(2) in (Wn) = B Xj + in ( 6nc + 1)
where Xj is a vector of worker characteristics in occupation j.
Then, the observed wage of the ith worker in a cross-section analysis
is:
(3) in (Wi) = Z B Xi + in ( 6 nc + 1) + in ( 6 un + 1) U + Ei
1
So in equation 3, which can be estimated, the level of the competitive
wage becomes subsumed in the constant term and the term in ( 6 un + 1) U
is a dummy variable for union membership for each worker i.
In addition, when estimating equation (3) Oaxaca controls
for occuptation and region as well as worker characteristics. Because
of this, 6 nc and Sun do not need to be constant across workers but can
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vary systematically between occupations and regions. As a result,
Oaxaca derives the estimating equation:
(4) ln(wi) = Z [ km ikm i P + 0km Vimk Pi + akm Vikm Gik m
+Gkm Vikm Si] + E Bj Xij + Ei
i
where K is Kth occupation in nth region and Vikm is a multiplicative
dummy variable for those effects and the effects of employment in the
unionized private sector (Uip); the non-union private sector Pj);
government (Gi) or self-employment (Si). The Xij again control for
the worker characteristics mentioned above. The model is estimated
for ten occupational categories; four regions; two races and both sexes.
Oaxaca's results show considerable variation in union
impact. Differentials for all occupations are usually highest in the
South and lowest in the Northeast. Across occupations, unions produce
great gains for lower skill groups (laborers receive 26 to 45 percent
more when unionized) and lower gains for white-collar workers (clerical
workers get a 2 to 20 percent difference and managers receive a
negative differential). Over-all, white males show an eleven percent
gain; black males twenty-five percent increase, and white females a
twenty-two percent increment due to unionization. It is interesting
to note that the union differentials for white craftsmen across
regions are generally lower than those of white operatives. In the
Northeast and North Central regions, for example, craftsmen receive
differentials of 8 and 12 percent respectively while operatives get
12 and 20 percent.
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Ashenfelter's recent work on the union wage differential
uses the 20,000 observations of the Current Population Survey as a
micro-data base. He estimates an equation similar to Oaxaca's and
gets similar results. Controlling for education (measured by years of
schooling): work experience (age minus years of schooling minus six);
marital status; and SMSA size, he finds unionism raised wages of all
workers by 11 percent in 1967; 14 percent in 1973 and 16 percent in
1975. In detailed analysis of union impact by occupation and industry,
the differential varies from negative (but insignificant) in white-
collar occupations to positive and highly significant for craftsmen,
operatives and laborers in construction, durable and non-durable
manufacturing and other major industry categories. The lowest
differentials generally occur in non-durable manufacturing, about 12
to 16 percent for different occupations in the three years studies,
and the highest occur in construction, varying from 30 to 51 percent.
(No regional differences in these differentials is reported due to
the specification of the equation.) Ashenfelter does not include any
analysis of why the union wage differential varies. He approaches
the question as a pure problem of price distortion in allocating
resources which has some distributive overtones:
"...the existence of differential wage rates
for similar workers has important implications
for the allocative efficiency of labor markets.
Artifically expensive labor in some sectors
of the economy relative to others may imply
artifically expensive goods in some sectors
of the economy relative to others and hence
too little production and consumption of
the former relative to the latter. On the
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other hand, it is important to know whether
some classes of workers gain more from
unionized labor markets than others. In
this sense, belonging to a union is a special
privilege and we should wonder whether blacks,
women, and other special groups receive a
proportionate share of the privileges."
The work of Ashenfelter and Oaxaca exemplifies, in the
words of the former, the "broad consensus" that now exists in the pro-
fession as to the wage impact of unions. The consensus has developed,
Ashenfelter notes, due to the "quality of measurement devices and of
the microeconomic data available, (eliminating) some of the ambiguity
of measurement present in the earlier studies." Ironically, one
major and quite provocative challenge to that consensus was made
by Ashenfelter himself in work previous to his analysis of the CPS
data. Before considering issues raised in that challenge, one other
aspect of the single equation approach deserves attention. That
is the role of market structure in the determination of the size of
the union wage differential.
2.3 Union Wage Impact and Market Structure
Parallel to the analysis of the impact of personal
characteristics on union wage differentials has been work including
variables related to the product market structure of unionized firms.
Many observers of union wage policy have concluded that the degree of
competition in the product market must have some impact on the ability
of the union to make wage gains. Early empirical work by Ross and
Goldner, Bowen, Levinson, and Segal seemed to confirm that wages rose
more rapidly in industrial sectors characterized by relatively strong
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union strength (as measured by the proportion of production workers
covered by collective agreements), relatively high "degree of monopoly"
(as measured by concentration ratios) and relatively high profit
rates.6 Critiques of these studies by Rees and by Lewis emphasized
that while these variables (unionization, concentration, high profits)
were often correlated in U.S. manufacturing, they were not so in the
rest of the economy. Thus, once could not always conclude that the
ability of a union to achieve large wage increases is facilitated
by a monopolistic product market. Lewis's empirical analysis, in
fact, showed that while both the extent of unionism and concentration
were significant and positive variables in a wage equation, an inter-
action term combining these two was negative.
Later work has both confirmed and attacked the position
taken by Rees and Lewis. Weiss, in his analysis of static union/non-
union wage differentials, confirmed Lewis's finding on wage impacts:
both extent of unionism and concentration were positively correlated
with annual earnings but an interaction term combining these variables
was negative. 7 In addition, Weiss also included personal characteristics
of workers as variables in the equation and found that, once these
were controlled for, the impact of both extent of unionism and
concentration became insignificant. He then concluded that with so
6 See especially Harold Levinson, "Unionism, Concentration, and Wage
Changes: Towards a Unified Theory," in Determining Forces in
Collective Wage Bargaining (Witey, New York, 1968).
7 Leonard W. Weiss, "Concentration and Labor Earnings," American
Economic Review, March 1966.
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little independent influence of unionization or concentration on
earnings, "The general picture is one of fairly efficiently working
labor markets, even where substantial monopoly may exist."
Despite Weiss' findings, Levinson and Segal persisted in
theoretical rationalization of the possible impact of market structure
on wages. 8 Both stressed that any form of monopoly in the product
market - be it through sectoral concentration of spatial charac-
teristics - should result in higher wage gains to unionization.
Levinson concluded that "the greater degree of concentration in an
industry, the greater will the union's ability to maintain a high
degree of organizational strength and consequently the greater will
be its rate of increase in wages." Both Segal and Levinson stressed,
however, that the key to this hypothesis was the definition of
concentration. They suggested that in industries characterized by
both a high degree of competition among firms and limited entry due
to spatial isolation of markets (e.g. trucking and construction)
union wage gains might be greater than in concentrated manufacturing
industries. This would come about through a strong union facing down
a large number of small companies with either limited financial
reserves to withstand a strike or little ability to maintain a strong
employers association. Consequently, Segal and Levinson re-emphasized
the importance of market structure on union wages, but in such a way
as to complicate empirical measures of impact. Either a high degree
8 Marin Segal, "Union Wage Impact and Market Structure," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, February 1964.
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of concentration or low concentration coupled with barriers to entry
could make substantial union wage gains possible. Thus, Segal finds
that measuring or describing market structure is more complicated
than supposed; and suggests five relevant aspects to structure not
captured in the simplistic concentration ratios used by Weiss and
others.
In sum, recent econometric work has dropped concentration
ratios from union wage equations - largely due to the critique by
Rees and Lewis and the findings by Weiss - and in so doing has ignored
all relations between union impact and market structure. At the least,
Levinson and Segal show that this approach is not justified and that
some continuing attention to market structure is warranted.
2.4 Wages and Endogenous Unions
Ashenfelter and Johnson, in a brief review of the literature
on union wage impacts, note that what all the statistical estimates
have in common is a "basic dependence on the accuracy of a model
which posits that unionism and labor quality are exogenous determinants
of wages, i.e., that there is a unicausal relationship from the level
of labor quality and the extent of unionism to the level of the wage."
Surprisingly, they find this commonplace assumption, one that they
had used and were to use in subsequent research, unjustified. On the
basis of critiques by Reder and Lewis and their own "elementary
theoretical considerations," they go on to develop a model in which
the extent of unionism, labor quality, and wage are jointly determined
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endogenous variables. As such, these variables are themselves func-
tions of other exogenous forces which are not included in single
equation models of the union wage impact.9
In brief, Ashenfelter and Johnson develop a three-equation
simultaneous system where wages, unionism, and labor quality are both
independent and dependent variables:
(1) ln Wi = ao + alEi + a2Ui + O3Ai+ei
(2) Ui = k + Si ln Wi + B2 Zi + ci
(3) Ei = Yo + Ri Y' + ci
Each of these equations has, in turn, been developed from assumptions
and neoclassical theory about the causes of wage determination,
unionization, and labor quality. Without going into great detail
about the assumptions and the theory, the following must serve to
explicate the specification of the equations:
Equation (2) is, in effect, a reduced form of two structural
equations representing the demand and supply for union services.
Their review of two or three obscure articles substantiates the obvious
fact that workers join unions for reasons other than wage increases
(e.g. for non-pecuniary benefits such as grievance procedures and
seniority systems). In addition, they posit, following Dunlop's
"membership function," a direct influence of wages upon extent of
9 Orley Ashenfelter and George Johnson, "Unionism Relative Wages,
and Labor Quality in U.S. Manufacturing," International Economic
Review, October 1972.
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unionism in an industry: "To the typical worker, the benefits of
unionism are derived from.. .the potential relative wage advantage due
to union membership." Thus, the typical worker sees the purchase
of unionism...in part as an investment good and in part as consumption
good." These attributes of unionism, when combined with variables
representing "taste parameters" and costs of membership, give a demand
function for unionism. In parallel, they develop a supply function
for union services whose main argument is the cost of supply of
union services to the industry (i.e., costs of organization). These
demand and supply functions then contribute one variable each to
equation (2). In this equation the extent of unionism is, in theory,
positively related to industry wages W, (the usual income effect on
consumption of a normal good) and negatively related to costs of
providing union services or organizing an industry, Z. (Taste
parameters which also might effect the extent of organization across
industries are "assumed to be invariant" and dropped from further
discussion.) So, equation (2) as written "only suggests that the
extent of union membership will tend to be relatively greater in
industries with realtively high wages and in which cost of organizing
and servicing union members are relatively low."
Equation (3) is the outcome of another laborious effort at
derivation. Ei represents labor quality by industry and, while this
might be taken as exogenous, it is in fact determined by firms as
they simultaneously bargain over wages and set hiring standards.
Firms have to trade-off increase in labor quality brought by
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higher wages with increases in productive efficiency of workers due
to their higher quality. Then, the amount of labor quality in each
industry will be a function of the differing contributions skilled
labor make to productive efficiency. Thus, E is positively related to
R, an index of labor efficiency.
While the specification of any of these three equations
might be analyzed further, the real point at issue is how their
simultaneity may bias the results if any one equation is estimated
alone. In particular, if equation (1) is estimated by OLS, biased
and inconsistent estimators will result. In all likelihood, the OLS
estimates of a2, the effect of unionism on wages will be biased upward
due to its receiving some of the credit for the relationship specified
in equation (2), the impact of wages on unionism. More precisely, if:
plim (a2 - a2 ) = (l-e2) A A iVar(ci)+ Cov (662)Nm (1-a2  ) Coy
states the conditions for an unbiased consistent estimator, then a2
will be inconsistent if Cov(Ei, £2) 0- In addition, the bias will be
positive since ai and Bi are positive (in theory), making (1- al Bl)>O.
Similar analyses of bias can be made for equations (2) and (3) above.
It is sufficient here just to emphasize that the hypothetical simul-
taneity does positively bias estimates of a2- As a consequence,
single equation estimates of the impact of unionism on wages may over-
state the "exogenous" impact of unions.
In empirical testing of this model described, Ashenfelter
and Johnson estimated equations (1) and (2) with two-stage least
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squares to correct for the bias. Surprisingly enough, they then
found that a2, which was highly significant and substantial (.46) in
OLS estimates, became statistically insignificant, though positive.
In three-stage least squares estimation of all three equations, they
find "the regression coefficient of unionism actually negative,
although it clearly would not be judged significantly different from
zero..." As a result, they conclude that they are "uncertain of the
magnitude of the effects of unions on interindustry wage differences..."
Clearly, approaching the analysis of union wage impact from a
perspective which permits the simultaneous determination of wages,
unionism, and labor quality result in much less certainty about the
impact of unions. In a later article, Johnson reviews this contribution
to the debate on the economic analysis of unions and bewails the fact
that it has been largely ignored by other economists.10
2.5 Union Wage Impact - A Critique
Since the early 1950's, the economic literature on the
impact of unions has developed in a particular way. Work in the
fifties and early sixties was a combination of empirical analysis
(e.g. Lewis) and institutional description and analysis (e.g. Reder
and Segal). The combination of these two approaches give the impression
that there was a common intellectual community concerned, in comple-
mentary ways, with the same issues. More importantly, the approaches
10 George Johnson, "Economic Analysis of Trade Unionism," Papers and
Proceedings, American Economic Association, May 1975.
-42-
taken by the empiricists and the institutionalists were open and
amenable to comments and critiques by those of the "opposite" per-
suasion. Since the 1950's, these two approaches to the study of
unions have diverged. The "institutionalist" literature on unions
peaked with books like Levinson's Determining Forces in Collection
Wage Bargaining and Slichter's The Impact of Collective Bargaining on
Management and then disappeared from view. The empirical trend
continued, with greater detail and rigor, but with little real following
or interest in the profession or the general public. As Ashenfelter
commented, since the very existence of unions is no longer of great
public concern, analyses of their static impact have only a small
academic interest.
As a result, by the middle 1970's academic analysis of
union impact had been narrowed down to the single equation approach
described above. The approach and results of that analysis were
described as a "consensus" even by those who had, at other times,
contradicted the usual findings. The implications of the findings
were held to be important only inasmuch as union influences on wages
affected prices, thereby distorting allocation of factor inputs and
commodity output. In sum, most economists were content to see unions
as simply one exogenous variable in a wage equation whose impact on
allocation would occur only through its measured effect on the average
wage paid to labor. This view, while providing a satisfactory
resolution to Lewis' basic question, seriously distorts the role
unions actually play in markets and in politics. Unions do have an
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impact on allocation, but that impact is not confirmed simply to
affecting the price of labor. In the now standard economic analysis
of the union wage impact, there is complete omission of the other
myriad channels unions may use to affect the "terms and conditions of
employment." Before attempting a more complete description of union
impact, it might be well to review in brief the limitations of current
economic analysis.
First, the "consensus" that Ashenfelter celebrates does not
really exist. The work of Lewis, Oaxaca, and Ashenfelter does help
in clarifying the impact of unions on wages. However, the posititve
and sometimes significant impact they attribute is challenged in
Ashenfelter's and Weiss's previous work. Apparently, even elementary
assumptions about "endogenous" unions or the relation between unions
and worker quality can substantially reduce the union wage coefficient
and/or make it statistically insignificant at conventional confidence
levels. Since some labor economists and industrial relations experts
would concur with this "endogenous" view of unions, the issue of the
extent of the union wage impact is by no means settled.
Second, and equally important, all the analysis of unions,
either exogenous or endogenous, adopts the view that Reder describes
as "unionism is unionism." That is, no attempt is made to differentiate
between types of unions or the different sectors of the economy in
which they operate. As a result, one of the more intriguing results
of the exogenous (or single equation) approach is overlooked. Oaxaca
and others show that the impact of unions varies substantially across
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regions, industries and occupations. This result however does not
lead them to ask why this should be the case, never mind to attempt
an explanation of the phenomenon. Indeed, there is even no attention
as to why the extent of organization of workers should vary in different
sectors of the economy. The older, institutionalist literature
which attributed differences in union impact to market structure,
union leadership capabilities, member preferences, government help
or hindrance and general economic conditions is ignored. As a result,
"unionism" in the single equation estimates becomes only, in Samuelson's
phrase, a "suitably named dummy variable."
Third, the focus on wage impact of unionism implicitly reduces
the activities of unions solely to those that can be measured by wage
(and fringe benefits) alone. This focus omits the major role unions
play in effecting other aspects of work life. Again, the institution-
alists have described some of these, but their descriptive work has not
been integrated into quantitative analysis. Even the old institutional
analysis was quite limited, however, usually confining itself only to
descriptions of grievance procedures, seniority systems, etc.
For example, the Slichter, Healy, and Livernash volume
records union influence on twenty-four different aspects of labor-
management relations, in addition to collective bargaining over wages
and benefits.11 The nature of this influence and the issues involved
are described in detail, with a considerable amount of eclectic
11 Sumner H. Slichter, James J. Healy, E. Robert Livernash, The Impact
of Collective Bargaining on Management, (The Brookings Institution,
1960).
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material included as illustration. Little or no attempt is made,
however, o generalize on the basis of the impacts listed. Unions
are described in a largely adversary role to management on most of
the issues studied. The union position ranges from conservative to
"irrational" depending on the specific illustration chosen. No
attempt is made to compare union impacts on specific procedures -
seniority, for example - with personnel practices in nonunion firms.
As a result, the authors implicitly describe how difficult it may be
to manage under collective bargaining constraints without exploring
similar (or equivalent) difficulties in nonunion environments.
A more normative approach to union non-wage impacts is
evidenced in an earlier work by Chamberlain, The Union Challenge to
Management Control. 12 Chamberlain's work reflects the concern (pre-
Lewis) that the most substantial effects of unions were not on wages
but on company operations and production practices. The range of
union influence in these areas was seen to be so great as to transgress
on "management rights." During the 1940's, considerable time and
effort was expended trying to delineate areas of pure management
control from areas subject to union influence. Chamberlain's book
records and analyzes this debate, one that he describes as central to
both the National Industrial Conference after WWI and the National
Labor-Management Conference after WWII. His work reports management
12 Neil Chamberlain, The Union Challenge to Management Control,
(Harper & Brothers, 1948).
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fears of loss of necessary power to run the business due to union
influence on not only wages but on other aspects of operations:
ranging from production scheduling to choice of technology. Chamberlain
describes management as seeing union as a threat to their complete
authority and freedom to discharge their responsibility to the stock-
holders to run the company. Unions threatened management's power,
recognition, and status in interfered with its self-perceived rational,
pragmatic, corporate-oriented decision-making. "The unions' concepts
are predominantly in terms of welfare rather than efficiency," one
manager commented. In contrast, the unions took a paradoxical stance
on "management rights." On the one hand, they refused to acknowledge
that any aspect of corporate decision-making was necessarily removed
from collective bargaining or union influence. On the other hand,
they were at the same time willing to accept management's power and
responsibility for operating a firm. They resolved this apparent
contradiction by being pragmatic. One union leader said: "Our
basic motivation is security. As long as management decisons don't
adversely affect the security of the workers or their union, we're
glad to let the management run the business..." Nonetheless,
Chamberlain documents continual conflict and dissension over what
the proper sphere of influence of both management and labor should
be. He concludes that it is impossible to delineate separate sets
of management rights or union responsibilities and he expects conflict
to continue until both sides can "reach an understanding which permits
them to achieve their goals jointly." The concluding chapters of
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the book describe a "functional integration" theory of management
where both parties work cooperatively for common objectives. 13
This paramount concern with the nonwage influence of unions
apparently declined in the 1950's. The Slichter, Healy, Livernash
book represents the only substantial and widely known work in this
area between 1946 and the present. As a result, the economics litera-
ture became dominated by the concerns of the "Lewis school" which
were almost completely noninstitutional in nature. Only recently
have new trends in research appeared which redress the balance. An
example of this is the research by Kochan on collective bargaining
structures in the public sector.14  Kochan shows that the local
unions he studied had over seventy different bargaining goals. Only
one of these was wages; others ranged from grievances to bulletin
boards. Attempts to weigh the goals, in the belief that wages and
some others must be more important, failed: all were deemed of roughly
equivalent importance in bargaining. So it is clear that unions
continue to value other goals than wages and affect other aspects of
work. In bargaining, they undoubtedly make trade-offs between these
goals. Consequently, a low wage impact of unionism does not neces-
sarily mean a small impact of unionism on workers, employers, or
labor costs.
13 A recent work by a student of Chamberlain's, R. Herding, argues
that unions have been too "integrated" in firm operations to the
point of co-option. See Richard Herding, Job Control and Union
Structure (Rotterdam University Press, 19/2).
14 Thomas N. Kochan and Hoyt Wheeler, "Municipal Collective
Bargaining: A Model and Analysis of Bargaining Outcomes,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, October 1975.
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More significantly, Freeman's recent research, "Non-Wage
Effects of Trade Unions on the Labor Market: An Exit-Voice Analysis,"
challenges much of the economic literature on unions and signals a
new direction for the theory of union behavior.15 Not only does
Freeman concentrate on non-wage impacts of unions, he also rationalizes
the efficiency contributions they may make in labor markets. Unlike
most economists, who describe unions simply as acting to distort
labor markets through raising wages above equilibrium, Freeman shows
that they may plan an important and necessary role as the "collective
voice" of workers in firms. He writes "the major advantages of
unionization are that it provides: a direct channel of communication
between workers and management; an alternative mode of expressing
discontent than quitting, with consequent reductions in turnover
costs and increases in specific training and work conditions; and
social relations of production which can mitigate the problems
associated with authority relations in firms." As a result of these
advantages, unions provide not only monopoly wage gain to workers
but, through reduction of quits due to better communication about
work conditions, gains to employers as well. "The reduction in
quits will reduce labor turnover and training costs and increase
firm-specific investments in human capital and possibly have efficiency
gains." The key breakthrough in Freeman's work does not lie in the
particular approach to nonwage impacts or in their empirical measure-
15 Richard Freeman, "Non-wage Effects of Trade Unions on the Labor
Market," (mimeo, Harvard University, Department of Economics, 1976).
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ment through the impact on the quit rate. Rather, it comes from the
fact that for nearly the first time in recent economic analysis
unions are seen as beneficial to both workers and managers and to
labor markets as a whole. That this view is not totally inconceivable
is born out by at least one of the few surveys on union-management
relations. In the 1950's, Chalmers and Derber studied a sample of
firms in "Illini City" and found that in 31 of the 41 establishments
surveyed, management referred favorably to the union.16 While there
are many ways to interpret this finding, it is one fact which must
temper the adversary relationship emphasized by economists and
institutionalists alike.
Finally, there is very little in the recent economics
literature about either the dynamics of union wage behavior or the
impact of unions on a wage structure, rather than just on an average
wage. The extent of dynamics is limited to the observation that
union wage changes lag periods of tight labor market. Thus, unions
cannot be held accountable, through cost push, for starting periods
of inflationary wage increases. While this observation is now
commonplace, the explanation of union behavior that underlies it has
never been developed. In addition, this approach to union wage
changes is a purely aggregate one. It focuses either on macroeconomic
averages or on sectoral averages. Very little work has been done on
16 W. Ellison Chalmers, Milton Derber, et al., Labor-Management
Relations in Illini City, (University oTITTinois Press, 1953).
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union wage policy at an industry level. This is unfortunate since
occasionally unions have adopted wage policies which were disastrous
to their ability to control the industry. (As a result, the unions
rapidly lost ground to non-union competition - in coal mining in the
1920's, in the rubber industry in the 1960's and in local trucking in
the 1970's.) These policies are hard to explain under the usual
assumptions about unions acting rationally to maximize the wage bill
or the wage level for all employed members. In addition, industrial
relation specialists have recognized that unions often have wage
goals that encompass a range of wages and occupations within a plant.
Industrial unions apparently act to narrow skill differentials,
raising the pay of the lowest labor grade and often holding back
increases for the most skilled. (This policy continually causes
difficulties with skilled craftsmen in the UAW contracts.) With one
notable exception, the work of Sherwin Rosen, this wage structure
impact of unionism has been ignored by economists.17
The proper study of unions and union impact should discuss
all the issues raised above. Economic research should not only describe
the wage imnpact but place it in the context of other goals and effects
of unions. Only in this way can the relative importance of the wage
impact be seen. Further, a study should attempt to explain, on a
microeconomic basis, why the results of unions were of the observed
magnitude. In doing this, it must analyze the role of market structure,
17 Sherwin Rosen, "Unionism and the Occupational Wage Structure in
the U.S.," International Economic Review, June 1970.
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employers' reactions, rank and file preferences and government policy
in the formation and accomplishment of union objectives. The reuslt
of this approach will show that unions affect labor allocation, but
in ways far removed from the mere raising of the hourly wage.
The legacy of Lewis to the economics profession has been
beneficial inasmuch as it has encouraged the rigorous estimation of
union/nonunion wage differences. The same legacy has been harmful to
the degree it, coupled with the now common quantitative preoccupations
of the profession, has encouraged researchers to ignore all non-wage
impacts. The focus on wage differentials alone has warped economists'
analysis of unions to the point that these institutions are seen
simply as mysterious exogenous forces in wage equations that serve
only to distort the price of labor. Most, if not all, "institu-
tionalist" analysis is then derived by deduction from this wage
distortion: union labor market structures serve only to maintain the
wage premium by restricting the supply of labor. This view of "union
as distortions" can be challenged. Ashenfelter and Johnson's work on
endogenous unions provides one basis; Freeman's approach permits a
different attack. Attention to the actual operation and function of
unions in real labor markets can provide yet a third source of chal-
lenge. In the following, the role of craft unions in the construction
industry will serve as a case study of union impact which will illumi-
nate not only unions' function in that industry but also illustrate
the range and nature of union impacts.
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3. UNION WAGE AND OCCUPATION DIFFERENTIALS
The construction industry is an ideal focus for research
which seeks a more complete description of the impact of unions on
labor markets. Craft unions in the industry are often cited, usually
pejoratively, as having a broad effect on all aspects of construction
operations. The building trades also represent unions which are
presumed to have substantial market power: evidenced by high hourly
wages and many "restrictive" work practices. So construction is
manifestly an industry where both the size and range of union impact
is so great as to permit clear delineations of union/nonunion
differences.
Unfortunately, academic economists know very little about
the construction industry. In the past seventy years, there have
been only three major works which attempt a comprehensive treatment
of labor relations in the industry. Two of these, one by Haber1 and
the other by Haber and Levinson 2, are now largely out-dated. The
third, by Mills 3, is much more current. While it contains the most
rigorous analysis available on several important topics in the industry
(wage determination; apprenticeship training; and minority hiring) it
1 William Haber, Industrial Relations in the Building Industry, 2nd
edition, New York: Arno Press, 1911.
2 William Haber and Harold Levinson, Labor Relations and Productivity
in the Building Trades, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956.
3 D. Quinn Mills, Industrial Relations and Manpower in Construction,
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1972.
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uses no direct field research and ignores the open shop sector of the
industry completely. In contrast, a recent study by Northrup and
Foster, entitled Open Shop Construction4, attempts a broad coverage
of labor relations issues in the industry on the basis of field
research. This work is limited, however, by the authors' ignorance
of and lack of attention to union construction practices. Outside of
these studies, there are a few monographs on particular aspects of
construction labor markets. Notable among these, again for being
based on field research, are Marshall, et. al.'s Training and Entry
in Union Construction5 and Foster's Manpower in Homebuilding6.
The result of this relative dearth of academic work on
labor in construction is not only a lack of knowledge about open shop
labor practices but considerable ignorance about union behavior as
well. Although the building trades are usually described as "craft
unions" this appellation really has very little content, except as a
contrast to "industrial" unions. Very few, in fact, of the building
trades are pure craft unions, in the sense of unions being organized
around one particular type of skill or occupation. The plasterers,
laborers, bricklayers and perhaps the ironworkers qualify as "pure"
craft unions; while the carpenters, operating engineers, and plumbers
4 Herbert Northrup and Howard Foster, Open Shop Construction,
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 19/5.
5 Ray Marshall, et. al., Training and Entry into Union Construction,
U.S. Department of Lii-or Manpower Administration Monograph 39, U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1975.
6 Howard Foster, Manpower in Homebuilding: A Preliminary Analysis,
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1974.
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are all amalgamated unions comprising at least two or three fairly
distinct occupations. Even unions like the painters are not purely
craft oriented since, west of the Mississippi, the painters include
the floor layers within their jurisdiction.
Although the definition of what is a craft union is of more
than semantic interest, as will be discussed below, what is of greater
import here is the point that little in fact is known about how craft
unions and union labor markets in construction actually operate.
Clearly, before any union/nonunion comparison can be made, the actual,
rather than the supposed, character of the union sector must be estab-
lished. Although this point may appear - and is - obvious, it has
been ignored by such recent students of the industry as Northrup
and Foster.
To organize a union/nonunion comparision then in construc-
tion, there must be a concentration on empirical research on three
basic issues: wage levels; nonwage, labor market institutions; and
the general "organization of work." It is the presupposition of this
study that craft unions affect, in coordination with or opposition
to the management groups, all three of these areas of construction
industry operations. Craft unions define, through jurisdictions and
skill categories like journeyman and apprentice, an occupational
structure which may necessitate certain wage levels. Craft unions
may also play a major role in hiring, training, onsite labor management,
and technological innovation. Craft unions also may help sustain a
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"craft" organization of work which is different from hierarchical,
bureaucratic or industrial forms of labor management.
In the chapters which follow, the basic issues in each of
these areas will be described. Existing literature will be noted in
the few cases where it is relevant. As a prelude to that discussion,
one brief comment on the construction industry is necessary. Con-
struction is, as Quinn Mills once commented, "a hundred different
industries." To the uninitiated, the complexity of the industry is
neither significant nor comprehensible. Yet, the varieties of product
types, firm sizes and characteristics and regional peculiarities
play a major role in shaping both the labor force and the labor
market institutions in the industry. The chief failing of most
studies or reports on the industry, whether academic or journalistic,
is over-generalization. Examples of gross generalization abound:
ranging from the supposed dominance of the union hiring hall in
referring workers to the supposed reliance on apprenticeship to both
train and limit the labor supply. In fact, both the hiring hall and
apprenticeship programs play vastly different roles for particular
craft unions, even in one geographic area. The ignorance of the
complexity of the industry most often manifests itself in wage com-
parisons. Carpenters' union and nonunion hourly rates, for example,
are often compared without regard to either the occupational and
skill levels which occur within the category "carpenter" or without
attention to the different product markets or types of construction
in which they are involved. The result is a very biased - and very
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naive - view of the impact of unions on wages and, in general, on the
industry itself.
Union/Nonunion Wage Differentials in Construction
Estimating a wage differential between workers which is
solely the result of union influence is a notoriously difficult pro-
cedure. Academic studies from Lewis in the 1950's to Oaxaca in 1975
have struggled with the problem of isolating union effects on wages
while controlling for industry, firm, and worker characteristics.
Most research on this topic may, in fact, present a biased estimate of
the impact of unions on wages by not controlling for product market
characteristics, plant size, workers' skills and experience, etc. In
the construction industry, these problems of unbiased estimation are
doubly difficult. This is partly due to the industry's incorporation
of a wide variety of productive activities, ranging from residential
rehabilitation to nuclear power plant construction. It is also due
to the great variance in workers' characteristics, particularly in
terms of mechanical skills, experience, and supervisory capability.
This variance is disguised by the fact that workers with vastly
different capabilities working in quite separate product markets may
all have the same occupational title: carpenter or pipefitter.
The research to date on the union/nonunion wage differential
in construction has not dealt adequately with the special nature of
the industry. Data which purport to show sizable union wage premiums
are, in fact, based on very poorly designed and poorly tabulated surveys
or questionnaires. The poor design results either from an inattention
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to the different skill classifications in union and nonunion construc-
tion or from a failure to control for the many other influences on
relative union and nonunion wages mentioned above. The surveys,
recently published by BLS and by Northrup and Foster, do find both a
large dispersion in nonunion rates of pay for a given construction
craft and a substantial differential between the union scale and the
nonunion mean wage for that craft. 7 Yet, due to the poor design
and data tabulation of the surveys, both wage dispersion and the
differential can be explained by any or all of the following factors.
1. geographic differentials in basic rates
2. type of construction (commercial, residential, etc.)
3. size of construction firm
4. influence of prevailing wage laws
5. individual levels of skill or experience
6. individual levels of supervisory resonsibility
For an unbiased estimate of union/nonunion wage differential,
only the fifth and sixth factors listed above are of major interest.
To provide data for such an estimate, a questionnaire must first define
homogeneous skill categories in both union and nonunion construction
and then compare wages for these categories within similar product
market. Then, using such a questionnaire, the survey must be designed
to control for the influences of the other factors mentioned.
7 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Industrial Wage Survey: Contract
Construction, Bulletin 1911, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1976.
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HUD-NAHB Nonunion Wage Survey
The survey instrument was designed to provide data on
union and nonunion wages and benefits, while controlling for other
influences on wages. (The survey was designed by the author and
administered through the National Association of Homebuilders under
a research grant from HUD.) To do this, the survey was:
1. restricted in geographic coverage to wages paid by
contractors in a specific metropolitan area and
within a given radius of so many miles of the center
of that area;
2. the type of construction in which the contractor
specializes was clearly defined;
3. the size of the contractor - either in terms of
employment or work volume - is given;
4. various levels of skill are defined for each trade
in a way compatible to nonunion construction;
5. the supervisory activity of some journeymen is noted
and controlled for.
The survey instrument was designed to be mailed to a random
sample of contractors, nonunion and union, including general contrac-
tors, subcontractors, and home builders, in a specified SMSA. (A
separate survey was designed to guide in-depth interviews with roughly
30 contractors in each area. This survey provided ancillary data on
hiring, training, manning, and wage policies in the union and nonunion
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sector and is described in Chapter 4.) Due to its design, the mail
survey permits analysis of the causes of wage variation within the
nonunion sector, as well as between it and unionized construction.
For example:
- occupational differentials in the nonunion sector
can be compared to union differentials;
- variations in wages within the nonunion sector can
be tabulated by contractor size and/or product
market differences;
- in addition, distribution of nonunion activity over
particular product markets contractor types can be
analyzed for each metropolitan area surveyed.
Ideally, a wage survey in construction should be of
individuals, in order to relate their personal characteristics (human
capital proxies for productivity) to their wage rates (or total hourly
compensation). Unfortunately due to the difficulty of identifying a
universe of individuals working in construction, generating a random
sample of workers (never mind obtaining an adequate level of survey
responses) was beyond the scope and resources of the project.
Occupational Classifications
In construction, the most intractable part of a union/nonunion
wage comparison is creating similar occupational categories in each
sector of the industry. The questionnaire to be used in the survey
leaves the occupational categories open, in order that they be named
by each contractor. In many cases, the contractor response was to list
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occupations by craft; using nomenclature common to both the union and
nonunion sectors: carpenter; pipefitter; electrician; etc. In other
cases, contractors named occupations unique to nonunion construction:
nailer; concrete mechanic; craftsman; etc. Even if similar trade
classifications are used, the questionnaire asks that contractors rank
workers by skill level within a trade, differentiating between foremen,
journeymen, helpers and apprentices. This skill breakdown should per-
mit a more accurate comparison between the wages of union and nonunion
journeymen. For example, in the union building trades, there are few
if any helper categories. However, nonunion contractors often employ
men called "helpers" who are either unregistered apprentices of men
with skill levels between a laborer and a journeyman. Past wage
surveys have not recognized this category and may have led nonunion
contractors to report wages for helpers along with journeyman wage
in the nonunion sector and to increase the reported union/nonunion
differential.
Even if wages for apparently similar skill levels and
occupational types are contrasted in union and nonunion firms, there
is still a problem of comparability. Using union trade classifica-
tions in order to group labor of comparable skills and occupations
does imply that journeyman carpenters, for example, are the same in
both union and nonunion work. In other words, if we want to compare
the union/nonunion wage differential for carpenters we need a homo-
geneous occupational and skill classification "carpenter" common to
both sectors of the industry. Unfortunately, no such homogeneous
category may exist in fact. Union carpenters may range in skills
-61-
from a master journeyman with a wide range of experience and duties
to a simple "journeyman" with only one skill and one job: hanging
sheet-rock or building forms for concrete. Despite the range of jobs
undertaken by carpenters in the union sector, the myth (or ideal) of
a well-trained journeyman persists and all are paid the same rate. In
effect, the union sector defines an hourly wage for an occupation and
then assumes that all labor paid that wage is homogeneous. Apprentice-
ship programs and jurisdictional definitions work to maintain the
role of formal occupational definitions when, in fact, the actual
skills and duties of a journeyman may vary considerably.
In the nonunion sectors there are no formal jurisdictional
boundaries. Nonetheless, for a variety of reasons there are some
occupations with job clusters or tasks roughly comparable to the
union sector. One major force for similarity is, of course, the fact
that construction technology is nearly identical in both union and
nonunion building. Technology should not be seen as completely
determining the job structure, however, since another major force for
occupational similarity between the two sectors lies in government
regulations. Government procedures for apprentice training, for the
licensing of some trades (electricians, plumbers), and for reporting
payment of prevailing wages all impose a union defined occupational
structure on the industry. Due to this government influence, most
nonunion contractors define their labor force in union terminology
even when their "carpenters" or "laborers" do work that in the union
sector would be assigned in part to these trades and in part to several
others.
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Thus, in the nonunion sector, there are occupations
denominated by union trade names but encompassing a range of skills
and a range of tasks not always found in these occupations in union
construction. As a result, comparing nonunion journeymen "carpenters"
to union journeyman "carpenters" will at times be comparing apples
and oranges. This makes it difficult to impossible to attribute any
wage differential solely to union influences: the differential may
well be a function of random differences in skills and tasks. The
problem is made more difficult by the fact that union/nonunion occu-
pational comparability varies by trade (electricians, owing to state
licensing requirements, are more comparable skill-occupational
categories than carpenters), by type of construction, and even by
construction firms.
Without data on the skills and tasks of individual journey-
men, no completely unbiased estimate of a union wage differential
can be made. The wage survey approximates this type of analysis by
carefully controlling for wages paid particular occupations by type
of contractor and by product market. Survey wage data will be reported
below, for example, for nonunion carpenters working for particular
types of subcontractors in residential construction. These nonunion
carpenters' wages can then be compared to other nonunion carpenters
in heavy and highway work, general building, etc. Then weighted means
of one or 11 of these nonunion wage distributions will be chosen for
comparison to the relevant union scale wage - which may itself vary
by product market.
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In addition, another part of this study will attempt to use
existing micro data sets on worker profiles (from the Parnes Logitudinal
Work History Survey tapes) to relate wages and earnings in union and
nonunion construction to individual worker characteristics. A hedonic
wage equation will be defined which will include, along with age,
race, and education of worker, a union/nonunion dummy variable. The
results from this analysis will supplement the findings from the
wage survey.
BLS and Northrup/Foster Wage Studies
The only recent research on union/nonunion differences in
the construction industry have been undertaken by the BLS, on wages
and benefits alone, and by Northrup and Foster, on the labor management
practices of open shop construction.
Since 1972 the BLS has supplemented its annual wage surveys
of union construction with a special survey designed to capture
nonunion activity as well. Sample surveys have been undertaken in
1972, 1973, and 1976 in seventeen metropolitan areas; at present,
published results are only available for the first two yars. The
methodology and sophistication of the surveys have improved since the
initial efforts. For example, the largely nonunion skill classification
of "helper" was included in the 1973 survey but not the previous one;
and in the data analysis in 1973 greater attention has been paid to
union/nonunion differences by product market and firm size. For many
geographic areas, however, the nonunion coverage is quite limited.
This is due, in part, to the choice of cities: the BLS included in
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its choice of areas eight cities which are almost entirely union.
Outside of five southern metropolitan areas, only Boston, Nassau-
Suffolk, and Denver show any evidence of open shop activity. The
limited coverage is also due to the sample design: only firms with
eight or more employees were included in the sample. To the extent
that nonunion firms are smaller than this, they will be under-represented.
In the metropolitan areas where there is both union and
nonunion activity, compensation differentials (including both wages
and benefits) were found to be substantial. Union carpenters typically
earned between 35 and 55 percent more per hour than nonunion carpenters;
for laborers, the union/nonunion differential was larger - ranging
from 26 to 81 percent. Comparisons for cement masons, plumbers, and
electricians showed similar margins in favor of union rates - typically
40 to 60 percent above nonunion rates for cement masons and plumbers,
and 45 to 60 percent for electricians. At least part of these
substantial differentials is due to the lower benefits, as well as
hourly wages, in the open shop sector. The BLS did not attempt to
measure nonunion benefits in cents per hour terms, but a reporting of
their incidence found that a majority of firms in all cities did not
provide paid holidays; vacations; or health, insurance, and retirement
plans.
One of the more interesting tabulations in the 1973 BLS
study is the reporting of percent union workers by product market and
firm size. Areas which are (by reputation) predominantly union tend
to be highly unionized in all three "branches" of the industry:
general contrctors in commercial building; heavy and highway general
-65-
contractors; and special trades contractors. Conversely, the South
shows levels of unionization in these types of firms. Yet, even in
some strong union areas, many smaller firms are nonunion. For example,
in Boston, Newark, and Philadelphia where 95 percent or more of the
large contractors are union, only 60 to 79 percent of the smaller
firms are union. For Baltimore, the differences in unionization by
size of firm are even more striking. Unfortunately, the BLS does not
follow up on this apparent coincidence between industrial organization
and unionization.
Foster and Northrup's work, Open Shop Construction, is
based on an analysis of survey sources, secondary material, and field
research. While some parts of the book provide valuable insights
into construction operations, much of the book is so biased against
unions as to be suspect. (For example, the authors assert that
"...the open shop sector is both more hospitable as a whole to minority
employment and, being without craft restrictions and union rigidities,
more capable of dealing with the problem" although their own data do
not confirm this. More recent data from the Bureau of Apprenticeship
and Training has shown much higher percentages of minorities in
certified union programs.)
The least satisfactory part of Foster and Northrup's work
is their wage data. Although they note in other parts of their book
the lack of occupational comparability, they use similar survey
formats for both open shop and union firms. Further, they fail to
specify geographic area or product market. (In addition, neither
Foster and Northrup or the BLS report standard errors for their sample
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statistics.) Nonetheless, their reported union/nonunion wage
differentials fall in the same range as those reported by the BLS:
35 to 62 percent higher for union carpenters and 50 to 70 percent
greater for union laborers. They also report coefficients of
variation for their sample since nonunion firms usually pay different
hourly wages for men in the same occupation. These coefficients are
often substantial, ranging from .10 to .42 across trades.
In summarizing their wage findings, Foster and Northrup
note bleatedly the possibilities of bias:
"To some extent, the (union/nonunion) wage
ranges depicted in the table may be misleading.
Wages paid by nonunion contractors will differ
not only according to worker competence, but
also as a function of training and experience.
Low paid "carpenters" may, in fact, be helpers
or trainees whose wages will rise steadily as
they gain practice at their trade...Unfortunately,
in the absence of uniformly accepted occupational
definitions, it is impossible to state with
precision how much of a rate range stems from
differences in competence and how much from
differences in extent of training or experience." 8
3.1 Wage Equations: Craft Union Impact
The data on individual workers collected and tabulated in
the longitudinal work history files provides one means of testing
hypotheses about union impacts on wages. The Parnes data makes
available the individual worker characteristics thought by economists
from Lewis to Ashenfelter to be important in controlling for, and
8 H. Northrup and H. Foster, op. cit., p. 204.
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thus isolating, the pure union wage effect.9 In addition, the Parnes
data can be used to focus on the impact of unionism among craft
workers, since this is the occupation which, in cross-section studies,
manifests the highest union wage differential: up to 40% in some
estimates. The disadvantage of the Parnes data for this purpose is
the small sample of craft workers. The sample is particularly small
if comparisions are to be made between the craft union impact in
construction and the impact in other industries. Nonetheless, there
is no reason to believe the sample is nonrandom or unrepresentative.
Thus the data can be used, at least on an experimental basis, to test
hypotheses about the nature of craft union wage impacts and how those
may differ between construction and other industries. In addition,
the availability of Parnes data for two years, 1969 and 1971, also
permits a test of whether the union impact changes at all even over a
short time-span.
The equation to be estimated consists of the now standard
form of the union-nonunion wage equation, compiled with some different
estimating procedures. The "standard" form, described by Oaxaca and
other, posits that the observed market wage for individuals is some
function of the competitive wage, Wic, and proportional impact of
unionism, aun, if the individual's wages are determined by collective
bargaining. Equation (1) represents this multiplicative relationship
in natural log form:
9 Herbert Parnes, et. al., The National Longitudinal Survey of
Older Men, Ann A~orT University of Michigan Press, 1971.
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(1) ln(Wi) = ln(Wic) + iN( Bun+ 1) U.
Since the competitive wage, Wic, is unobserved it must be
replaced in the estimation by proxies. These proxies are observed
individual "human capital" characteristics, given in a vector form
BiX ,and an unobserved noncompetitive impact of unionism, 3nc, which
represents "threat" or "spillover" effects. Thus, equation (2)
represents the estimating form of equation (1):
(2) ln(Wi) = Zj SiXij + In ( anc+1 ) + in( @nc+1)U + Ej
In the estimation, the noncompetitive impacts become subsumed
in the constant term and the union impact is entered as a dummy
variable. After estimation, the coefficient on the union dummy
variable can be translated into the proportional impact of unionism.
Of course, as noted above in Chapter 2, there are a variety
of implicit and explicit assumptions about the nature of union wage
impacts behind this kind of estimation. One important problem is the
nature of the "spillover" or "threat" effects. If these effects are
large, due to union power or aggressiveness, substantially raising
the wage in the unorganized sector, the observed union wage impact
might be very small. An econometrician, without any independent
estimation of the competitive wage, might conclude that the union
wage impact was small when, in fact, the opposite would be true.
Equally important is the assumption of the constant proportional
form of the union wage effect. This view allows for a neat point
estimate of the union wage impact as a percentage of the nonunion
wage but it does not necessarily represent the actual form in which
union impacts might occur. Unions could quite reasonably, bargain
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for absolute differentials over a nonunion situation or bargain with
differing goals for different workers.
In addition, both Oaxaca and Ashenfelter estimate this type
of equation on the basis of dummy variables for industry and occupation
of workers. 10 In other words, they admit that the constant proportional
impact of unions may differ between industries and occupations. (Why
it may not also differ within these groups, given the high variance
in intra-occupational earnings, is overlooked.) To correct for the
inter-occupational/industrial impacts, they use multiplicative dummy
variables for different industries and occupations, combined with
common human capital characteristics (age, education, experience,
etc.) Technically, however, this heavy reliance on dummy variables
is correct only if the error term of the equation is not correlated
with any of the dummy variables. If there is any reason to suspect
that the specification of the human capital proxies should change as
industry and occupation change, then this estimation is biased.
To correct some of the problems inherent in the Oaxaca/
Ashenfelter estimation approach, wage equations were developed to
include both a unionization variable and personal characteristics
related to "human capital." These equations were then estimated on
data for craftsman, foreman, and kindred workers and for laborers
stratified by industry (using construction and other industries) and
10 Ronald Oaxaca, "Estimation of Union/Nonunion Wage Differentials
Within Occupational Regional Subgroups," Journal of Human Resources,
Fall 1975, pp. 529-536.
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by region (the four basic census regions). This approach allows for
different specification of the equation for different occupation/industry
strata, avoiding the assumption of a uncorrelated error term when
dummy variables are used. While this change may improve the reliability
of some of the estimates, it should be emphasized that a main drawback
of the Parnes data for evaluation of the union wage impact in
construction is the lack of any detailed industry classification.
In other words, if, as has been argued above, there are major wage
differences between residential, commercial, and heavy and highway
work which become confused with union/nonunion differentials, these
differentials will remain uncontrolled in the Parnes estimations.
While this is a major failing of the data, its uniqueness as a source
of information on workers characteristics makes the estimation results
informative, if not definitive.
Before reporting the estimation results, it is of some
interest just to note the differences in the union and nonunion wage
rates before controlling for personal characteristics. Table 3.1.1
presents the mean and standard deviation for hourly wages by region
for the two occupations studied, craftsmen and laborers, in two
industries, construction and "other". It is obvious from the table
that the uncontrolled union impact is substantially greater in
construction, ranging from 20 to over 100 percent, than it is in
other industries. In the other industries, the union wage differential
for craftsmen, excepting the extreme low and high values in the East
North Central and East South Central, falls quite consistently between
20 and 29 percent. The dispersion of wage is also consistently
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smaller among unionized craftsmen in other industries, a finding that
is consistent with other results. In construction, the dispersion
follows a similar pattern: being smaller in the union section of the
industry in the northeast and south, and larger in the union sector in
the west.
Among laborers, the range of gross union wage impact is
even more marked. In both industry groups, it ranges from nearly 40
percent to over 100 percent. In construction, the differential is
equivalent to the union increment for craftsman while in other
industries the differential substantially exceeds the craftsmen's.
Finally, one interesting result from the comparision of
hourly wages across industries is the sectional differences between
union and nonunion rates. Over the nine regions, a comparison of
nonunion rates for craftsmen in construction with the nonunion rates
for craftsmen in other industries shows that the former are not
consistently greater or less than the latter. In fact, with two
exceptions, the nonunion rates for craftsmen across industries are
roughly comparable. In construction, however, the union rate for
craftsmen consistently exceeds the union rate for craftsmen in other
industries in all nine regions. And it exceeds it by a substantial
amount--not as much, of course, as the percent difference over the
nonunion craftsmen rate in construction, but still by twenty to thirty
percent. This anomaly of rough equivalence between the nonunion
craftsman rates across sectors (perhaps attributable to competitive
forces) and the large differences between union rates is just another
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example of the unexplained ways union wage impacts differ by product
sector.
Estimation Results
The union/nonunion wage equations were estimated in various
forms and specifications at both the national and regional level for
the years 1969 and 1971. For construction, the results for craftsman
etc. were generally consistent: a point estimate of coefficient in
the union dummy variable of .43 to .57. This implies a union wage dif-
ferential of 55 to 77 percent; a differential higher than any previous
econometric estimates, but one consistent with gross wage comparisons
such as those above. For other industries, the differential was much
smaller, ranging from 9 to 30 percent, but the estimates tended to be
more inconsistent between different specifications of the equation.
At the national level, construction union wage differentials
were estimated at 67 percent in 1969 and 68 percent in 1971, using
the log form of the equation -- a form that usually fits better in
both national and regional estimates. Although the union coefficient
is strongly significant, the standard errors of the estimate are
large enough to give confidence intervals, at the 95% level, of
roughly 25% above and below the point estimate of 67 percent. This,
then, presents a picture of a wage impact which may be, in fact,
anywhere from 42 percent to 92 percent. As important as the union
coefficient itself, is the role the other variables play in the whole
equation. For the construction industry, there were no variables
related to the "human capital" determinants of wages which were
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statistically significant. Neither education, occupational training,
job tenure, years of experience in the industry, or even marital
status were consistently significant in national or regional equations.
This implies that whatever the "human capital" component of wages rep-
resents in construction, it is not easily captured by the standard
proxies for on-the-job skills and productivity. (This finding, of
course, confirms the doubts about using similarly specified wage
equations across industries, as Oaxaca and Ashenfelter do.) The
other variables in the construction equation do have the expected
signs and impact and are significant. Race is strongly negative as
is size of area and part-time work.
In other industries, at the national level, the union wage
impact has a point estimate of 13 percent in 1969 and 12 percent in
1971. Unlike the construction industry, many other variables are
significant in the wage equation. Education, occupational training,
and experience are all significant and positive, though the size of
the impact varies considerably. (These categories are not, by the
way, highly collinear.) In addition, race, area size, and part-time
work are significant with the expected signs. Interestingly enough,
the size of the negative coefficient on the race variable in other
industries is about half its size in construction.
Regionally, for craftmen in both industries, the results
are not very much different from the national estimates. There is,
however, more variation in results. In some cases, the equations fit
better regionally (or fit better in the linear form); in other cases,
they do not fit at all. In general, the fit for both the linear and
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log form for construction gives roughly the same R2, while one or
the other fits better for other industries in different regions.
Regional Comparisons
There are a plethora of regional wage equations: the log
and linear forms for two industries in four regions for two years,
1969 and 1971. Since all of these equations are based on a very small
sample of workers in each region, the results, though statistically
significant in most cases, may not be very robust. What is important
here is not a detailed comparison of results by region, but developing
some sense of gross regional differences. In general, the most
important results are:
1. Although the log form fits best for both industries in
most regions, the linear form of the equation has comparable, though
slightly smaller R2 's, in most regions and a higher R2 in the south
for construction.
2. Union wage impacts in other industries are insignificant
in the Northeast, though they are strongly significant in the South.
To the contrary, union wage impacts in construction are insignificant
in the South (in the log form) but significant in the Northeast.
3. In the West, the wage equation which fits very well for
other industries in all three other regions becomes completely insig-
nificant. The construction equation, however, remains significant,
with a comparable R2, and shows a positive and substantial union
impact--one equivalent to the union impact in other regions.
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4. The other variables in the equations have a significance
and size comparable to the national findings. In construction, the
human capital variables continue to be insignificant and even turn
negative in some regions. In other industries, education, training,
experience, and marital status all continue to be significant and
positive.
A summary of the union wage impacts for both industries by
region is presented in Tables 3.1.6 and 3.1.8. The results confirm
previous findings that union wage impacts do vary by region, even con-
trolling for occupation and industry. More importantly, these results
indicate that different specifications of the wage equation may be
important in capturing precisely how union wage impacts do differ.
The insignificance of the union coefficient in construction in the
south (in the log form) and the failure of the standard wage equation
to fit in the West for other industries point towards substantial
unexplained differences in the form and nature of union influence in
different geographic areas. Statistical procedures which use all
dummy variables to capture these differences, in fact, only gloss
over them. In effect, that estimation approach imposes a form of
union wage impact on occupations and regions where it may not be very
appropri ate.
Laborers
Unskilled occupations often exhibit very high union wage
differentials. Oaxaca finds unionized laborers being paid a substan-
tial percent more due to their union status; Ashenfelter's findings
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established a large differential. It is not clear why unionization
should have such a substantial impact among low-skilled workers.
Other workers of comparable status, such as low skilled factory
operatives in textiles, manifest a much smaller union wage differ-
ential. In theory, the high elasticity of supply of low skilled
labor should mitigate whatever independent monopoly power unions may
create. The fact that this apparently does not happen may be due to
the influence of relative wages or the wage structure in a particular
industry. In manufacturing, industrial unions bargain for all workers
and wage increases are likely to increase the wages of those at the
bottom of the job ladder as well as those at the top. In construction,
the laborers' union has maintained relative parity in the wage struc-
ture over at least the last fifteen years. In the early 1960's, the
laborers earned, on average, 50 percent of the top wage and they
maintained the same differential into the mid-1970's. As a result,
by following the wage pattern for all construction wages in an area,
laborers were earning nearly $9/hour in Boston and nearly $10/hour
in Buffalo.
The wage equations for laborers in both construction and
other industries are found in Table 3.1.5. (They were estimated only
at the national level due to very small samples in each region.) In
both 1969 and 1971, the union wage differential in both industries
was, as expected, quite substantial. In construction, it was roughly
72% in 1969 and 97% in 1971. In other industries, the union wage
impact was 2 to 4 times greater than for craftsmen in those industries.
-77-
In 1969 it was 44% and in 1971, 41 percent. The impact of the other
variables in the wage equation for construction was similar to that
for craftsmen: all of the human capital variables were insignificant.
For other industries, this was also true, in contrast to the signifi-
cance of education and occupational training for craftsmen, with the
exception of experience which also proved positive and significant,
though very small, in the laborers equation. Despite the lack of
significance of many of these variables, the R2 for the national
equations was very high. This suggests that the union variable may
play a uniquely significant role in wage determination in this sector,
or that it is correlated with other wage determining influences which
are not specified in the equation.
In any event, unionism is significant in wage determination
for laborers, but again, the particular role that variable plays in
combination with other independent influences on wages is somewhat
unique both to laborers as an occupation and to each type of work:
construction and other industries. Some variables which capture these
other influences for one occupation like craftsmen are insignificant
when used with laborers.
Annual Income
One of the most frequent assertions encountered in the open
shop sectors of the construction industry is the statement that, al-
though open shop hourly wages may be lower than the union scale, annual
incomes are comparable due to greater year-round employment. Open
shop contractors feel that their workers have a stronger attachment
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to a firm than the union journeyman and as a result get virtually
full-time employment all year. Union craftsmen are supposed to suffer
from long periods of seasonal inactivity which substantially reduces
their annual income. Only one study, however, has ever clearly
delineated the impact of seasonability on annual incomes of union
members. It found that a substantial number of journeymen worked
1800 to 2000 hours per year. Other investigations have confirmed
there there is a significant number of journeymen in the union sector
who remain permanently attached to a firm and to whom the firm is
informally committed to providing full-time work.
Since the Parnes data report annual income by occupation for
both union and nonunion members, the relationship between union status
and income can be tested. The gross comparisons for construction and
other industries are presented in Table 3.1.3. To say the least, the
data does not support the open shop assertion. Union journeymen's
annual income in the three regions noted is 100 to 200 percent greater
than craftsman in the nonunion sector. On the other hand, the annual
incomes of union and nonunion workers in other industries are much more
comparable. It should also be noted that the annual income of union
construction journeyman is only slightly higher than that of union
craftsman in other industries. Apparently, the high hourly wage in
construction, and the resulting wage differential between union con-
struction and other unionized craftsman (noted in Table 3.1.1 above)
does not result in substantially greater mean incomes. Presumably,
this is due to the differences in mean hours worked annually by crafts-
men in the two sectors. The high union wage serves to offset, on the
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average, the effect of seasonal unemployment in the construction
industry. So even though union construction workers have hourly
wages which are 30 to 60 percent higher than union craftsmen in other
industries, their mean annual income differences are much smaller:
varying from 11 to 18 percent in the three regions in Table 3.1.3.
Summary: Union Wage Equations
The results reported above replicate in some ways previous
research on union wage impact. The findings confirm the existence and
size of a union impact on wages for craftsmen. However, the close
attention paid to different specifications of the wage equation
reveals, first, that the size of the union wage differential is
substantially different for craftsmen in construction and in other
industries; and, second, that the nature of the differential and the
role of the other independent variables differ considerably between
industries. This second finding casts some doubt on the provision of
estimates of a constant, proportional impact of unions on wages for
all craftsmen.
Nonetheless, it is apparent that in construction the gross
wage comparisons and the estimational wage equations substantiate the
existence of a large increment in wages due to unionization. The
estimated size of this, over fifty percent in many cases, puts it
completely outside the observed range of union impacts in other
industries. What accounts for this substantial and unique ability to
raise wages? There are several explanations which remain to be tested.
These are:
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1. That the union differential is largely the result of
"union monopoly power" and that construction unions, by limiting
entry, can easily raise wages in labor markets with inelastic labor
demand. This explanation, while common to most economic analysis,
begs the question: what is the source of the great monopoly power
and what has prevented open shop competition from eroding it? In
addition, the explanation is inconsistent with the observed flexi-
bility of unions in the industry in admitting and training workers.
Craft unions in construction may attempt to control the labor supply
in construction; they do not necessarily limit it.
2. That the union differential is largely the result of
differences in worker skill or other personal characteristics between
the "union" sector of the industry and "nonunion" work. Obviously,
these characteristics would have to be different from those controlled
for in the estimations above and found to be insignificant. One way
to attempt a different form of control between worker characteristics
is to compare wages of union and nonunion workers in particular
product markets of construction. In other words, construction skills
are so peculiar or elusive that they are not reflected even in the
usual observed worker characteristics found significant in other
industries. In the absence of other data sources on the skill
characteristics of construction workers, it may be possible to use
product markets as a proxy for skill differences. Construction is
really many different industries and journeymen in residential
construction or rehabilitation may have characteristics and skills
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different from those who build highrise office buildings or highways.
For this reason, an interview survey of union and nonunion wages
by major product market and size and type of firm was designed. The
results are reported in Chapter 4.
Table 3.1.1
HOURLY WAGE AND STANDARD DEVIATION FOR CRAFTSMEN, FOREMEN AND
KINDRED WORKERS IN CONSTRUCTION AND OTHER INDUSTRIES, 1969
CONSTRUCTION
Union Nonunion
Region Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Construction
Union Differ.
Other Industry
Union Differ.
OTHER INDUSTRIES
uni on Nonunion
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Northeast
Midatlantic
E. North Central
W. North Central
South Atlantic
E. South Central
W. South Central
Mountain
Pacific
5.31
6.15
6.12
5.38
4.03
5.14
5.35
4.96
6.10
.33
.06
.14
.17
.84
.61
.69
.80
.81
4.19
3.59
4.09
1.88
2.85
1.90
2.90
4.15
3.76
1.78
.67
1.35
.18
1.43
1.25
.31
1.63
.42
27%
71%
50%
>100%
41%
>100%
85%
20%
62%
28%
8%
26%
25%
75%
21%
20%
3.28 .54 3.53
3.93 .90 3.06
4.11 .87 3.81
4.07 .99 3.22
3.65 1.04 2.92
3.69 .31 2.11
3.70 1.02 3.07
---- ---- 3.46
4.69 1.05 3.92
Source: Parnes, op. cit.
.73
.45
.23
.34
.18
.71
.75
.55
.97
Table 3.1.2
HOURLY WAGE FOR LABORERS IN CONSTRUCTION AND OTHER
INDUSTRIES, 1969, SELECTED REGIONS
Construction
Union Nonunion
Mean MeanRegion
Construction
Union
Differential
Other Industries
Union Nonunion
Mean Mean
Union
Differential
Midatl antic
East Central
South Atlantic
W. South Central
Source: Parnes, op. cit.
4.11
5.22
2.79
4.07
3.11
3.48
2.01
1.77
32%
50%
39%
>100%
3.23
3.49
2.93
3.53
2.16
3.42
1.63
1.74
49%
44%
80%
>100%
Table 3.1.3
MEAN ANNUAL EARNINGS OF CRAFTSMEN, FOREMEN, AND KINDRED
WORKERS IN CONSTRUCTION AND OTHER INDUSTRIES
By Union and Nonunion Status (1971)
And Weeks Unemployed (1969)
Region
Midatlantic
E. North Central
South Atlantic
Construction
Union Nonunion
$10,397 $3,353
11,814 4,136
11,196 5,055
ANNUAL EARNINGS
Other Industries
Union Nonunion
$ 9,340 $9,967
10,735
9,502
7,850
8,950
WEEKS UNEMPLOYED
Construction
Union Nonunion
4.9
4.8
3.8
Other Industries
Union Nonunion
2.3
.7
2.1
Source: Parnes, op. cit.
Table 3.1.4
WAGE EQUATIONS FOR CRAFTSMEN, FOREMEN, AND KINDRED WORKERS IN
CONSTRUCTION AND OTHER INDUSTRIES,
(National Sample)
1969 AND 1971.
Coverage Constant Race
Area Hours Collective Occupational
Size Worked Bargaining Education Training
All .9317 -.2564 -.0266 -.9493 .2414 .0192
(.0480) (.0069) (.0518) (.0367) (.0066)
C 1.4450 -.5976 -.0549 -.3897 .5132 .0151
(.1462) (.0205) (.1802) (.1190) (.0218)
C 1.4016 -.6247 -.0521 -.3103 .5728 .0129
(.1302) (.0182) (.1599) (.1058) (.0193)
0 .5474 -.2737 -.0288 -.0555 .1239 .0292
(.0446) (.0059) (.1011) (.0311) (.0056)
C 4.3940 -1.75 -.132 -.227 2.08 -----
(.224) (.033) (.285) (.187) -----
Dependent
Variable
L W 69
R = .39
LW: 69
R = .27
L W 69
R = .32
L W 69
R = .31
H W 69
R = .59
H W=69
R =.22
.0067
(.0038)
.0020
(.0009)
.001
(.007)
Mari tal
Experience Status
.0018 .1562
(.0016) (.1199)
.0048 -.1754
(.0054) (.5144)
.00612 .4170
(.0013) (.1054)
.339 .117
(.107) (.019)
All .9392 -. 2506 .0221 .1827 .2136 .0195
(.0383) (.0051) (.0603) (.0278) (.0049)
.0020
(.0009)
C 1.3416 -. 2701 -. 0266 .0660 .5165 .0203 .0016(.0601) (.0085) (.0640) (.0503) (.0085) (.0019)
C 4.0580 -1.1855 -. 1292 .0746 2.575 .0923 .0049
(.2930) (.0417) (.3123) (.0353) (.0416) (.0092)
0 .9396 -.2387 -.0262 .0590 .1130 .0254 .0022
(.0404) (.0052) (.0845) (.0284) (.0051) (.0009)
0 2.2175 -.799 -.094 .594 .349
(.173) (.023) (.362) (.122)
.110
(.022)
.010
(.004)
.0017 .3058
(.0012) (.1156)
4.058
.0042 .2167
(.0013) (.1065)
.0165
(.006)
.968
(.457)
See notes to Table 3.1.5 and Table 3.1.7
0 3.0480 -.882 -.098 .756
(.153) (.020) (.351)
L W=71
R = .64
HPW 718
R =.65
L W=71
R = .18
HRW 71
R2 = .23
Table 3.1.5
WAGE EQUATIONS FOR LABORERS IN CONSTRUCTION AND OTHER
INDUSTRIES, 1971 NATIONAL SAMPLE
Dependent
Variable Coverage Constant
L W 71
R = .47
L W 71
R = .55
L W 71
R= .51
L W 69
R .55
L W 69
R =.52
Area Hours Collective
Race Size Worked Bargaining
ill .5796 -.1238 -.0376 -.1766 .4361 .0205
(.0625) (.0112) (.0831) (.0619) (.0098)
C 1.2640 -.2097 -.0490 .5305 .6771 .0049
(.1446) (.0249) (.4032) (.1411) (.0209)
0 .3912 -.1135 -.0328 -.1804 .3430 .0338
(.0623) (.0117) (.0784) (.0639) (.0106)
C 1.081 -.1490 -.0527 .1177 .5225 -----
(.0808) (.0142) (.0996) (.0752) -----
0 .7888 -.1165 -.0422 .0197 .3672 -----
(.0483) (.0087) (.0610) (.0507) -----
Occupational
Education Training Experience
-.0025 -.0025
(.0023) (.0025)
Marital
Status
.3419
(.1700)
-. 0064
(.0075)
.0069 .3165
(.0025) (.1554)
.0047
(.0128)
.0092
(.0023)
Note: "All"
"C"
"O"11
refers
is the
is the
to the combined sample of workers in construction and
sample of workers in construction alone
sample of workers in other industries alone
other industries
Standard errors in parenthesis. Date Source: Parnes, op. cit.
Table 3.1.6
WAGE EQUATIONS FOR CRAFTSMEN, FOREMEN, AND KINDRED WORKERS
IN CONSTRUCTION AND OTHER INDUSTRIES, 1969
(Regional Sample)
Coverage Constant Race
Area Hours Collective
Size Worked Bargaining
C 1.365 -.2451 -.0079 .1290 .4294
(.1538) (.0117) (.1067) (.0823)
0 .6588 -.2788 -.0208 .3338 .01266
(.1079) (.0121) (.1745) (.0635)
C 1.3578 -.4817 -.0193 .0310 .5518
(.1347) (.0152) (.1377) (.1127)
.5455 -. 1903 -. 0251 -. 5522
(.0706) (.01086) (.1824)
.0527
(.0459)
Dependent
Variable
Northeast
L W 69
R = .54
L W 69
R = .25
N. Central
L W 69
R = .33
L W 69
R = .33
South
L W 69
R = .28
Occupational
Education Training
-. 0042 .0017
(.0175) (.0025)
.0033
(.0016)
-.0032 .0047
(.0164) (.0070)
.0291 .4021
(.0088) (.0014)
-.0262 -.0316
(.0454) (.0121)
.0171 .0016
(.0105) (.0024)
.0056 .0004
(.0148) (.0018)
Experience
Marital
Status
.0067 .3091
(.0028) (.2015)
.0064 .4675
(.0018) (.1812)
.0056 .3967
(.0031) (.1872)
Standard errors in parenthesis.
See Notes, Table 3.1.5 and Table 3.1.7.
Data Source: Parnes, op. cit.
C 2.018 -. 5270 -. 0958 -1.327 .4685
(.2882) (.0592) (.4772) (.2713)
0 .6411 -.3610 -.0352 -.0924 .2592
(.0790) (.0136) (.1892) (.0678)
C 1.352 -.1786 -.0133 -.1569 .4447
(.1068) (.0126) (.1089) (.0861)
L W 69
R = .38
L W 69
R = .52
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Table 3.1.7
WAGE EQUATION VARIABLES
LNW
HRW
RACE
AREA SIZE
HOURS WORKED
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
EDUCATION
OCCUPATIONAL TRAINING
Natural log of the straight hourly wage rate.
Absolute value of the hourly wage rate.
Dummy variable: 0 for white, 1 for other.
Discontinuous variable increasing from 1,
largest metropolitan areas, to 9., rural areas.
Dummy variable: 0 for full-time; 1 for
part-time (worked less than 35 hours).
Dummy variable: 0 for "nonunion;" 1 if wages
determined by collective bargaining.
Years completed of formal schooling.
Months completed, all types of occupational
training programs.
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Table 3.1.8
SUMMARY OF ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATES OF UNION IMPACT, CONSTRUCTION
AND OTHER INDUSTRIES, 1969 AND 1971, NATIONAL & REGIONAL SAMPLE
UNION/NONUNION
WAGE DIFFERENTIALNATIONAL
1969
Construction
Log
Linear
67%
45%
Other Industries
Log
Li near
13%
REGIONAL
Northeast
Construction
Other
Northcentral
Construction
Other
South
Construction
Other
1971
68%
12%
54%
1%
49%
0%
74%
5%
50%
0%
60%
30%
48%
24%
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Table 3.1.9
REPRESENTATIVE SELECTION OF CRAFTSMEN, FOREMEN, AND KINDRED
WORKERS IN "OTHER INDUSTRIES" FROM PARNES FILE.
Baker
Blacksmiths
Bookbinders
Cabinet Makers
Compositors/Typesetters
Engravers
Jewelers
Locomotive Engineers
Mechanics/Repairman
(Autos, Airplane,
T.V., etc.)
Metal Molders
Photoengravers/Lithographers
Pressmen and Plate Printers
Shoemakers
Metal Rollers
Tailors
Uphol sterers
Fishermen
Source: Parnes, op. cit.
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3.2 1976 Union/Nonunion Wage Survey in Construction
Because of the deficiencies of existing data sources on
wages in construction, a survey was designed in 1975 to provide
additional data. The survey was administered in 1976 by mail in
eight U.S. cities; results for two cities, Boston and Denver, are
reported below.
The design of the survey sought to overcome most of the
drawbacks of previous work. The main questionnaire asked for
information on firm type (general or type of subcontractor); product
market; size (in terms of volume of contract work); and employment
levels. Wages were to be reported by four different skill levels
(working foreman; journeyman; apprentice; helper) within each craft.
The craft names were left open so that nonunion contractors could use
other than union craft designations. Wages paid due to prevailing
wage laws were to be excluded: only "market" nonunion wages were to
be reported. Finally, a specific geographic area was designated on a
map as the reporting area: usually an SMSA.
The survey was administered in particular cities because of
the reported mix of both union and nonunion work in all types of
construction in those areas. The universe of firms in the construction
industry in each city was created by combining membership lists of
major contractor associations, particularly the Associated General
Contractors, and a comprehensive list of construction firms developed
by Dun and Bradstreet. On the basis of the universe list, a random
sample totaling fifty percent of the firms in the universe; was designed
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to provide statistically significant information on wages and benefits
for all firms. (Unfortunately, due to a lack of identification of most
firms by union or nonunion status, no stratification by that dimension
was possible.) Finally, the survey questionnaire, after minor revisions
from a pilot test, was mailed to 11 firms in the sample. A follow-up
mailing to non-respondents, in addition to phone calls, was used to
increase the response rate.
Despite the care in designing and administering the survey,
the response rate was reasonably low (approximately 20 to 25%). This
was not unexpected. Preliminary interviews with firms and associations
in the industry revealed that most wage surveys which have been under-
taken have been relatively unsuccessful. Nonunion firms in particular
are secretive about wage scales, both for political and competitive
reasons. In addition, the small size of most construction firms
coupled with their low levels of office staffing make responding to
questionnaires costly and low in priority. But low response does
create some problems for statistical presentation and analysis.
Ideally, a random sample of firms should be designated and responses
evolved from this sample. However, this approach requires explicit
identification of firms by name and a follow-up to non-respondent
firms. If firms are secretive about wages, this attention to their
particular response may make them even more uncooperative. An
alternative approach is ,to choose a large sample and, by promising
anonymity, hope to generate a large number of responses and then
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correct for response by doing a third survey of non-respondents and
creating a non-response adjustment factor to weight the responses in
the original survey. This second approach was taken here.
All of this is simply evidence that accurate, detailed wage
information is very difficult to compile. This is particularly true
when the survey questionnaire is complex enough to permit the wage
data to be controlled and tabulated by firm size; product market;
workers skill level, etc. Complexity of the questionnaire obviously
lowers the response rate. In addition, wages are often secret and
idiosyncratic; evoking them from a neutral to hostile group of firms
is difficult and costly. (The hostility of open shop contractors
emanates from their being continually attacked by unions for paying
"substandard wages." At least one previous wage survey undertaken by
the government with the promise of anonymity ended up in the hands of
a union business agent and was used in legislative testimony. Thus,
the political climate in the industry makes any pretension to academic
neutrality or confidentiality suspect.)
Nonetheless, sample wage results are available. In par-
ticular, wage contours in nonunion construction can be defined on
the basis of the survey information. These contours can then be
compared to union rates to generate more precise wage differentials
by craft and skill level in particular types of construction product
markets. Despite the caveats on sample coverage above, the information
compiled from the survey is the most detailed and extensive available:
there is no comparable data source either in terms of size or coverage
of both skill classifications and firm characteristics.
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Union and Nonunion Employment
The extent of nonunion employment in the major construction
product markets has been a mystery. Although it is believed that
there has been a recent increase in open shop activity there are no
time-series on union versus nonunion activity to confirm such a trend.
Data from the 1976 survey, however, provide a static comparison of
the proportion of construction employment that is union in Boston and
Denver. (See Table 3.2.1) The sample proportion of nonunion employment
is, respectively, 15 percent and 35 percent in those SMSAs.
In Denver, as in Boston, union employment is concentrated
in commercial and industrial building. In both SMSAs, roughly 55% of
employment by general contractors and 88 percent of employment by sub-
contractors is in this product market. Heavy and highway construction
makes up the other large category of union work. There is virtually
no union employment in residential construction in Denver. The larger
percentage in residential work in Boston may reflect the union role
in the state-subsidized low and middle income housing in Massachusetts.
In contrast, nonunion contractors do the major proportion of their
work in residential construction in both cities - nearly roughly
sixty percent of total open shop employment. A considerable proportion
of nonunion work, however, is also in the commercial building sector:
roughly thirty to forty percent of employment in each city. Heavy
and highway work is not a large part of open shop employment in either
metropolitan area.
Table 3.2.1
UNION AND OPEN SHOP EMPLOYMENT DISTRIBUTION BY PRODUCT MARKET, 1976
Residential
Commercial
Building
Heavy and
Highway
Employment
Total
Percent
Nonunion
Employment
DENVER
Union
General Contractor
Subcontractor
nunion
General Contractor
Subcontractor
STON
ion
General Contractor
Subcontractor
nunion
General Contractor
Subcontractor
Source: Author's mail survey of union and open shop construction firms, 1976.
Total
Firms
1,382
3,323
1,162
192
No
BO
Un
No
1,052
157
215
110
98
195
276
101
103
2,597
3,814
6,41T
3,464
53
299
2,325
215
253
1,252
35%
5,029
4,272
1 ,940
271
8,184
4,296
127,8U
954 2,291 15%
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The marked differences in union and nonunion participation
in residential construction is not surprising. Though it has never
been quantitatively described, residential work has generally been
conceded to be almost completely nonunion in most parts of the country.
(This has not always been the case, however. Haber and Levinson report
substantial amounts of union homebuilding in Boston and other cities in
the early 1950's.) In contrast to the differences in residential work,
the survey data do show considerable open shop activity in types of
construction still thought to be predominantly union: particularly
in commercial and industrial construction. In Boston, this union
predominance is still clearly the case given the small total size of
the nonunion sector. In Denver, however, the open shop sector is
considerably larger in its relative share of the commercial and
industrial work.
In their present tabulation the data do not reveal finer
breakdowns that can be made within product markets: either by firm size
or other types of construction. It is quite possible that even within
a product type, union and open shop firms represent, on the whole,
different types, sizes, and location of construction. Nonunion firms
are said to specialize in small-scale commercial building (shopping
centers, gas stations, and small offices) in the suburban rings of
metropolitan areas. Union firms still control most of the large-scale,
center-city, high-rise building and all of the major industrial work
in both SMSAs. Thus, even controlling for some product market differ-
ences may leave substantial variations in the type of construction work
and in the resulting skill level and composition of the labor force.
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Union and Nonunion Firm Size
The employment data described above show, in Boston, that
although open shop firms comprise 30% of the total firms in the sample,
they only account for 15% of total employment. In Denver, the size
of nonunion firms is, on the average, much more comparable to the union
sector: nonunion firms are 36 percent of firms in the sample and account
for 35 percent of the employment. These employment figures can be com-
pared to the data on the distribution of firms by size and volume in
Tables 3.2.2 through 3.2.5.
In Boston, the open shop firms are concentrated in the smal-
lest categories of total employment. Fifty-nine percent of nonunion
commercial general contractors have less than ten employees; only
thirty-one percent of comparable union firms are this small.
Conversely, thirty-five percent of union commercial generals have
more than 26 employees; no nonunion firms in the sample were this
large. This distribution by number of construction field employers
is roughly mirrored in the reported total dollar volume of contracts
for union and nonunion firms. Fifty-six percent of the union general
contractors and forty-five percent of the union subcontractors
concentrating in commercial and industrial work report over one
million dollars in gross revenue. Only twenty-five and five percent
of similar open shop firms are that large.
In Denver, the distribution of firms over size classes is
more equal. Where Boston has no commercial open shop general contrac-
tors reporting more than 26 employees, twenty-one percent of the
Table 3.2.2
PERCENT OF UNION AND NONUNION FIRMS BY DOLLAR VOLUME OF ACTIVITY
BOSTON 1976
Percent
$100-500,000 $.5 - $ 5m. $1 - 5.
I Total
$5 m. I Firms
RESIDENTIAL
Union General
Union Subcontractor
Nonunion General
Nonunion Subcontractor
COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL
Union General
Union Subcontractor
Nonunion General
Nonunion Subcontractor
Source: See Table 3.2.1 and text.
<$100,000
67
143
47
74
Table 3.2.3
UNION AND NONUNION FIRMS, PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY NUMBER OF FIELD EMPLOYEES,
BOSTON 1976
Percent
1 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 25 26 to 50 51 to 75
I Total
>76 | Firms
RESIDENTIAL
Union General
Union Sub
Nonunion Gen.
Nonunion Subs.
COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL
Union Gen.
Union Sub.
Nonunion Gen.
Nonunion Sub.
Source: See Table 3.2.1 and text.
20
0
2.4
0
65
136
37
72
Table 3.2.4
PERCENT OF UNION AND NONUNION FIRMS BY DOLLAR VOLUME OF ACTIVITY
DENVER 1976
$100-500,000
Percent
$.5 - $5m. $5._$________| Total$1 - $5. $5 m. I Firms
RESIDENTIAL
Union General
Union Subcontractor
Nonunion General
Nonunion Subcontractor
COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL
Union General
Union Subcontractor
Nonunion General
Nonunion Subcontractor
Source: See Table 3.2.1 and text.
<$100,000
38
107
44
40
Table 3.2.5
UNION AND NONUNION FIRMS, PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY NUMBER OF FIELD EMPLOYEES,
DENVER 1976
Percent
1 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 25 26 to 50 51 to 75 >75
RESIDENTIAL
Union General
Union Subcontractor
Nonunion General
Nonunion Subcontractor
COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL
Union General
Union Subcontractor
Nonunion General
Nonunion Subcontractor
100
20
31
37
107
39
36
Source: See Table 3.2.1 and text.
| Total
| Firms
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equivalent general contractors in Denver are this big. Nonetheless,
large union firms still predominate - forty-three percent of them have
more than twenty-six employees. And a larger proportion of nonunion
firms in Denver are smaller in terms of both dollar volume and
employment.
Like the glass which can be seen as half empty, or half
full, these size distributions can be interpreted two ways. In one
light, they do show the significant difference in scale of firms in
the open shop and union sector. As a result, there simply are very
few, if any, comparable open shop firms to the larger union general
contractors and subcontractors and there are relatively few small
union firms. In another light, the distributions evidence a consid-
erable over-lap in firm sizes in the two sectors. Fifty-five percent
of the union generals in Denver do between 0.5 and 5 million dollars
a year in volume; sixty percent of the nonunion generals are of
equivalent size. In Boston 55 percent of union and non-union firms
in this middle category are also roughly equal in dollar volume. So
comparing the size distributions brings out both the discrepancy in
size at the tails as well as the substantial overlap in the middle.
The extremes of the distribution of firms sizes may, in fact,
be a good proxy for the substantially different types and scales of
projects the firms undertake. To be consistent, the overlap in sizes
may represent a type of work that is presently an area of competition
between organized and unorganized firms.
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Wage Differentials and Contours
As described above, one way to correct for unobserved skill
differences in the construction labor force is to make union/nonunion
wage comparisons only within particular product markets. The survey
results presented in Table 3.2.6 and 3.2.7 make this comparison
possible. The wage data are tabulated for journeymen and helpers
in eleven different trades in Boston and Denver. With these data,
comparisons can be made between the average hourly rates of nonunion
mechanics in three product markets and the equivalent union rates.
For the most part, the relevant union rate is the "building rate"
negotiated for most commercial and industrial work. In addition, the
unions also may have special rates for some trades in heavy and highway
construction. Occasionally, the unions may negotiate a "residential"
rate, for home-building or small-scale residential work; usually this
rate is seventy-five to eighty percent of the commercial wage rate,
plus the normal fringe benefit package.
In Boston, comparisons between mean hourly wages in open
shop commercial building and the union scale (excluding benefits)
reveal somewhat lower union differentials than those obtained through
regression estimates or simple wage comparisons. The unweighted
average of the differentials in Boston is 41 percent, with a range of
between 16 percent for operating engineers to 73 percent for painters.
In Denver, although it apparently has a much larger nonunion sector,
the differentials are of a similar magnitude. The mean is 40 percent
and the range is from eleven percent for laborers to 68 percent for
plumbers.
Table 3.2.6
UNION AND NONUNION CONSTRUCTION WAGE RATES, BOSTON SMSA, 1976
TRADE
Bricklayer
Journeyman
Helper
Carpenter
Journeyman
Helper
Electrician
Journeyman
Helper
Ironworker
Journeyman
Helper
Operating Engineer
Journeyman
Helper
Commercial
Building
7.78
(.30)
6.13
(.45)
8.19
(.19)
5.20
(.24)
6.21
(.08)
3.83
(.08)
6.29
(.52)
3.13
(.33)
9.12
(.67)
3.42
(.54)
NONUNION
Residential
7.04
(.16)
4.95
(.28)
6.73
(.13)
4.23
(.14)
6.55
(.25)
4.56
(.26)
6.75
(.19)
3.75
(.37)
Heavy&|
Highway
--- I|
--- I|
--- I
--- I
11.07 I
(.59) 1
Commercial
Building
9.90/1.75
10.00/1.60
11.25/2.16
10.49/2.20
10.61/1.90
UNION
Residential
Heavy & |
Highway I
--- I
--- I
12.69
12.00/77
--- I|
Union
Differential
(Commercial
Building)
27%
22%
50%
67%
16%
Table 3.2.6
UNION AND NONUNION CONSTRUCTION WAGE RATES, BOSTON SMSA, 1976
Commercial
TRADE Building
Painter
Journeyman 5.64
(.09)
Helper 4.32
(.26)
Plumbers & Pipefitters
Journeyman
Helper
Roofer
Journeyman
Helper
Sheet Metal Worker
Journeyman
Helper
Teamster
Driver
Laborer
Journeyman
7.31
(.32)
4.88
(.57)
7.34
(.15)
5.07
(.11)
6.12
(.20)
3.82
(.28)
5.38
(.11)
6.10
(.18)
NONUNION
Residential
6.83
(.32)
3.67
(.07)
7.12
(.16)
4.34
(.29)
Heavy &I
Highway
8.43 |
(.05) |
8.08
(.49)
6.79 8.75
(.18) (.26)
5.42 7.19
(.23) (.15)
Hourly wage only, excluding benetits.
Hourly wage/total benefits.
The union wage differential here is t
Commercial
Building
9.76/1.77
10.80/2.30
9.75/1.90
12.39 total
8.11/.85
7.50/1.35
2
UNION |
Heavy & I
Residential Highway.
--- ---
--- 8.95 |
Mean Union Wage Differential:
Differential Range:
3
Union
Differential
(Commercial
Building)
73%
48%
33%
N/A
51%
23%
41%
6 to 73%
5tandard errors in parentheses.
he percent difference between the union journeyman's commercial
building rate and the nonunion journeyman's commercial building rate.
Source: See Table 3.2.1 and text.
1
Table 3.2.7
UNION AND NONUNION CONSTRUCTION WAGE RATES, DENVER/BOULDER SMSA, 1976
TRADE
Bricklayer
Journeyman
Helper
Carpenter
Journeyman
Helper
Electrician
Journeyman
Helper
Ironworker
Journeyman
Helper
Operating Engineer
Journeyman
Helper
Commercial
Building
7.97
(.33)
6.25
(.60)
6.95
(.12)
4.62
(.13)
7.66
(.17)
4.36
(.23)
6.94
(.16)
6.27
(.29)
6.97
(.24)
5.66
(.22)
NONUNION
Residential
7.47
(.17)
4.72
(.09)
6.09
(.05)
3.87
(.06)
6.60
(.29)
4.00
(.37)
6.88
(.07)
4.25
(.18)
6.22
(.19)
3.75
(.15)
Heavy& I
Highway
--- I
--- I
--- I
--- I
--- I
6.23 I
(.30) I
Commercial
Building
9.95/1.30
9.19/1.73
10.94/1.31
UNION
Residential
6.15/1.98
7.20/.64
9.75/1.86
8.50/1.54
Heavy & |
Highway I
8.54/1.981
Union
Differential
(Commercial
Building)
25%
32%
43%
41%
22%
Table 3.2.7
UNION AND NONUNION CONSTRUCTION WAGE RATES, BOSTON SMSA, 1976
Commercial
TRADE Building
Painter
Journeyman 7.00
Helper
Plumbers & Pipefitters
Journeyman
Helper
Roofer
Journeyman
Helper
Sheet Metal Worker
Journeyman
Helper
(.34)
4.25
(.22)
6.12
(.26)
3.77
(.03)
8.42
(.25)
4.13
(.12)
8.51
(.28)
3.80
(.23)
Teamster
Driver
Laborer
J~iiurneyman
5.73
(.22)
NONUNION
Residential
6.43
(.23)
3.86
(.14)
6.91
(.21)
4.34
(.29)
5.15
(.38)
3.55
(.11)
6.86
(.19)
4.42
(.12)
6.11
(.13)
4.33
(.08)
Heavy &I Commercial
Highwayl Building
2
UNION
Residential
Heavy
H ighway
10.04/1.10
10.30/1.75
9.41/.95
10.67/1.91
7.55/.40
6.35/.94
Mean Union Wage Differential:
Differential Range:
Hourywage 6nTy, excluding benefits. Standard errors in parentheses
Hourly wage/total benefits.
The union wage differential here is the percent difference between th
building rate and the nonunion journeyman's commercial building rate.
3
Union
I Differential
I (Commercial
Building)
| 43%
68%
| 12%
| 25%
N/A
I 11%
40%
11 to 68%
e union journeyman's commercial
Source: See Table 3.2.1 and text.
-108-
Since benefits make up a substantial portion of total hourly
earnings of union journeymen - up to twenty percent in some cases -
the inclusion of these in the comparison may widen the union/nonunion
gap considerably. Some examples of benefits reported paid to nonunion
journeymen are given in Table 3.2.8 and 9. Unfortunately, these are
not tabulated by product market, but for the sample as a whole in
each metropolitan area. On the average, the benefit levels for open
shop journeyman are roughly fifty percent of the employer contributions
in the union sector. So a pure union/nonunion wage comparison does
understate the union earnings differential. The task of comparing
the total earnings package is complicated, however, by the variety of
fringe benefits found in the open shop sector. These range from
formal health and welfare plans to ad hoc, informal bonus systems and
profit-sharing. In some cases where benefits are paid, contractors
do not know the hourly cost and thus are not likely to report them
accurately or at all. In contrast, union contracts specify, to the
one-hundredth of a cent in some cases, the hourly employer contribu-
tions to all fringe benefit plans. This contrast in reporting style
and formality may bias comparisons of the total pay package in the
unions' favor.
Wage Contours
The data reported in Table 3.2.6 and 3.2.7 also permit
identification of wage contours. Dunlop, in the classic essay on
"the task of contemporary wage theory" defines wage contours as the
range of wages paid to the same occupation in different product
-109-
Table 3.2.8
AVERAGE HOURLY FRINGE BENEFITS ALL OPEN SHOP CONSTRUCTION FIRMS, 1976
City: Boston
OCCUPATION
Bricklayer
Working Foreman
Journeymen
# OF
FIRMS
# OF
WORKERS
SAMPLE
MEAN MEDIAN
4 .90
(.23)
3 15 2.13
(.19)
.50
2.50
RANGE
LOW HIGH
.50 1.60
.50 2.50
Apprentice
Helpers
Carpenter
Working Foreman
Journeymen
Apprentice
Helper
Electrician
Working Foreman
Journeymen
Apprentice
Helper
19 44
.25
(.00)
.67
(.14)
.98
(.07)
17 82 .92
(.04)
10 40 .87
(.04)
7 25 .69
(.02)
9 45 1.65
(.08)
7 63 1.30
(.07)
7 38 1.16
(.18)
4 35 1.20
(.04)
.25
.50
1.25
1.00
1.00
.75
.25 .25
.50 1.00
.20 1.50
.15 1.50
.20 1.50
.50 1.00
1.95 .15 2.55
1.50
1.35
1.35
.10 2.55
.05 2.55
.63 1.35
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Source: See Table 3.2.1.
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Table 3.2.9
AVERAGE HOURLY FRINGE BENEFITS ALL OPEN SHOP CONSTRUCTION FIRMS, 1976
City: Denver/Boulder
OCCUPATION
Bricklayer
Working Foreman
Journeymen
Apprentice
Helpers
Carpenter
Working Foreman
Journeymen
Apprentice
Helper
Electrician
Working Foreman
Journeymen
Apprentice
Helper
# OF
FIRMS
# OF
WORKERS
SAMPLE
MEAN MEDIAN
4 2.25
(.22)
11 1.29
(.24)
1 2.00
(.00)
5 1.19
(.00)
98 1.59
(.19)
24 248 .63
(.03)
77 .60
(.04)
.69
(.05)
17 1.29
(.24)
22 1.14
(.19)
8 .86
(.36)
8 .75
(.23)
RAN GE
LOW HIGH
2.00 2.00 3.00
2.00 .25 2.01
2.00 2.00 2.00
1.19 1.19 1.19
.80
.47
.36
.70
1.30
1.00
.30
.10
.10 6.71
.10 2.04
.10 1.20
.20 1.40
.20 3.50
.25 3.00
.10 2.60
.10 1.40
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Source: See Table 3.2.1
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markets. Dunlop does not theorize as to why these wage differences
should exist, but presumably they are a function of unobserved skill
differentials within occupations which correlate with product markets.
(If, of course, markets were highly segmented on the supply side,
the contours could also result from rents earned by different skill
groups. In a competitive market these rents should be competed
away, leaving the contours as evidence only of skill differences.)
The wage data for nonunion construction does give some
evidence in support of wage contours across construction product
markets. In thirteen out of seventeen trades in both cities for which
rates can be compared between commercial and residential building, the
commercial rate is slightly to substantially higher. Tests for
significant differences between means reveal, though, that in only
nine cases are there wage differences significant at the 95 percent
level. In five of these significant differences, the commercial mean
is higher. This is not strong evidence of major skill differences,
but it is suggestive that some unreported skills are roughly correlated
with product markets. Of course, the relative equivalence of wages
between markets, in contrast to the larger union product market
differentials noted below can be used to support a competitive view
of labor markets too: the lack of substantial differentials implies
considerable mobility of similar labor types between sub-markets.
(This mobility is consistent with the interview data on open shop
contractors - some worked in both low-rise residential and small-scale
commercial building.)
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The union wage contours are less well-defined. The few
rates negotiated with heavy and highway contractors are quite similar
to the commercial rate. This finding in Denver and Boston is not
inconsistent with apparent national patterns: heavy and highway
rates are usually the same, or slightly greater than, the commercial
rate. The two examples of residential rates in Denver, however, are
more interesting. In negotiating the rates for carpenters and
electricians, the union has approximated (or met) the observed
competitive rate in the open shop sector. In fact, the carpenters'
rate is part of a union program, called CHOP, to organize residential
construction. In Boston, there are no residential rates reported in
effect in 1976. Attempts to negotiate a reduced rate for federal
housing program failed during 1977 and, at present, the union does all
public residential work (both state and federal) at the commercial
building scale.
Firm Size and Wages
The final attempt that can be made to approximate homogenous
occupational categories between union and nonunion work is to compare
journeymen in firms of roughly equivalent size in the same product
market. This comparison is limited, of course, by the small number
of large nonunion firms. Table 3.2.10 presents results from the
available data on four crafts in small and large firms in commercial
building in Boston and Denver. Of the seven examples of occupations
with workers in both firm size categories, six show significant
differences between the mean wages. In five out of these six,
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the hourly wage is substantially higher in the larger firm. A
comparison of these higher nonunion wages with the union scale results
in an unweighted mean differential of twenty-nine percent. There
are two anomalies in this comparison: carpenters show only a 4%
differential in Boston and open shop electricians in large firms in
that area apparently are paid less than in small firms.
Without additional information on worker characteristics -
or even direct measures of productivity - comparisons based on firm size
are about as close as one can come to approximating the "competitive"
wage of union labor. It is suggestive, but no more than that, that
these comparisons reduce the union-differential to a more moderate
thirty percent. Obviously, a smaller union wage premium is both
easier to sustain in market and easier to rationalize as indicative
of other unobserved skill differentials than the gross differentials
of fifty percent or more reported above.
Nonunion Wage Dispersion
One of the phenomena most frequently overlooked by economists
studying the wage impact on wages is the substantial variance in
nonunion wages within occupations. This dispersion is sometimes so
great as to have prompted Raimon to characterize wages of semi-skilled
workers as "indeterminate." Raimon also showed that in unionized
labor markets, the union impact narrowed the wage dispersion among
semi-skilled factory operatives. While much of Raimon's work has been
superceded by econometric estimates of hedonic wage equations, the
inability of such equations to explain all variation on the basis of
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observed human capital attributes leaves much dispersion still
"i ndetermi nate."
For the skill levels "journeymen" and "helpers" in five
construction occupations in Boston and Denver, the dispersion of
wages is presented in Tables 3.2.11 and 3.2.12. These dispersions
reflect wages paid to the occupations across all product markets;
consequently, some of the variance is due to major skill differences.
Several notable facts emerge from the dispersions. The first is the
extreme range of wages paid for nominally the "same" occupation in the
"same" industry: construction. Clearly, with this great a variance
in wages the kind of attention to unobserved differences in skill
levels attempted above is justified. Second, there is substantial
overlap between the wage range for journeymen and for helpers, although
there remains an obvious difference in means within each skill group.
Again, this points up the difficulties of defining homogeneous skill
and job classification in the industry. Third, the upper tail of the
journeyman's wage range usually overlaps with the union wage scale
(excluding benefits). In some cases this overlap is very small; yet
for five out the eight skilled occupations and for laborers in both
cities well over ten percent of the sample of nonunion journeymen earn
within one dollar of the union scale. In addition, a substantial
percentage of the foremen earn the union rate or more. If "threat"
effects can be discounted, this overlap between the upper tail of the
nonunion wage dispersion and the union scale suggests that the union
rate is not very far removed from at least one indicator of the
competitive wage or marginal product of some workers in construction.
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Table 3.2.10
OPEN SHOP WAGE RATES BY SIZE OF FIRM
COMMERCIAL BUILDING CONTRACTORS
BOSTON
Bricklayers
Carpenters
Electricians
Plumbers
DENVER
Bricklayers
Carpenters
Electricians
Plumbers
General
Contractor
Small Large
7.44
(.21)
7.34
(.09)
6.11
(.21)
5.91
(.15)
5.68
(.16)
5.71
(.10)
7.13
(.21)
4.82
(.25)
9.55
(.52)
7.85
(.47)
4.08
(.36)
8.43
(.05)
6.98
(.14)
8.50
(.26)
8.00
(.24)
Union
Rate
9.90
10.00
11.25
10.80
9.19
10.94
10.30
Subcontractor
Small Large
7.75 ----
(.17) ----
9.28 ----
(.39)
6.52
(.14)
7.80
(.25)
8.52
(.63)
8.15
(.23)
7.50
(.10)
5.91
(.54)
6.11
(.35)
6.90
(.24)
6.80
(.22)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: See Table 3.2.1.
Table 3.2.11
Boston Hourly Wage Distribution (Range in $)
2.50 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 10.00 11.00 12.00 13.00 14.00
F* W* 2.99 3.99 4.99 5.99 6.99 7.99 8.99 9.99 10.99 11.99 12.99 13.99 20.00
Bricklayer
Foreman 22 34 - -- -- 1 1 2 14 6 8 2 -- -- --
Journeyman 19 67- -- -- 10 20 20 8 4 5 -- -- -- --
Apprentice 9 19 - -- 14 3 2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Helper 14 26 - 8 5 4 5 4 -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Carpenter
Foreman 60 137 - 5 5 11 29 22 30 3 22 1 6 2 1
Journeyman 50 212 - 1 13 23 52 56 35 13 8 7 -- 4 --
Apprentice 30 77 - 12 29 21 12 2 1 -- -- -- -- -- --
Helper 27 71 8 14 24 9 15 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Electrician
Foreman 39 73 - -- 1 12 19 24 13 -- 1 -- 2 -- 1
Journeyman 27 117 - -- 2 41 58 11 4 -- -- 1 -- -- --
Apprentice 24 69 4 19 24 16 5 -- -- 1 -- -- -- -- --
Helper 23 78 8 38 23 8 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Plumber
Foreman 32 73 - -- -- 3 12 12 27 2 9 7 -- -- 1
Journeyman 38 131 - -- 4 20 27 36 30 8 4 -- 2 -- --
Apprentice 34 272 2 13 29 220 7 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Helper 12 26 - 6 12 7 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Laborer
Foreman 28 63 1 2 9 9 8 8 24 1 1 -- -- -- --
Journeyman 31 144 - 15 27 38 11 34 18 -- 1 -- -- -- --
Apprentice 5 13 1 4 5 3 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Helper 9 17 - 8 3 6 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
*F = Number of Firms; W = Number of Workers.
Source: See Table 3.1.2.
Table 3.2.12
Denver/Boulder Hourly Wage Distribution (Range in $)
2.50 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 10.00 11.00 12.00 13.00 14.00
F* W* 2.99 3.99 4.99 5.99 6.99 7.99 8.99 9.99 10.99 11.99 12.99 13.99 20.00
Bricklayer
Foreman 16 29 -- -- -- 5 5 2 5 12 -- -- -- -- --
Journeyman 20 84-- -- 1 11 20 19 21 5 2 5 -- -- --
Apprentice 14 47-- 15 3 21 7 -- 1 -- -- -- -- -- --
Helper 10 44-- 6 21 12 -- 5 -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Carpenter
Foreman 77 209-- 1 1 13 57 58 47 15 12 1 4 -- --
Journeyman 82 703 -- 13 128 161 192 133 71 3 2 -- -- -- --
Apprentice 47 285 -- 56 134 78 14 3 -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Helper 38 154 9 71 65 4 5 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Electrician
Foreman 21 35-- 1 -- 2 3 13 8 4 2 1 -- -- 1
Journeyman 17 47 -- -- 2 4 9 19 7 6 -- -- -- -- --
Apprentice 15 33 -- 4 16 10 3 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Helper 9 24 3 6 9 6 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Plumber
Foreman 22 57 -- 6 1 9 13 8 11 2 3 4 -- -- --
Journeyman 26 99 -- 6 15 17 28 14 14 5 -- -- -- -- --
Apprentice 15 54 -- 9 20 23 2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Helper 14 88 1 75 7 3 -- 2 -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Laborer
Foreman 37 126 1 11 26 23 25 4 6 1 3 14 5 5 2
Journeyman 33 211 2 82 50 41 27 7 -- 2 -- -- -- -- --
Apprentice 16 57 -- 11 25 18 3 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Helper 17 132 13 92 13 1 13 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
*F = Number of Firms; W = Number of Workers.
Source: See Table 3.2.1.
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Indeed, if the union rate is compared to only these higher wages in
the open shop sector, the union/nonunion wage differential drops to
about five percent.
One other fact of interest may be gleaned from comparisons
of the wage dispersion: occupations which, due to technology and/or
licensing requirements, might be presumed to be more "homogeneous" in
skill composition - such as electricians - do not evidence much less
dispersion than those, like carpenters, which are disparate and
unlicensed. All of the skilled trades manifest roughly the same wide
variance in wages; their helpers have a narrower, but similarly
consistent, range. Part of this wage dispersion in the open shop
sector results from many different firm-specific occupational
definitions. Many firms included in the questionnaire occupational
titles which indicated a much narrower range of skills than contained
in the (ideal) broadly-trained journeyman in union craft occupations.
Table 3.2.13 lists the open shop names for occupations similar to
union carpenters, sheetmetal workers, and plumbers. In cases such as
"drywall nailer," "aluminum siding mechanic," and "welder" the titles
imply a much finer division of labor in some open shop firms which,
if filled by a semi-skilled, very specialized workman, may carry a
lower equilibrium wage. Such a reliance on heterogeneous, specialized
workers skilled in only a few construction tasks may explain the wide
distribution of wages across the lower end of the open shop wage
distribution.
Finally, it should be noted that the wage dispersion evident
in open shop construction is, in fact, a result of a conscious wage
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Table 3.2.13
UNION AND OPEN SHOP OCCUPATIONAL TITLES
UNION TITLE
Carpenters:
OPEN SHOP TITLES
Carpenters:
Carpenters
Millwrights and Pile Drivers
Floor Layers
Drywall
Plumbers:
Rough Carpenter
Framer
Finish Carpenter
Roof Carpenter
Drywall Nailer
Drywall Taper
Drywall Scraper
Formsetter
Cabinet Maker
Plumbers:
Pipe Layer
Pipe Welder
Pipe Installer
Water System Installer
Sprinkler Installer
Pump Installer
Sheet Metal Worker: Sheet Metal:
Refrigeration Mechanic
Sheeters
Welders
Air Conditioning Mechanic
Aluminum Siding Mechanic
Gutter and Pipe Work
Duct Installer
Source: See Table 3.1.2 and text.
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policy by nonunion contractors. In the field interviews, one of the
most highly prized aspects of the flexibility of nonunion management
was the ability to pay individual workers "what they were worth."
This led many firms to create wage structures to reward many firm-
specific attributes, as well as fitting compensation to idiosyncratic
characteristics of workers, such as "initiative" or "integrity," in
addition to obviously productive traits such as "mechanical skill" or
"experience." As a result of this management approach, most wage
levels were bargained individually with workers and were not set by
any standard formula even within one firm. The union wage structure,
where most journeymen get a fixed hourly rate, was seen as a great
threat to both individual motivation and management rights by open
shop contractors.
Craft Union Wage and Skill Structure
One of the hallmarks of craft unions is the bifurcation of
the occupational structure into a high skill group, journeymen, and
a lower skill group, apprentices. A separate union, laborers, is
available for some unskilled work but, due to jurisdictional lines,
they are severely circumscribed in their activities. Carrying of iron
rods, electrical or plumbing fixtures, and wood cannot be done by
laborers but only by journeymen or apprentices of the ironworkers,
plumbers, electricians, and carpenters. At present, very few of the
building trades have an unskilled or helper category internal to the
jurisdiction. For the most part, apprentices play this role: per-
forming routine or unskilled tasks. This has not always been the
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case, however. In the early years of the building trades unions
between 1880 and 1920, nearly every craft had helpers. Some of these
were, in fact, informal apprentices; others were permanently fixed in
that grade. In at least one case, the steamfitters in Chicago, the
helpers formed a separate local union. Ordinarily, helpers were
assigned to journeymen on a 1:1 ratio and a basic crew for plumbing,
carpentry or electrical work would consist of even proportions of
journeymen and helpers.
The creation and structuring of formal apprentice programs
by some unions did away in most cases with the helper category. One
of the primary goals of the U.S. in the 1880's, its formative years,
was controlling entry and training in the trade. The means for doing
this was the structuring of four to five year apprenticeship programs
which would permit entry on the basis of specified criteria and at
the same time eliminate the widespread practice of employing helpers
who might, through informal training, flood the trade with journeymen.
At this time, the high ratios of four or so journeymen to one apprentice
were established and usually applied on a firm, rather than a project,
basis. It should be noted that the employers were not completely
opposed to this restructuring of the labor force. They, as well as
their journeymen, suffered from competition from small contractors
who, after one or two years' work as a helper, had set up shops on
their own and competed for work. Apprenticeships served to help con-
trol entry not only into the labor force but, given the low costs of
entry in creating small firms, into the product market as well.
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In contrast to the rigid union apprenticeship programs, one
of the supposed advantages of open shop firms has been the ability to
maintain some flexibility in skill categories and ratios. For the
most part, these "categories" are largely informal and are visible
only by noting the differing wage dispersion in roughly defined skill
levels such as foreman, journeyman, helper, and apprentice. However,
large union firms such as Daniels, Inc. and Brown and Root, Inc. have
developed formal systems of labor grading within each craft category.
Brown and Root, for example, has four grades of pipefitters, with dif-
ferent skill and wage levels, below the level of "craftsman." While
these grades may be comparable to first through fourth year apprentices
in the union system, there are two notable differences: there are
no time limits attached to the grade and there are no fixed ratios
between the lower grades and craftsman.
Offsetting the open shop contractors' freedom to substitute
unskilled or semi-skilled labor for skilled journeymen may be the
necessity to provide supervision for those labor groups. Ideally,
the union journeyman is both mechanically skilled and professionally
trained to work independently on varied aspects of construction.
Lesser skilled mechanics, lacking training, broad experience, or
standards of the craft, may require both assistance and supervision
to work productively. This supervision costs money and may offset at
least some of the gains from the lower unskilled wages.
In sum, there may be major differences between the wage and
skill structure of union and open shop construction. The difference
in these structures might be said to represent two different labor
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technologies of work: one focused on the "journeyman" and one a finer,
more "industrial," division of labor. Of course, there are no neces-
sary or obvious implications of these differences in skill structure
for overall efficiency of union or open shop construction. The trade-
offs may be such, in fact, that the total wage bill will be equivalent:
a larger number of both unskilled and supervisory workers in open shop
construction will be offset by fewer of both in union construction
combined with more highly paid journeymen. Only empirical studies of
the costs of actual construction projects can confirm whether this
trade-off, or equivalent wage bill, exists. However, attention to the
entire wage and skill structure of both union and open shop construction
again confirms that concern with a single wage differential is misguided.
Union journeymen may in fact earn more per hour than nonunion mechanics,
but at least part of this differential could represent embodied super-
visory skills. In the open shop sector these are not contained in
the "journeyman" and thus not reflected in the wage; but have to be
provided in an additional number of foremen at a higher labor cost.
The data available on skill ratios available from the survey
confirm the hypothetical ratios described above. In its present form the
data cannot be tabulated on a firm or project basis, so aggregations
across all firms in one product market will have to suffice. For six
occupations in Boston, the average skill ratios in open shop work were
.6 foremen to one journeyman to .7 helpers and apprentices. Similar
results were reported for Denver: .5 to 1 to 1.1. (See Table 3.2.14).
These ratios can be compared to "best practice" estimates on the ratio
of foremen to journeymen in union commercial construction. These
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estimates are roughly one foreman to ten journeymen, though practice
may vary widely by type and scale of project. The ratio of appren-
tices to union journeymen is usually one for every four or five jour-
neymen employed in a firm. So, a presumed ratio of skills in union
work is: .1 to 1 to .2. Comparison of this ratio with the survey
results on the open shop reveal the expected differences: open shop
construction employs both more workers and apprentices and more
foremen than union work.
Union Wage Differentials - Implications
What the numerous percentages show in the above sections is
that it is very difficult to fix on one estimate of the union/nonunion
wage differential in construction. In large part, this is due to the
complexity of both demand and labor supply in the industry. Products
are highly differentiated; while the character of the labor force can
vary substantially even within common occupational classifications.
Although other industries may be equally complex, the econometric esti-
mation of wage differentials appears to provide for them a more valid
comparison of union and nonunion labor than it does in construction.
However, it may be that closer attention to industrial organization,
product differentiation, and worker characteristics and preferences
in some manufacturing industries would also raise questions about the
true size of a union wage differential.
The comparative data on union and nonunion wages does give
some insight into the different wage structures in each sector of the
construction industry. But it also presents a difficult problem for
Table 3.2.14
SKILL RATIOS (BUILDING)
Sk
Ra
DENVER
Working
Foreman
Journeyman
Apprentices
& Helpers
BOSTON
Working
Foreman
Journeyman
Apprentices
& Helpers
Average
ill I Plumber/ I
tio I Pipefitter Sheetmetal
# R # R
.5 I 18 .6 14 .3
1.0 I 30 1.0 I 57 1.0
I |I
1.1 I 81 2.7 I 21 .4
I |I
I |I
I |I| |I
I |I
.6 I 18 .7 I 15 .6
I |I
I |I
1.0 I 27 1.0 1 27 1.0
I I
.7 I 21 .8 I 16 .6
I |I
I I
I Bricklayer I Carpenter
I # RI # R
12 .4 65 .5
I 34 1.0 I 125 1.0
I I
I 28 .8 I 91 .7
I |I
I |I
I I
I |I
I |I
I 10 .5 I 51 .5
I |I
I 19 1.0 I 94 1.0
I I
I 8 .4 I 53 .6
I |I
I lOperating I
lElectrician I Engineer |Union
I I I| # R # RI
I 22 .7 I 10 .4 I .1
I I I
I 34 1.0 I 23 1.0 I 1.0
I 40 1.2 I 14 .6 | .2
I 56 .6 I 7 .5 I .1
I I I
I 89 1.0 I 15 1.0 I 1.0
I 104 1.2 I 5 .3 I .2
I I
I I |
Note: The skill ratio, R, is the number of foremen or apprentices/helpers per journeyman. The number
in column # is the total number of foremen, journeymen, or apprentice/helper reported in the
survey.
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the analysis of the union impact on industry and even for the theory
of union behavior. Obviously, one would like to have a consistent
and simple estimate of the union wage premium - or, conversely, of the
shadow price of union labor supply - in order to integrate it with the
observations on the non-wage behavior of unions to be presented in
Chapter Four. A relatively small union wage premium is reflected
by some of the percentages computed above; it is also consistent with
the interview findings reported below of a lack of union limitation
of the labor supply. But such a small premium is certainly not in
keeping with general, qualitative impression of the building trades'
"monopoly power" and "high wages." Even if this conventional wisdom
is wrong, which it very well may be, it leaves one rather fundamental
question unresolved. Given that the construction unions are monopo-
listic, in that they are in some sense single suppliers of labor to
union firms, what monopoly power do they possess, if any, and how do
they use it?
The answer to this question requires that the information
on both wage and non-wage impacts of the unions be integrated with
observations on the industrial organization of construction; on the
trends and elasticities of product demand and of labor supply; on the
strategies of workers, firms, unions and employee associations in the
industry. In addition, attention should be paid to the role of
government bureaucracies and legislative and executive bodies. All
of these economic and political structures impinge upon, as well as
being influenced by, union goals and behavior. The scope of this
research, limited largely to management interviews and wage surveys,
-11-1, - A- '014~ 11 - -- -- I -
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is not adequate to portray the full complexity of the industry or the
unions' role in it. Nonetheless, these observations can be used to
develop a tentative model of the union behavior which is related to
the structure of the construction industry. This is presented in
Chapter Five.
In terms of estimating the impact of union wages on construc-
tion costs, however, a new and different academic methodology is clearly
needed. If there are major differences in workers skills and occupation
structure between the union and nonunion sectors of construction, further
research must either compare construction costs or worker productivity
directly or develop better proxies for individual skills. In fact, the
only study to undertake a direct cost comparison of similar types of con-
struction built by union and nonunion contractors, research by Mandelstam
in the early 1960's, found that although nonunion hourly wages were sub-
stantially lower than union rates, the total wage bill for both organized
and open shop contractors was virtually identical.1 2 In other words,
although nonunion contractors paid lower wages they used more labor: a
clear indication that the lower wage reflected lower productivity. With
the rapid rise in union wages in the late 1960's these results may no
longer be valid (i.e. it may be very difficult for the unions to "earn"
the high hourly wage in all sectors of construction) but at least such
comparative cost studies can focus directly on actual productivity in
particular market contexts and not rely on proxies for skills or assump-
tions about competitive market outcomes.
12 Allan Mandelstam, "The Effects of Unions on Efficiency in the Residential
Construction Industry: A Case Study," Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, Volume 18, 1965, pp. 503-521.
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4. NONWAGE IMPACT OF CRAFT UNIONS IN CONSTRUCTION
4.1 The Labor-Management Context
"A union does not limit its function to
raising wages, shortening hours and improving
working conditions, but assumes the perogative
of protecting them against any contingency."
HaberI
"...there is no clear understanding of what the
various devices of union influence at the plant
level imply in terms of interests of the re-
spective parties: which devices serve whose
interests, and under what conditions; and what
are the aggregate functions of job control
rights? Analysis should include workers, union
bureaucracy and management as distinct parties,
and should pay attention to whether the cost
of union progress in a particular relationship
is passed on to groups elsewhere in society."
R. Herding 2
Craft unions, particularly in the construction industry,
have always been exemplars of the industrial relations adage that
'unions affect everything' in the employment relation. The building
trade unions define, through jurisdictions, the exact nature of the
work their members can and cannot do. The unions also determine
wages for specific skill levels in a trade, usually just a "journeyman"
or an "apprentice", not permitting large variations in either wages
of men in one skill classification or in the classifications
1 William Haber, Industrial Relations in the Building Industry, Harvard
University Press, 1930, p. 214.
2 R. Herding, Job Control and Union Structure, Rotterdam University
Press, 1972, p. 12.
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themselves. Collective bargaining contracts may also contain provisions
relating to many aspects of the on-site construction work: tools
used; number of men required; materials permitted; scheduling and
shift work; etc. In addition, the union may also play a major role
in the referral of men to the contractor and in the operation of
apprenticeship and other training programs.
It might be supposed that there would be a variety of ways
to describe and analyze the complex impact of these nonwage activities
of craft unions. Yet, most often in the popular press, examples of
some particular work practice will be used as sufficient evidence of
the general inefficiency and impracticality of craft union methods.
Especially "restrictive" practices will be used to indict all union
effects as clearly inefficient. In the few examples of serious
academic research in construction, a less perjorative description of
union practices is given. But because of the special circumstances
under which the two cases of major field research have been done by
Haber and Levinson and Foster and Northrup, no attempt was made to
see to what extent the "union work practices" were in fact peculiar
only to the unionized sector of the industry. Haber and Levinson's
survey in the early 1950's was based almost entirely on union con-
tractors. 3 Foster and Northrup's empirical study covered only the
open shop sector, though they make some allegations about union
3 William Haber and Harold Levinson, Labor Relations and Productivity
in the Building Trades, University of Michigan Press, 1956.
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activity.4 As a result, there is still no clear understanding of the
extent to which the nonwage aspects of union impact are solely
attributable to unions themselves or largely a characteristic of the
"normal" labor market organization of the construction industry.
Obviously, some facts about the incidence and types of union impacts
on the industry must be gathered before any evaluation of the
contribution to or detraction from the efficiency of the industry can
be made.
More importantly, owing to the absence of comparative union/
nonunion field research, there is very little evidence in the labor
economics and industrial relations literature that academics really
understand the nature of union-management relations, particulary in
regard to the nonwage aspects of union behavior. Because collective
bargaining is an inherently adversary process, evidencing a struggle
over the distribution of gains from work, all aspects of union-manage-
ment relations have come to be interpreted in an adversary - or
distributive - context. This interpretation is particularly
characteristic of writing on craft unions, especially in the construction
industry. Yet, the lack of consistent and comparative evidence for
restrictive practices (in the building trades, at least) coupled with
the relative absence of acknowledgement of the positive contributions
that craft unions may make raises questions about a purely one-
dimensional, adversary or distributive, view of labor management
4 F. Northrup and Howard Foster, Open Shop Construction, University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1975.
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relations. It may be that union behavior makes some positive
contributions to management efficiency which are overlooked - or at
least under-emphasized - when union activity and goals are interpreted
solely in a distributive context.
In fact, descriptions of union non-wage behavior are more
often deduced by labor economists from the monopoly model of unionism
that they are induced from field research. According to the monopoly
model, a union which succeeds in raising wages above equilibrium must
then restrict entry to protect the disequilibrium wage. In its
simplest form, (see figure 4-1) the union raises the wage to W,
requiring that it restrict entry to Q; otherwise, workers out to Q on
the supply curve would be available for employment and bid wages down
to W*. While, in the very short run, strikes may play the role of
restricting supply, the union must adapt other means to sustain the
higher wage in the face of presumably elastic labor supply. These
"other means" are taken to be many of the nonwage elements of collective
bargaining. Thus, as Haber's quote above suggests, many of the
institutional activities of unions have been assumed to be the
necessary and rational manifestations of union wage gains.
In the following, a new attempt is made to define and
discuss objectively the key types of nonwage union impact in con-
struction. These impacts include: (1) jurisdictional definition;
(2) skill and wage structures; (3) technology and work rules; (4)
hiring and referral systems; and (5) training and apprenticeship
programs. On the basis of the existing research and theory a short
description of the supposed union impacts and goals is given for each
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of these five aspects of labor-management relations. Then, survey
results from interviews with sixty-five union and nonunion contractors
are presented in order to describe empirically, on a comparative
basis, actual labor-management practice. Finally, a sketchy and
somewhat intuitive "map" of the industry is developed which relates
particular types of nonwage behavior in the industry to firm and
project size; different product markets; and union and nonunion
organization.
Survey Issues and Methodology
To begin to answer many of the questions about the role of
nonwage union impacts on construction labor management, sixty-five
contractors were interviewed in Boston and Denver during the summer
of 1976. The survey approach was designed to contrast union and
nonunion contractors in comparable product markets and of comparable
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firm sizes. Thus, an attempt was made, given limited resources, to
include union and nonunion general and subcontractors, both small and
large firms, in residential, commercial, and heavy and highway
construction.
The survey instrument was designed largely on the basis of
informal discussions with nonunion contractors in the Boston area in
1975. The discussion topics covered: background information on the
type of firm; skill and occupation definitions; jurisdictional
problems; use of tools and materials; hiring practices; and training.
Because of the length of the final questionnaire developed from these
interviews, very few of these issues could be covered in depth. Each
alone is sufficient for a comparable union/nonunion study. As a
result, the survey coverage is occasionally incomplete, particularly
where the respondent chose to expound on one or more questions and
not on others.
Construction firms were chosen for the survey on the basis
of referrals by local contractor association representatives. Usually
the author was referred to specific individuals in the firm. Survey
interviews were usually held at the office of the contractor and
lasted from twenty minutes to an hour, depending on the time and
interest of the contractor. The survey approach was generally open-
ended; the range of issues discussed in the questionnaire was explained,
general comments were requested, and the ensuing conversation was
directed to complete most of the questions.
In general, gathering this kind of data on behavior of
workers, unions, and firms presents great problems for social
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scientists. If what is desired is a true reporting of day-to-day
operations in construction, then some form of participant observation
is best. Since the comparative approach of this survey would make
such participant observation costly and time-consuming, the survey
interviews had to be undertaken in a manner to evoke "honest" comments
and observations. In order to accomplish this, contractors were not
contacted on a random basis nor was the survey approach highly
structured or "objective". Rather, contractors were pre-selected by
association executives as those most likely to be cooperative and
informative. Personal referrals were made to the individuals inter-
viewed and, in at least some of the cases, the interviews began with
a general conversation about union or open shop problems in the
industry that served, among other things, to establish the credentials
of the interviewer as one who was well-informed about the industry
and not in need of a laborious education. While this approach may
have biased the sample of firms chosen or affected some of the survey
results, the purpose of the survey was not entirely to describe firms
themselves but to establish some general patterns of labor and manage-
ment behavior in the union and nonunion sectors of the industry.
More precise measurements and interpretations of these differences
may have to await in-depth study of each of the nonwage issues
described.
The following sections report on the survey findings. Five
issues are covered: (1) jurisdictional definitions; (2) skill levels
and occupational structure; (3) tools and work practices; (4) hiring
process; and (5) training and apprenticeships. Survey findings on
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these issues are reported for (1) general contractors in commercial
building, both small and large and union and nonunion, (2) for
subcontractors along the same dimensions. The information on open
shop general contractors is supplemented by material on the operations
of Daniels International Inc. and Brown and Root, Inc., as there are
no comparable nonunion general contractors in the Boston and Denver
area. In addition, general information on trends in the industry,
obtained from contractor association staffs and trade publications,
is included where relevant.
4.2 Jurisdiction--Introduction
Over the past eighty years or so of their history, U.S.
building trades unions have been continually plagued by problems of
jurisdictional definition and disputes. In the construction industry,
there have been two main underlying causes of these jurisdictional
difficulties. The first cause lies in the ambiguous character of a
craft union itself: an ambiguity which may give rise to competition
between craft unions or between craft and "industrial" unions in
organizing workers. The second cause lies in the tension between the
contractor's need for a flexible organization of on-site work and the
unions' desire for clear task demarcations which, by controlling jobs,
will help to maintain the political identity and economic strength of
the local union. Note that there are two meanings of "jurisdiction".
One is the allocation of organizing rights to a particular union, in
order to prevent dual or competitive unions within the AFL-CIO. The
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other is the content of work undertaken by the membership of a
particular building trades unions.
Craft unions in construction are organized by combining
workers with particular tasks or capabilities into self-governing
local bodies. At present, there are eighteen different building
trade unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO, each of which is granted
"exclusive jurisdiction" over the organizing workers within its craft
(See Table 4.1). However, the existing craft structure of the union
organization has been determined and shaped as much by historical
circumstance and political forces as by construction technology and
labor market conditions. In the nineteenth century, most craft unions
were very narrowly defined around workers with a single capability
and function. By the end of the nineteenth century, as larger national
unions grew out of local associations, rivalries occurred as to which
unions would organize which workers. The desire of some unions to
enlarge and strengthen their political and economic structure led to
the inclusion of workers in related, or even distant, occupations.
Different philosophies of union organization, such as the "one big
union" of the Knights of Labor, also led to an attempt to organize
regardless of occupation, rather than because of it. The present
craft structure of the U.S. building trades is, then partly a result
of these union rivalries. The rivalries brought the creation of the
Building Trades Departent in the AFL in 1908, which made many attempts
to resolve jurisdiction problems in organizing, but competition
-137-
Table 4.1
BUILDING TRADES' UNIONS AND THEIR JURISDICTIONS
(Some Examples)
UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS - The Brotherhood assertsjurisdiction over most work operations involving wood, plastics, and
metals where used in place of wood (such as light metal stucco), and
substitute materials, and over thirty subdivisions of the carpenter's
trade. The major occupational elements of the international are
general-construction carpenters, millwrights, piledrivers, marine
carpenters, millmen, lumber and sawmill workers, and furniture workers.
Most members are organized into either general-construction, pile-
drivers, dock builders, millwrights, or wood-products-industry
locals. The general construction locals are by far the largest
element of the international union.
THE UNION ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES OF THE PLUMBING
AND PIPE FITTING INDUSTRY - The UA has membership and bargaining
agreements in the following industries: industrial maintenance,
pipeline construction, gas distribution and utilities, pipe-
fabrication shops, panelboards, instrumentation and control manu-
facturing, refrigeration and air-conditioning installation, building
construction, and naval and private shipyards.
THE BRICKLAYERS, MASONS AND PLASTERERS INTERNATIONAL UNION - the
BMPIU asserts jurisdiction over the following types of work: brick-
masonry, stonemasonry, marble masonry, plastering, marbel, mosaic
and terrazzo work, the laying, pointing, calking and cleaning, and
cement or concrete-block laying. Local unions may be of a single
type, or mixed. Large cities have the most extensive specialization
of craft and local union jurisdictions. In New York City, there are
separate locals of brickmasons, pointers, and tile setters, each
with an exclusive jurisdiction.
THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS - The IBEW includes
membership in the following industries: electrical construction,
electrical manufacturing, communications (including radio, television,
telephone), and power utilities. The international asserts jurisdiction
over the manufacture, assembly, construction, installation erection,
maintenance, repair, and operation of all electrical equipment and
all materials and equipment required in the production and delivery
of electricity.
SHEET METAL WORKERS' INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION - The jurisdiction
of the international includes fabrication, assembly, handling, and
erection of all sheetmetal work, including all air-handling systems,
ductwork, etc. The union represents employees of contractors in
the building industry and of production or industrial companies in
railroads, shipyards, etc.
Source: D.Q. Mills, "The Labor Force and Industrial Relations" in
J. O'Brien and R. Zilly (eds) Contractor's Management Handbook
McGraw-Hill, 1971.
-138-
persisted, both between the AFL unions and later between them and the
CIO. At present, the matter continues to be resolved by the granting
of exclusive jurisdiction to the different craft unions and by policing
of those jurisdictions by the Building Trades Department.
As the result of this evolution of the construction craft
union in the U.S., the narrowness of the craft oriented union has
sometimes been lost. Some craft unions grew by resolving jurisdictional
problems through amalgamation: the plumber, pipefitters, and steam-
fitters, for example, is a combined union of various pipe trades or
specializations which in many cases existed as separate local craft
unions. (In some cases, usually in large cities, there are still
separate locals for plumbers and pipefitters in the U.A.) Other
unions, like the carpenter, joiners, and millwrights, grew both by
amalgamation; by organizing factory workers doing cabinetry and by
signing up ancillary trades, such as the floor layers. Still other
unions, like the Elevator Constructors, combine different workers of
different skills around the installation of a particular product.
Finally, some unions like the ironworkers do not include any semi-
skilled workers or laborers while others, like the bricklayers and
masons do. As a consequence, there is a separate union in the building
trades for common laborers whose jurisdiction includes the less
skilled work outside of all of the other trades.
Not only is the organization structure of craft unions in
the U.S. not always determined by the particular skills of workers,
the structure is unique to the U.S. Other countries, with similar if
-139-
not identical construction technology, manifest a different variety
of craft organizations. In England, the plumbers and electricians
form one union. In Denmark, all of the laborers and semi-skilled
workers are in one large union while the craft unions are limited to
highly skilled specialists.
Thus, the present structure of the building trades unions
established the concept of exclusive jurisdiction over types of con-
struction work. The carpenters control work relating to wood, but
also are assigned some tasks which involve metal (normally the province
of ironworkers) because these tasks were formerly done by carpenters
before metal forms and frames were substituted for wood ones.
Electricians control all installation of materials relating to
electrical conduit and fixtures, and so forth. Records of jurisdic-
tional agreements between trades are described in "the Green Book",
which is published by the National Joint Board for the Settlement of
Jurisdictional Disputes. The Board both attempts to come to voluntary
agreements over the assignment of work, particularly in the case
of new materials and technology, as well as acting to resolve juris-
dictional disputes which occur in the industry.
Jurisdictional disputes arise on the work site for a variety
of reasons. (Note again, as Dunlop comments, that "In the jurisdic-
tional dispute proper the contending organizations are not seeking new
members; they are demanding the work in dispute for existing members.")
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One fairly comprehensive list of dispute causes included: 5
1. overlapping of jurisdictional claims and skills
of craft unions
2. existence of dual unionism
3. aggressiveness of some unions
4. changes in methods, machinery, and materials
5. actions of employers
6. differing local customs or practice
The concept of exclusive jurisdiction and the activities
of the Joint Board have not served to eliminate all disputes caused for
any one or more of these reasons. Of the six mentioned, existence of
dual unions is probably the least important: dual unionism is usually
not an issue between the AFL Building Trades, although it often is a
cause of disputes between the building trades and the teamsters. The
relative importance of other causes of disputes is unknown. The most
recent detailed study of jurisdictional problems found, though, that
most of the disputes occurred between eight unions and usually involved
work in the boundary between the skills or materials used by different
crafts. 6 Although not all jurisdictional disputes result in work
5 Kenneth Strand, Jurisdictional Disputes in Construction
(Washington State University Press, 1961).
6 Ibid., pp. 50-55.
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stoppages, the number of stoppages is very high--partly due to the
short-term nature of most construction work. In many cases the
disputes are caused, willingly or unwillingly, by contractors. In
construction contractors have the management responsibility to make
the work assignment, but to do it in accordance with Green Book
regulations or, in their absence, in accordance with "area practice."
In undertaking their management role, contractors may cause disputes
by: making no assignment; making mistakes about assignments;
economizing and assigning work in one jurisdiction to another trade
with a lower rate (this is often the cause of disputes between
carpenters and laborers); or by assigning work to their permanent
journeymen, in order to keep them employed, even though the work is
in the province of another union. Finally, general contractors and
various subcontractors may compete among themselves for particular
work and this competition may result in the trades they employ crossing
jurisdictional lines.
In sum, in terms of the day-to-day operations of a construction
project, jurisdictions define occupational boundaries between tasks.
Disputes arise apparently because the variety of construction work is
so great that there are almost always opportunities to use men outside
of their trade jurisdiction. This kind of short-run flexibility may
be very important to construction management: it permits temporarily
unused men to fill in at other tasks and it saves hiring specialized
workers for only a small quantity of work. To the extent that unions
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are rigid about jurisdictional assignments, this management flexibility
is severely constrained and project costs may be increased. And, in
general, one of the greatest sources of management resentment of
unions, in construction and in other industries, is their interference
with "the right to manage" which of course includes work assignment.
Despite all of the research and management concern about
jurisdictional problems in construction, there have been two basic
issues overlooked. The first is to what extent the existance of
jurisdictions is unique to union construction. The implication of
some of the writing on craft unions is that jurisdictions are, in
large part, relatively arbitrary occupational boundaries drawn to
suit the political and institutional needs of the unions themselves.
This view tends to support a belief that jurisdictional rules are
created, maintained, and imposed by unions on the industry in
furtherance of their political and short-run economic goals. It may
be, however, the jurisdictions only reflect "natural" groupings of tasks
into occupations as they would occur in construction without the
presence of unions. Only a detailed comparison of union and nonunion
construction can substantiate the sources of jurisdictional definition.
Second, jurisdictions, as they are codified by union
agreements, obviously restrict the short-run flexibility of labor
allocation in construction. Yet they have obvious benefits in creating
and protecting the jobs and occupational rights of different groups
of workers. In fact, Dunlop refers to jurisdiction as defining labor
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"property" which the unions protect. Other analysts speak of the
role jurisdictions play in creating employment and see them as the
worker's justifiable response to a perceived "job scarcity". These
distributional purposes of jurisdictions may be verifiable and should
be subject to survey research.
It is clear that jurisdictions may play a beneficial
political role of limiting competition between unions, but that this
jurisdictional structure, if rigidly adhered to, will limit management
flexibility and may create some inefficiencies in the allocation of
labor on job-sites. Further, it is apparent that jurisdiction may
also benefit various workers to the extent they create jobs or prevent
the erosion of jobs through competition by other (cheaper) trades.
So jurisdictions are important to maintaining a union and union power.
What is not clear is: (1) to what extent are jurisdictions "foreign"
or "artificial" or obsolete or obstructionist definitions of occupation
which are imposed on the industry by unions, or to what extent are
they simply codifications of an occupational structure created by
technology and labor market forces; and (2) to what extent do
jurisdictions and craft unions stabilize the labor force in the
industry by helping to define how workers can be screened, hired,
specialized in training, and employed. In other words, formal
occupational definition and identity may be important in providing
security and status to skilled workers in an industry such as
construction. Some occupational definition may come naturally
through the labor market and the craft unions in these cases may only
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reflect and amplify that. In other cases, there may be no inherent
or necessary definition of an occupation due to the variety and
flexibility of the work. In these circumstances, the unions, through
craft and jurisdictional definitions, may help impose a structure
which will result in clear work assignments, wage scales, and status
differentiation.
This clear occupational definition may be crucial to
maintaining a skilled labor force attached to an industry where the
employment relation with particular firms is very unstable. By
providing such definition and contributing to the maintenance of a
skilled labor force, jurisdictions may actually increase the efficiency
of the industry. Only a comparison between union and nonunion
construction establish where occupations are basically endogenous and
unions pick them up and where unions exogenously impose jurisdictional
categories which may have both distributive and efficiency implications.
The structure of management in the construction industry
adds an additional complication to the understanding of jurisdictions.
Construction activity is organized around two basic types of firms,
general contractors and subcontractors that undertake specific, though
varied, parts of a construction project. Some idea of the complexity
of work on even small buildings is given by the list of nearly forty
areas of expenditure in Table 4.2. Each one of these areas may be
the content of work assigned to one subcontractor on a particular
project. However, the exact division of labor between general and
subcontractors will vary over both projects and product markets.
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Table 4.2
COMMERCIAL BUILDING COMPONENTS
General conditions and management
Sitework (clearing and grubbing)
Roads and walks
Landscaping
Excavation
Caissons and pilings
Formed concrete
Exterior masonry
Structural steel
Miscellaneous metal, including stairs
Ornamental metal
Carpentry
Air conditioning enclosures
Waterproofing and dampproofing
Roofing and flashing
Metal doors and frames
Metal windows
Wood doors, windows, and trim
Hardware
Glass and glazing
Store front and lobby
Curtain wall
Lath and plaster
Drywall
Tile work
Terrazzo
Acoustical ceiling
Resilient flooring
Carpet
Painting
Toilet partitions
Special equipment
Elevators
Plumbing
Sprinklers
HVAC
Electrical
Miscellaneous
Parking
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In some cases, the general may play a very small part in actual on-
site labor and limit its role to the management of a large group of
highly specialized subcontracting firms.
The firm structure of general and subcontractors may be
both wider or narrower than craft jurisdictions. In many cases,
there will be a rough coincidence between the work of the subcontractor,
say heating, plumbing and air conditioning firms, and the crafts they
employ: plumbers and pipefitters; sheet metal workers; and insulators.
When this occurs, it is in the interest of the subcontractor to
support the jurisdictional claims of the crafts: jurisdictions will
define a joint monopoly on work. But such coincident interests do
not always hold. The work of general contractors may overlap several
jurisdictions and thus the interests of the firm may be at best neutral
with regard to work assignment. At the other extreme, a subcontractor
may be so specialized, say in parquet floor laying, as to work entirely
within one sub-craft area: floorlayers of the carpenters. In between,
conflicts between subcontractors over work may become jurisdictional
disputes between crafts.
The complexity of the relation between craft unions and the
specialization of firms in construction obviously destroys any attempt
to portray jurisdictional lines as union artifacts or as antithetical
to management's interests. Thus, it is important to describe how
union and management interests converge and diverge in this area and
compare the resulting structures and tensions to behavior in open shop
construction.
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Firms and Jurisdiction: Survey Results
General Contractors
Most of the anecdotes concerning jurisdictional problems
come from the context of the union general contractor. This is
because the general usually hires a group of related trades, commonly
referred to as the "basic trades" which construct the structural
frame of a building. Among these trades are carpenters, laborers,
bricklayers, cement masons, iron workers, and operating engineers.
Since these trades normally work together on a site during the early
stages of construction there is continual opportunity for disputes
over jurisdiction.
In Boston and Denver, however, the survey results showed
that union contractors, though irate about jurisdictional rigidities,
also enjoyed considerable flexibility in craft assignment. Large
union general contractors were most concerned about jurisdictional
problems. But this concern did not stem from a sense of any inefficiency
causes by the existence of jurisdictional lines. Rather, it was due
to the costly nature of the disputes themselves in terms of lost work-
time. Either avoiding, if possible, or resolving, if necessary,
jurisdictional stoppages was a continual, onerous burden on project
management. Continual attempts to resolve the bases of the disputes
through formal boards for hearings or through contract language
revision have apparently failed to eliminate them.
In Boston in 1976, for example, all specific jurisdictional
language between carpenters and laborers had been removed from
contracts to remove any incentive for disputes. The contracts still
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stipulated that assignments were to be made "in accordance with area
practice." At least one union project superintendent thought this
would be enough to permit disputes to arise if pushed by an ambitious
steward or truculent business agent.
Though disputes are clearly a problem for the large union
contractor, the existence of jurisdictions per se does not appear to
be. Most of the contractors work on projects of a sufficient scale
to employ dozens of men in different trades. This scale of work
supports the division of labor defined by jurisdictions. Several
carpenters can be employed at the same time in various aspects of
carpentry work. Crews of ironworkers (rodmen) and cement masons can
work exclusively on large-scale contract forms and slabs. In the
context of a large construction project, disputes only arise over new
materials in tasks on the boundary of different jurisdictions. The
only real problem of efficient allocation of labor which large
contractors face is in having a "multi-skilled" crew to complete work
not done by the basic trades or specialty subcontractors. At the end
of large projects, one contractor reported, there is always a large
volume of detailed work to be finished: light plates to be put on;
doors to be painted; glass panes to be fixed or installed. Most of
these simple tasks could be done by experienced laborers--who are on
the site cleaning up--but jurisdictional rules prevent laborers from
doing any of this work. As a result, journeymen in diferent trades
have to be brought back, usually for a full-day, to do a few hours
work.
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Small union general contractors could be greatly hindered
by jurisdictional rules. A small construction job, requiring a half
dozen men, might not have sufficient work to employ carpenters, iron-
workers, operating engineers, etc. full time every day, but under
rigid jurisdictions such trades would have to be employed whenever
even a small amount of work in their craft was needed. In many cases,
small union generals are not hindered because these jurisdictional
rules are not enforced. In setting concrete, for example, union
generals use their carpenters and laborers to do the work of iron-
workers and cement masons to avoid employing these trades for only a
few hours a day. These minor infractions of union rules are usually
overlooked, especially if they are of short duration or in rural
areas where it is obvious that importing another craft is costly.
Overlooking these incidents gives both a contractor and the union a
flexibility to adapt jurisdiction rules to differing circumstances.
The only problem is that the contractor bears the risk: the rules
always could be enforced. Thus it is hard for him to bid a job and
know beforehand exactly what his labor costs might be. So the
flexibility helps the efficiency of the small general, but the
uncertainty makes it risky for the contractor to bid very low. One
small contractor in Denver noted that he had to bid concrete work on
one project at a cost of $2500. If he could get by doing it with his
own supervisor setting the reinforcing bars as he usually did the
cost would be only $800.
The experience of union generals outside of the commercial
building area is less well documented. One or two interviews with
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heavy and highway contractors show an even greater jurisdictional
mixing than among small union generals. Contractors employing
laborers, operating engineers, and carpenters in water and sewer
plant construction or in highway report an almost complete intermixing
of tasks. Carpenters will do laborer's work; laborers will serve as
operators on small equipment; both will do iron and concrete work.
Whether this is common practice or just incidental is unknown. It
may be that in union work which depends largely on only the three
trades mentioned informal procedures for working across jurisdictions
have developed.
In general, then, while the work-assignment implications of
jurisdictional boundaries are easy to document in their absurd extreme
they are not always inefficient in the union contractor. Large-scale
work makes them relatively efficient; small-scale work may find them
ignored. In all cases, of course, the role jurisdictions actually do
play is at the discretion of the business agent and/or steward of the
crafts involved. Outside of jurisdiction disputes themselves, one
major problem jurisdiction lines cause is in the uncertainty they
raise about manning.
Apparently, the other major difficulty with jurisdictions
for the union general is the lack of fit beween the occupations they
define and the firm's on-site labor needs. Over the past seventy
years, changes in construction technology have reduced the general
contractor to largely a project management role. Whereas the general,
with his own workforce, used to undertake the construction of the
foundation and structural frame of a building, the continual
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development of sophisticated steel and concrete technology has moved
most of the generals' main tasks off to subcontractors. On major
buildings or projects (from two or three million dollars) speciality
subcontractors will be engaged for steel frame erection or for use of
particular forming devices for cement foundations or floors. As a
result, the on-site activities of the general contractor are usually
confined to small tasks: "anything the subcontractors don't do."
For these tasks, the generals will employ carpenters and laborers
but, as mentioned above, they need workers with skills in other areas.
Thus, in the area of general contracting, the craft occupational
structure of the basic trades unions are, in formal terms, somewhat
out of date with the changes in technology and firm structure.
Among non-union generals, there is a great sense of pride
in their flexible work-force. All of the non-union generals interviewed
in Boston and Denver were small contractors. As a result, their
scale of operations on-site rarely justified more than one dozen men
specializing in the basic trades. These journeymen often had
occupational labels similar to union journeymen, but did a wide
variety of other tasks. For example, carpenters would often do iron
work or laborers would work on painting if the need arose on-site.
Although labeled as a particular trade, the non-union generals often
spoke of these men as general mechanics who did "everything the
subcontractors didn't do." This blurring of occupational lines
usually occurred for one of several reasons: most often, it was due
simply to the variety of tasks needed to be done on small-scale
construction, where there was not enough work to support one or more
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full-time ironworkers, operating engineers, etc. Being exposed to
this variety, men would tend to pick up complementary skills in
building and use these when necessary to complete a day's work or a
job. Some open shop contractors began to formalize this process and
refer to their men as general mechanics composing a "work crew". The
crew itself would be charged with a particular aspect of construction:
pouring cement slabs in forms; or erecting a steel building. In the
cement slab example, members of the crew would do all the work of
five trades. (In union construction, laborers and operating engineers
would clear, grade and grout the site; carpenters would build cement
forms; ironworkers would set the reinforcing bars; and laborers and
cement masons would pour and finish the concrete.) In nonunion work,
a contractor will use a crew which will do little else except cement
slab work and whose members will know enough of each of the trade
specialities to do the type and scale of work the contractor undertakes.
In the erection of metal buildings, the workers were basically
ironworkers, rigging a frame in a building and attaching metal siding
and roofs, but in the course of construction would also operate small
cranes or do light carpentry. As a result, new occupations were in
fact formed, "general building mechanic" combining many of the skills
of the basic trades or a "steel building erector," adding to the
skills of an ironworker those of carpentry, roofer, and crane operator.
However, the exact content or nomenclature used to describe these
occupations varied by contractor. Some open shop contractors were
very similar in the variety of tasks performed by their "carpenters",
others were traditional in not extensively mixing tasks into new
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occupations. In effect, the contractor was free to create occupations
as the nature of the project or the capabilities of his labor force
permitted. Thus, the freedom of work assignment, coupled with the
variety of tasks associated with different types of building, leads
to a very fluid occupational definition. It should be stressed though
that the occupations which result are not entirely open. They are
largely shaped by the particular product the contractor is constructing;
thus occupations are organized around a type or phase of construction:
concrete forms; structural framing; metal buildings, etc.
Among large non-union generals like Daniels and Brown and
Root, jurisdictional lines and on-site work organization is very
similar to union work. Again, it is the scale of activity which
supports the craft specializations defined as jurisdictions. (However,
there are major differences in skill levels and skill ratios used by
large non-union generals and these are described in the next section).
Non-union generals like Daniels and Brown and Root do not hire men
classified as "general mechanics" nor do they tend to move men from
craft area to craft area on a job-site. Rather, the large projects
which they build will often employ hundreds of workers of one craft--
such as pipefitters--who will do nothing but cut, fit, and weld pipe.
Of course, these contractors do enjoy a complete absence of jurisdictional
lines and can move men to any small specific tasks when needed, but
all the while they program and organize the on-site workforce using
mostly common craft classifications.
The large nonunion generals do, however, report differences
from similar union general contractors. First, they can create one
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or two new occupations to suit a particular type of work. For example,
Brown and Root constructs a large number of chemical plants which
require numerous values and instruments throughout the piping system.
The company has developed a single classification, instrument fitter,
to specialize in this work. Second, both Daniels and Brown and Root
report that many of the men hired as semi-skilled mechanics for
routine carpentry or cement work early in a project may stay on, be
re-trained on-site, and do routine electrical or painting work in the
later stages on construction. Whether this crossing of jurisdictional
lines over-time, as it were, is unique to open shop construction is
not known.
Subcontractors
Among nonunion subcontractors, the lack of formal juris-
dictional lines has two contrasting implications. First, it may make
very little difference since the occupational structure of the mechanical
trades is often defined "exogenously" by state licensing of electricians
and plumbers or by the structure of subcontracting. State licensing
boards define tests for construction occupations by reflecting
"traditional" practice in the industry. (This usually means adopting
union occupational structure.) The structure of subcontracting also
defines similar occupations in the mechanical trades: many open shop
subs are identical types of electrical, plumbing, or HVAC firms as
their union counterparts. However, the second implication of the lack
of jurisdiction rigidity is that some occupation flexibility is
possible. This can occur in one of two ways: first, it permits
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mechanical crafts to do (or not do) certain related tasks at the
discretion of the contractor. For example, open shop plumbers often
dig their own trenches for pipe--something they would require laborers
to do on union work. Laborers or helpers can be used in open shop
construction to wash sinks and bathtubs or set fixtures, work which
union plumbers control. In addition, pipefitters may also do pipe
insulation work in open shop construction: something which is the
province of another trade in union construction. So, the lack of
jurisdiction does give the open shop subcontrctor greater flexibility
to do ancillary work.
In addition, the jurisdiction flexibility also permits men
to be shifted about within large diversified subcontracting firms.
For example, open subs in Boston and Denver often combine plumbing
subcontracting with HVAC work. The former requires plumbers working
on wet pipe, the latter requires sheet metal fabrication. In a firm
which does both, those who are specialists in either can be combined
with or supplemented by men who can do a little (or a lot) of both.
In this way, the firm can maintain permanent employment of its
workforce by shifting them from product to product as demand changes.
In other words, jurisdiction flexibility contributes to the diver-
sification of the firm and may make possible larger, yet reasonably
stable, subcontractors.
This kind of shifting of men as demand changes within a firm
is similar to an aspect of jurisdiction flexibility in large open
shop generals discussed above. Even though, at one point in time,
their jurisdiction lines and occupations look similar to union ones,
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they claim that some men work at different trades at different times
over the life of the project. For example, carpenters may work on
wood forms for the first year of a large job and then move to be
electrician helpers (doing light wiring) in later stages. When men
are deeply trained in one occupation, as in union work, and codify
this by union membership in that craft, this kind of flexibility over
time rarely occurs.
Finally, all open shop contractors commented that jurisdiction
flexibility was very important to them in employing men in seasonal
lows. During winter months, any particular firm may have little
work for its permanent crew of journeymen. If these men are constrained
by rigid limits on what they can do, their employability is obviously
limited. Open shop employees credit their (self-described) ability to
ensure more permanent employment to their workers to lack of juris-
diction lines. (Note, however, that this permanent employment may in
fact only be a function of size. Small union contractors also try
to maintain most of their workforce on a year-round basis. And, on
the average, other survey data do not substantiate the assertion
that men work more hours per year in open shop as opposed to union
construction.
Residential Contruction
The construction of dwellings is, in itself, at least three
different types of industries. Many single-family houses are built
by very small builders/developers who are also their own contractors
and labor force. A few larger builders in the industry develop
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tracts or garden apartments on a speculative basis, acting as their
own general contractors and using all subcontractors for the actual
on-site work. High rise apartments and condominiums are built by
developers who usually take bid from both generals and subs and let
the general manage the on-site work. These developers act, then,
much like a client for commercial and industrial building.
Because of the limited scope of the survey, very few builders
were interviewed in Boston and Denver. Those that were fell into the
middle category implied above: developers who built annually ten to
twenty single family homes or a similar number of garden apartments.
In both cities, the majority of single-family and low-rise residential
construction is nonunion. These builders usually employ only a few
on-site workers, whose skills may range from a general superintendent
to a simple cleaning laborer or satchman. Almost all of the on-site
work is done by subcontractors. One builder listed fifteen to twenty
different subs whom he employed at different times and whose duties
encompassed the entire range of construction. Many of these subs
worked regularly for the builder; others were contacted through
competitive bidding procedures. Most of the subcontractors are
also nonunion. The exception to this in the two cities are subs on
very large scale developments; on high-rise buildings; or on publicly
subsidized new construction.
A representative list of subcontractors is given in
Table 4.3. It is obvious that "jurisdictions" as such do not exist
in open shop residential building except as they are defined by the
subcontract. Flooring subs, for example, will have men whose tasks
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are defined solely by the product which they install. Different
types of flooring (tile v. carpet) may bring different subcontrcting
firms or different specialities from the same firm. As a result, the
occupational structure in residential work is defined by very narrow,
almost single task, jobs. The degree of specialization which can
occur is exemplified by carpenters who do framing.
Table 4.3 Residential
General Excavation
Landscaping
Sidewalks and driveway
Foundation
General Framing
Roofing and Siding
Windows
Electrical
Plumbing
Subcontractors
Heating
Insulation
Drywall
Finish Carpentry
Flooring
Ceramic Tile
Painting
Ceilings
Brickwork
When one of these was asked to define his job he replied, a "second
floor framer." In other words, within a crew erecting the wooden
frame of a house, he would only work on the second floor beams and
joists. Other "carpenters" working for sliding roofing, or interior
subs, would then come in and do paneling in each of those areas. So,
in sum, the concept of jurisdiction exists in residential work not
around a general trade but as a function of the extreme spcialization
of the subcontractor and his individual workmen.
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4.3 Skill Level and Skill Structure
Union crafts usually organize their internal skill structure
into two basic categories: journeymen and apprentices. Journeymen
are those highly skilled, "well-rounded" craftsmen who make up the
core of the workforce. In theory, their skill level is defined by
the accomplishment of all the tasks set forth in a multi-year apprentice
training program. Apprentices are, of course, learning to become
journeymen by following a prescribed course of training composed of
on-the-job experience in specified tasks and after hours instruction.
It is difficult to describe, in the abstract, how the label
"journeymen" describes the skill level of a worker. The craft union
usually defines the range of mechanical competence of the journeyman
by the training program for apprenticeship. In addition, the tradition
of craft unions and the organization of craft work carry the implications
that it is the journeyman who both embodies the standards of the
craft and is capable of self-supervision in meeting them. Thus, a
journeyman is ideally more than simple one skilled worker in a job
hierarchy: he is an independent craftsman charged with defining what
needs to be done and accomplishing it efficiently and competently.
The problem with this abstract ideal of a journeyman's
skills is that the definition may have no basis in fact, either as a
description of how a building trades journeyman actually works or
even as a concept. The craft unions of the building trades are
themselves not particularly oquacious on their definition of a
journeyman. Journeymen are usually described as simply those mechanics
who can earn the hourly wage that union members receive. In addition,
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the reality of craft union operation, as described below, often fails
to meet many of the presumed ideals set forth above on a journeyman's
skills. As a consequence, it may be better simply to describe what
journeymen are found to do in union construction and relate this to a
skill level. Then we can return to the issue as to whether this
description of a journeyman best suits the "craft" ideal described
above, or another sense of craft organization, or even of a distinctive
craft mode of work at all.
Union General Contractors
Union general contractors employ journeymen and apprentices
in the basic trades: carpentry, ironworkers, operating engineers,
bricklayers, cement masons. Formally, the range of skills of these
men varies only between that of the journeyman at one hourly rate and
apprentices at various percentages of the hourly rate depending on
years in the program. All work within the jurisdiction of each trade
must be performed then by these skill levels--from first year apprentice
through journeyman. Again, formally, there are two supplements to
this skill structure: laborers who do routine, unskilled work
complementary to some of the trades activities (but of course outside
their jurisdiction) and foremen who supervise the journeyman in one
trade or several trades. In two of the basic trades, there are also
categories of helpers: unskilled or semiskilled men who do routine
work, in aid of the journeyman. For bricklayers, these are the
"tenders" who carry bricks and mortar. for operating engineers, they
are the oilers who clean, oil, and do simple maintenance on equipment.
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This formal skill structure also carries with it, as a part of union
contracts, rigid ratios of the number of apprentices to journeyman.
These ratios, which usually range around one apprentice to every four
or five journeymen, serve to limit the number of lesser skilled
mechanics in each craft in or attached to a firm. As a result of the
definitions of jurisdiction, journeymen, and apprentice and the ratios
in the contract, the skill structure of a general contractor is
formally shaped like a diamond: there are a few foremen on top, a
large number of undifferentiated journeymen in the middle and a small
number of apprentices (supplemented by helpers in the cases mentioned)
at the bottom. This skill structure is matched by a wage structure.
The union contract sets a journeyman's hourly wage (at a minimum);
defines a minium increment per hour for foreman; and sets a wage
scale for apprentices as a function of a percent of the journeyman's
wage. So, from the point of view of the firm, there is a clear skill
structure attached to a fairly rigid wage structure. More importantly,
each skill category is defined implicitly as homogenous: all journeymen
must receive the same (minimum) hourly wage and benefits.
In fact, the structure is not so simple. When interviewed,
union contractors stressed the following points about their workers:
- All journeymen are by no means of comparable mechanical
skill, supervisory capability, or productivity. The best journeymen
are usually referred to a "lead men" or "key men" and they form the
core of a small work crew. These key men, while perhaps earning the
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contract hourly wage or slight premiums above it, are rewarded by
relatively permanent employment with the firm and by annual bonuses
when profits permit.
- Other journeymen, which a contractor may hire through the
business agent or from referrals by his foreman or workers, vary in
skill level, as one put it, "from zero to 100". Many contractors
said that they had to take ten carpenters from the hall to be sure
of finding one good one to employ. (The rest are released after a
day or so) Another contractor spoke of being referred men who were
so incompetent as carpenters that they ruined door assemblies during
installation--at a cost of $350 per assembly.
- The contractors stressed that the ability of the union to
supply reasonably skilled men varied with the state of the labor
market. In peaks of activity, good men were impossible to get and
were never available through the hall. In slumps, capable men came
directly to the firm or were referred by word of mouth through present
employees. Over-all, however, the union was recognized as providing
a pool of reasonably skilled men who could be easily assembled in
large numbers. It is simply reported that the variance in skill
level was quite high.
Due to the differences in skills, contractors resented
paying one wage to all journeymen. They also felt that journeymen
were being overpaid to do many routine tasks that fell within their
jurisdiction. As far as possible, apprentices, being the only source
of cheap labor, were used for these duties--a situation which does
not always contribute to their training. Of course, the restrictions
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on number of apprentices reduced their availability for routine work
also. In some cases, the skill levels or productivity of entire
trades was in disrepute. Carpenters in Boston were thought to be
largely incompetent by some contractors, even for the simple task of
rough carpentry used by many generals in concrete setting. One
general commented that most of his laborers were better carpenters
than the craftsmen themselves. Ironworkers were described as another
trade with very low productivity, less because of lack of skill than
due to an unwillingness to work. There were frequent complaints in
Boston but not in Denver of getting "4 hours work for 8 hours pay."
Whether these complaints about the skill level or attitude
of individuals in trades is justified or not, there is a consistent
report in both cities of tremendous variations in journeyman skill
levels. Since this variation cannot be reflected in hourly wages, it
was compensated for by annual income: the best journeymen were
employed the longest. The worst worked fewer hours per year usually
for a number of different contractors. Of course, while this variation
in annual income may serve to equilibrate labor supply, ensuring that
the best are rewarded, contractors still faced a distortion due to
having to pay a single hourly wage. As a result, most reacted very
favorably when a less rigid wage structure was suggested: they would,
for example, welcome three classifications of carpenters, with
differing wage scales, depending on ability. Although it was unclear
who would determine what defined the skill in each wage category,
the sense of having some recognized wage variation among journeymen
was accepted.
-164-
Union Subcontractors
Many of the same problems with union skill categories and
structure were mentioned by union subcontractors. They felt also that
the variance in skills of journeymen did not justify a single hourly
wage--particularly the high ones now prevailing. They felt the need
for other categories or levels in the skill structure, to provide a
job for "helpers" to do routine work now assigned to journeymen or
the few apprentices. The importance of helpers was particularly
stressed by the mechanical subs whose skilled journeyman electricians
and plumbers do most of the unskilled work in their trade due to
jurisdictional restrictions. For example, only electricians can
unload electrical supplies from trucks, pull wire through conduits,
or do other unskilled jobs related to electrical wiring. Plumbers
also do all the routine tasks associated with pipe installation:
from carrying of material to the washing of bathtubs.
Again, apprentices can be used to do many of these tasks
(and usually are) but both their scarcity and their cost make them
inefficient for this. (Hourly wage and apprentices are no longer low
for many of the mechanical trades due to the rapid rise in the wages
of the journeymen's scale.) One major difference between the union
generals and the mechanical subs is in reaction to skill variance.
Since electricians and plumbers have to be licensed by the state,
most licensed mechanics are competent craftsmen. Outside of this,
the desire for a helper category in the main mechanical trades and
the need for some wage flexibility by skill level was evident.
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Open Shop Generals and Subcontractors
The skill and wage structure in open shop construction
differs in two major ways from union firms. First, the concept of
journeymen is more loosely conceived and accompanied by suitably
varied wages. Second, there is greater reliance on semi-skilled
workers to perform routine tasks.
Among nonunion generals, the appellation "journeyman"
usually is simply used to describe more highly paid members of the
workforce. The skills of these journeymen vary within firms and
across firms. In some cases, they may be highly skilled carpenters;
in others, they may be jack-of-all trades whose value lies not in
their depth of skill in any one trade but in their versatility. Wage
variations, again within and/or across firms, reflect these skill
differences. Differences in wages also reflect different values
contractors place on different attributes of the worker. Character-
istics such as "mechanical skill", "attitude", "experience", and so
forth are all rewarded, but different contractors place different
weights on each.
Most general contractors also employ helpers in the basic
trades. These men can be simply semi-skilled workers doing the
routine work in specific trades or can be floaters who do less skilled
work across many trades. In many cases, these helpers are informal
apprentices: men hired with the expectation that they will learn on
the job and progress to higher skills levels and journeyman status.
However, the management flexibility of nonunion work permits helpers
also to be paid a range of wages, again on a basis of the contractors
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weighing of various personal attributes. In addition, since the firm
is not constrained by apprentice ratios in collective bargaining
contracts, as many helpers can be hired as desired. There is nothing
to prevent the substitution of cheaper, lesser skilled men for more
highly trained, experienced journeymen. As a result, open shop firms
often work on a ratio of from one helper to one journeyman to five
helpers to one "lead" journeyman.
Very large open shop generals like Daniels and Brown and
Root have formalized this skill structure around the use of semi-
skilled, partially trained mechanics. Brown and Root in particular
has adopted a skill structure within each craft that comprises four
grades of skill. For example, pipe fitters range from an entry level
of pipefitter I, where a worker is still receiving elementary training
after hours, to a pipefitter IV, the highest rank below "craftsman"
status. (In Brown and Root terminology, a craftsman is comparable to
a well-rounded, experienced journeyman). The four grades of pipefitter
are differentiated by specific skill attainments and by commensurate
wage levels. Of course, this structure is similar to that of a union
journeyman and first to four year apprentices. However, there are
two important differences: there are no restrictions placed on the
number of lower grade pipefitters and there are no time limits on
progress for a one grade to another.
Open shop subcontractors cover a range of types of construction
and exhibit a variety of firm characteristics. In Boston and Denver
most all small-scale residential work is performed by small open shop
subs. As described above, these firms are likely to be very small
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and highly specialized. Often they are composed of one "master" who
contracts the work on a fixed-fee basis from a builder and then hires
specialists to complete the contract. For example, a framing sub may
simply be one man who does the bidding and organizes the on-site
work with several hired carpenters to help. Since the work is done
on a fixed-price basis, speed in production is the source of profits.
As a consequence, workers become highly trained in a few simple
repetitive tasks which can be done very quickly. For example, in a
drywall subcontractor, some men will only cut and fit sheet-rock;
others will only nail it, usually using air-powered nail guns; and
others will only tape and finish the joints. The hourly earnings of
these workers will depend on their ability to work quickly and
effectively at only these particular tasks.
In some cases there are union subcontracting firms which
operate in comparable ways to the open shop side just described. In
commercial building, for example, there are drywall subcontractors who
employ union carpenters who may have done nothing other than hang or
tape drywall during their construction careers. Though these men are
highly specialized in the performance of a routine, simple task they
are still classified as journeymen and paid the union scale for
journeymen carpenters.
Open shop subs in commercial building range across the
usual types of mechanical and basic trades subcontracting. In some
cases, open shop firms are almost identical in skill and wage structure
to union firms. This is particularly true among the licensed mechanical
trades where electricians and plumbers have to pass standardized
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tests. One electrical contractor in Denver for example, classifies
most of his men as journeymen, pays them all the same hourly wages,
and supplements them with apprentices in government certified open-
shop training programs. The wage and benefit package is almost
identical to that of a union firm. In fact, when the owner wanted to
go union, in order to bid on larger contracts as a sub to union
generals, his workmen vetoed the idea: they had all the advantages
of a union shop without paying dues or being answerable to a local
business agent.
While some commercial open shop subs are similar to union
firms, others are markedly different. Many vary the wage for journeymen
with different skills, experience, etc. Often, journeymen and helpers
work on projects in a 1:1 ratio, a much higher ratio of skilled to
semi-skilled workers than found in union work. Again, helpers are
often informal apprentices who are expected not only to assit on
routine work but also work on the job and progress to journeyman
status. Due to the structure of subcontracting, there is little
opportunity for open shop firms to develop occupations substantially
different from union trade classifications. However, since there are
no rigid jurisdictional lines, nonunion subs can be flexible in work
assignment. This flexibility is usually used in either of two ways.
First, craftsmen may occasionally do work outside of their "jurisdiction"
but important to the completion of the project. For example, one
electrical sub trained his electricians to weld in order that they
could install junction boxes for electrical switches. Otherwise, he
would have had to sub this work to a welding firm. Second, firms may
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have men who can do routine work in two or more trades. A HVAC and
plumbing sub moves men from NV to wet pipe as demand changes. This
flexibility in assignment, in both cases, was seen to contribute to
the ability to employ men full-time year round.
In sum, the union firms faced a supply of labor with clear
skill demarcations at a fixed wage. There are apparently major
quality variations in workmen at each skill level (journeyman and
apprentice). Firms can only adjust to these variations by varying the
time employed: the best journeymen are kept on permanently as foremen
or lead men while the worst are released after one day's work. For
the union firm, formal skill ratios are also fixed and it cannot
effectively substitute less-skilled, cheaper labor for routine aspects
of skilled jobs. Of course, this substitution takes places in
actuality--temporary, low-skilled "journeymen" do less skilled work
under supervision--but this substitution is not reflected in the
hourly wage or cost of labor to the firm.
The nonunion firms hire and pay labor on the basis of firm-
specific characteristics of work. As a result, there are a range of
skills and wages found among journeymen, helpers, and apprentices in
most open shop contractors. In addition, these contractors are free
to design and assign work to whomever they please: this often results
in both the specialization of many men, as semi-skilled helpers, in the
performance of routine tasks and in different skill ratios among firms.
Open shop firms themselves also appear to be smaller and more special-
ized, so their occupations and skill definitions are often specific
not only to the firm but also to a particular type of construction.
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4.4 Technology and Work Practices
"The effect of unions on efficiency is a contro-
versial area in industrial relations, as can be
seen from the terms used in discussing it. In
objecting to a rapid pace of work, unions talk
of speed-ups and sweat-shops; employers discuss
union working rules in terms of featherbedding.
Issues of efficiency become entangled with those
of health and saftey, and the effect of the union
as an organization is often hard to distinguish
from the informal restriction of output practiced
by work groups."
A. Rees7
The building trades unions are notorious for resistance to
technical innovations in building technology. In some cases, this
resistance manifests itself as opposition to particular tools used in
on-site work: spray guns or rollers opposed by painters, for example.
In other cases, opposition is to particular building materials:
plastic pipe opposed by plumbers. In addition, there is an attempt
by some to control manning and use of equipment: operating engineers
may require operators on all machinery and may prohibit one man from
operating more than two different pieces of equipment in one day's
work. Yet, while clear cases of resistance to innovation have occurred
at some time in almost all of the different craft unions in construction,
hostility to change is by no means universal or even typical. In
fact, the only serious research on the union's impact on changing
technology in construction dates from Haber and Levinson's work in
the early fifties.
7 Albert Rees, The Economics of Trade Unions, (University of Chicago
Press, 1962).
-171-
They stressed that the industry as a whole was not backward
in adopting new technology, despite the claims about that in the
popular press. Although the role of local unions toward innovation
was so varied "no generalization" can be made, they found the unions
generally more receptive to new techniques than commonly thought.
Power machinery, ranging from hand tools to on-site fabrication
machinery, was accepted and used by cement finishers, carpenters,
bricklayers, plumbers, and sheet metal workers. New materials were
generally either accepted by unions, such as pre-cut wood units by
carpenters, or rejected by both unions and subcontractors. Both
plumbers and plumbing subs, for example, opposed some prefabricated
bathroom units. Where union opposition alone did occur, it was often
inconsistent. The plastering gun was accepted by some locals and
rejected by others. Painters used rollers and spray guns under
differing terms in different local contracts. Electricians were
occasionally involved in disputes over the installation of flexible
conduit.
Haber and Levinson did very little direct union/nonunion
comparisons on the adoption of innovations. Where they did so, they
found that the comparable nonunion contractor was often not taking
advantage of his "free" status and adopting the new technology. In
painting, for example, rollers were often not used by nonunion subs
because of the type of paint or surface to be covered. Rivet guns
were introduced very slowly into both union and open shop construction
largely due to early concern for safety in their use.
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Despite the extreme variation in their findings, Haber and
Levinson do offer some basic economic rationalizations about union
reaction to innovation. They note that where union resistance does
occur it is often instigated by a fear of a craft union that its skills
would be degradated by some new technology. Prefabricated wood
components, in particular, as well as some types of materials like
plastic pipe, substantially reduce the skill component in carpentry
or plumbing. This skill degradation could be the first step in
substituting lesser skilled, lower wage labor for journeymen. In
other cases, the resistance to labor-saving innovations was simply a
union's attempt at maintaining employment through the exercise of
market power. Clearly, the goals of craft unions extend beyond wage
bargaining to "employment bargaining" and either restrictions on
technology or manning regulations are an exercise in preventing
contractors from cutting labor costs by "under-manning". Although
the recent economic analysis of unions has stressed the wage impact,
earlier studies have shown that unions may bargain to increase
employment or to increase, at least temporarily, both employment and
wages.8
Beyond these obvious goals of unions in maintaining skills
and employment, Haber and Levinson attribute product market
8 Paul Weinstein, "Featherbedding: A Theoretical Analysis," in P.
Weinstein (ed.) Featherbedding and Technological Change, (D.C. Heath
1965) and G. Nutter, "The Limits of Union Power," in Philip Bradley
(ed.) The Public Stake in Union Power, (University of Virginia Press,
1959).
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characteristics as the major factor in explaining the acceptance of
innovations. The key characteristic is of course, the elasticity of
the derived demand for labor. In circumstances where the elasticity
is very low, the reduction in unit labor costs that a technical change
could bring will not result in any substantial increase in employment.
If the elasticity of demand is high, however, the outcome is reversed:
lower costs may sustain or increase employment. Haber and Levinson
note that though demand for any particular construction trade is
usually inelastic, due to the well-known Marshallian conditions, the
elasticity will be higher if direct substitutes are available. For
example, plasterers accepted the plaster gun in order to compete
with drywall. Painters used rollers and spray guns in order to
compete with prefinished materials. In both of these cases, the
trade was directly threatened by a competitive material or process
and its increase in productivity was the only means to maintain
employment. (It should be noted that there were other means used:
the plasterers in some areas tried to eliminate drywall usage through
affecting building codes.) Another example of competitive acceptance
of innovations has been the bricklayers. They have actively cooperated
with masonry suppliers to develop cheaper and easier to install
bricks and blocks. Again, this was motivated by the competition
from exposed concrete surfaces.
In sum, the pure substitution effect of other factors for
labor will always decrease employment. Since the elasticity of
derived demand for any particular trade in construction can be
expected to be low, the negative substitution effect is not likely to
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be offset by increases in product demand and hence labor demand.
As a result, it is not surprising that craft unions would use any
power they possess to limit innovation and preserve employment.
Indeed, a large amount of litigation has taken place precisely over
the rights and powers of construction unions to bargain and enforce
"work presentation" clauses in contracts. In some cases, unions have
acted alone, as in National Woodwork and many others; in a few cases,
such as the celebrated Allen Bradley v. IBEW, they have been shown to
collaborate with subcontractors to preserve work for both firms and
workers. 9 But despite the economic rationality of such restrictive
behavior, and numerous legal cases in which it is attacked, there is
no consistent survey evidence that unions do affect technology in
construction or that they have impeded its progress over time.
Work Rules
In his discussion of union practices affecting employment
and productivity, Rees mentions several impacts unions may have:
- work rules that increase the number employed;
- restriction of output;
- regulating hours of work; and
- guarantees of work to an individual employee.
Work rules in union construction provide some examples of
all these types of practice. Manning requirements on machinery by
9 Arthur Smith, Jr., "Boycotts of Prefabricated Building Products and
the Regulation of Technological Change in Construction Jobsites,
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, January 1972.
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the operating engineers certainly increases the number employed.
Hours of work are regulated and overtime is often double or even
triple time. There are no formal restrictions on output in building
trade union contracts, but output is said to be informally restricted.
Guarantees of work to an individual employee is rare, but practices
such as "show-up time", where a worker is paid for several hours work
even if none is available, is common in the industry.
Again, the issue is whether these supposedly inefficient
practices are peculiarly union or serve only union interests. For
example, one classic study has shown that while union works may restrict,
output can also be informally restricted among nonunion workers. In
other cases, work rule that increase the number employed may serve to
benefit employers as well as union workers. This is certainly the
case among subcontractors in construction where, for example, management
and labor in the mechanical trades have a common interest in maintaining
their share of the work. Finally, at least some of the "restrictive"
practices which exist in unionized industries may have been the result
of past trade-offs in collective bargaining. As a result, their exis-
tence is no more irrational or ineffeicient than gains in wages or
fringe benefits. The infamous "fireman rule" on diesel locomotives
is, in fact, an example of this kind of past employment, rather than
wage, bargaining. Consequently, unions cannot be generally disparaged
for creating inefficiencies without a rather detailed and comprehensive
knowledge of the circumstances in which certain work practices have
developed. Attention in particular to comparable nonunion practices and
to employer interests is vital in assessing the differences unions make.
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Finally, a note on trends in construction labor use may put
the work practices issues in perspective. Since the Haber and Levinson
research in the nineteen fifties, both total employment in construction
and union membership in the building trades have increased in absolute
terms. At the same time, according to a recent study by the BLS, on-
site labor requirements per $1,000 of building costs, have dropped by
nearly twenty-five percent (See Table 4.4). This decrease may
represent some combination of subsitution of capital, in terms of
machinery and prefabricated materials, for labor and as a neutral increase
in labor productivity. The trends are not consistent with a hypotheses
of "excessive" restrictive work practices or avoidance of technological
change by construction unions--although, of course, there is no
evidence of what changes might have occurred without unions at all.
At the least, the unions were either accommodating enough to permit
change (given particular bargaining goals) or powerless to prevent
considerable technological change.
Survey Findings
Union contractors reported little interference by unions
with either building materials used or with on-site technology.
Most general and subcontractors reported that they used whatever
building materials the codes permitted. In some cases, there had
been union protests or stoppages over use of plastic pipe or prefitted
sprinkler systems, for example, but these had not continued and any
restrictions were not part of a written contract. In some cases,
unions did require on-site fabrication of materials which could have
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been obtained prefab, but these restrictions were not major or onerous.
For example, plumbers refuse to use pre-bent elbows for pipes and
required that these be bent at the site. In the cases of restrictions
which had occurred in the past, the union, in this case the plumbers,
was said to have accepted any prefitted pipe system as long as it had
"some kind of union label."
Union contractors were greatly concerned, on the other hand,
with manning requirements and other work practice issues. It is largely
among general contractors dealing with the basic trades that different
types of "restrictive work practices" arise. (In subcontractors,
these issues are similar, if not identified, to the problems of juris-
dictional and skill level described above in section 2 and 3. For
example, use of skilled men to do unskilled work.) In Boston and
Denver, for example, there are continuing problems with the operating
engineers over the manning of pumps. The engineers require all
pumps of 2 inch diameter or more to be manned during operation.
Contractors are trying to change this to drop the manning requirement
for pumps over 3 inches in diameter. Operating engineers may also
require an oiler be hired for small cranes; contractors feel that an
operator is all that is necessary. Ironworkers often want contractors
to hire a "rigging crew" of a certain size for any project; contractors
want to be free to hire as few men as are necessary. Bricklayers
have requirements that a scaffold has to be built so men work facing
the wall; also they may require one man on a wall to build only corners,
while other men build only the wall. Contractors, under certain circum-
stances, may not want to use scaffolds and may want to move men around.
-178-
Table 4.4
FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING CONSTRUCTION:
LABOR REQUIREMENTS AND COST COMPONENTS
Labor Requirements*
Total
Onsite
Offsite
Distribution of Costs
Onsite Wages
Materials, Equipment and Supplies
Profit and Overhead
1959
108.7
97.1
11.6
29%
53.3%
17.7%
1973
85.8
74.4
11.5
34%
50%
16%
1975
81.1
70.2
10.9
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
*Labor requirements are employee hours per 1,000 1959 dollars.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics report cited in Engineering
News-Record, December 2, 1976.
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The only problem unique to union subcontractors relates not
to the type of tools used, but to the ownership of tools. Many union
contracts in the mechanical trades require that the contractor supply
the hand tools needed for the job. The contractors prefer, however,
that the journeymen supply their own--this is not because of the cost
difference, but because the journeymen will value and care for their
own tools, but have a tendency to loose or misuse the contractor's.
In open shop firms, there are no restrictions on tools or
materials used or other "work practice" rules other than those imposed
by government building codes or safety regulations. Due to this, the
nonunion contractor celebrates his freedom and flexibility in manning;
in work technology; or in building materials. In fact, few consistent
differences could be found between union and open shop firms in this
regard. Open shop contractors were free to use all prefab materials,
union made or not, making no concessions to the creation of on-site
work. They were also free, in the case of the mechanical subs, to
require that their journeymen furnish their own tools. Finally, they
could make any provisions they desired on manning of machinery work
or assignment of men. Despite this vaunted flexibility, their
operations did not appear to differ substantially from union firms in
regard to either technology or work practices.
In sum, there is no doubt that at times and in various
places the building trades unions have resisted innovation or maintained
restrictive work practices. Yet the survey results do not support
the contention that this has been a consistent or effective policy.
Both the trend data by the BLS on "labor productivity" and the union/
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nonunion comparisons of practices evidence change in labor input over
time and a cross-section similarity in work practices. Neither of
these phenomena are consistent with hypotheses or allegations as to
"excessive" union power over work and technology. Surprisingly, most
of the complaints of union contractors, when justified, appear to be
over trivial issues. Certain unions, like the operating engineers
and the ironworkers, do have obvious but isolated featherbedding
practices. Yet, these practices, in terms of actual costs imposed on
contractors or concrete benefits accruing to unions, cannot result in
substantial losses or gains. Whether two-inch pumps are manned
or will not significantly affect contractors' profits on a multi-
million dollar building or balloon the membership of the operating
engineers. (Admittedly, estimating the actual impact of union work
practices on costs must await careful cost comparisons for similar
projects undertaken by union and open shop contractors.)
Thus, the problem with union work practices in construction
appears to be as much a symbolic as pure economic issue. The presence
of unions on a job-site automatically interfers with a contractor's
"right to manage." Whether the unions adopt formal restrictive
practices or not, their presence can always complicate any change
management feels necessary. The resentment of management to unions
in construction seems to stem less from the imposition of real costs
(although this sensitivity is changing as open shop competition grows)
than from the uncertainty and instability of union reaction. When
interviewed, project managers and small contractors always stressed
the role of "politics" in determining union behavior. On a job-site,
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a project manager may deal with six to eighteen different trades.
Each of these may have a steward on-site; all will have a local
business agent. The temper of this union leadership, in policing the
agreements, determines the flow of work. Contractors have the sense
that work stoppages often occur largely because of intro- and inter-
union competition over policital leadership. Local union business
agents are elected; stewards may be running for office. Their
campaigns and their attractiveness to the membership may depend on
how "tough" they are on management. Harassment of management, even
over--or perhaps especially over--trivial issues like work rules,
apparently plays an important role in building a personal constituency.
The complications of a multi-union structure in the industry only
expands the opportunity for this kind of political competition. It
also makes the whole construction industry in an area vunerable to
minor disputes in even small local unions.
4.5 Hiring and Screening Systems
"...Job information is transmitted through a
grapevine involving workers, builders, sub-
contracts, and material supplies...the hall was
used only as a last resort, since many builders
feel that only workers with limited talent have
to rely on it to find work."
H.A. Foster 10
For an industry like construction, which must rely on a
geographically mobile labor force to man large projects, the systems
10 Harold Foster, Manpower in Homebuilding, (University of Philadephia,
1974).
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of labor market information exchange, referral, screening and hiring
are of crucial importance. Although most contractors staff their
projects with at least a few of their permanent men, they often need
additional workers from different occupations on short notice. In
union construction, the hiring process has often been described as
being controlled solely by the unions. The building trades' supposed
power to raise and maintain high hourly wages is presumed to stem
from their control over the labor supply through the hiring hall.
The local business agent is said to play the central role: he receives
all requests from contractors for journeyman and assigns men from a
queue or on the basis of his preference from those available in the
hall. This total control of the hiring process is often described as
illegal since it conflicts with federal legislation prohibiting closed
shops. The control is also taken to be a means of limiting the labor
supply in construction unions: a "fact" which is often deduced from
the high hourly wage in the industry.
In fact, the role that unions play in the hiring process in
construction may be vastly over-rated. At the least, like most union
institutions in the industry, the role and impact varies by craft, by
geographic area, and over time. Some observers, like Foster, have
shown that informal processes of referral dominate the hiring process
in at least two geographic areas. In Cleveland and in Erie County,
Foster found that the union hiring hall only served as a secondary
source of labor when preferred sources were exhausted. Other observers
and participants in the industry have noted that, though the unions
participate in the hiring process, they by no means control it. A
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survey of their membership by the AGC, for example, showed that only
4% said that they had to hire through a "restrictive hiring hall";
other studies note how flexible many locals are in admitting men for
work, sometimes on a temporary or "permit" basis, to meet peak labor
demands. Finally, the sense of the union sector of the industry is
now that very few, if any, collective bargaining contracts require
any more than the contractor call the hall first and if the local
cannot meet his demand, then he is free to hire anyone. These
impressions are largely confirmed by surveys and studies by the
Department of Labor. One survey of job search methods found that
only fifteen percent or so of craftsmen relied on a hiring hall as a
primary source of job information. Most received information from
friends or past or present employers."l A study of major contracts
in the construction industry by the BLS found that only half required
that the union either be the "sole and exclusive source of applicants
for employment" or "recognized as the principal source of (workers)
and shall be given the first opportunity to refer qualified
applicants.. ."12
Whether even these formal requirements are actually followed
or not in practice is difficult to say. Certainly, some trades like
the electricians and plumbers generally maintain formal referral
systems run through a hall. Other trades, like ironworkers, often
11 U.S. Department of Labor, BLS Bulletin 1886, Job Seeking Methods
Used by Americans As Workers, (Washington, D.C., 1975).
12 U.S. Department of Labor, Exclusive Work Referral Systems in
the Building Trades (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1910).
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pick up work directly through referrals by former foremen. Bethlehem
Steel, for example, is said to man many local projects simply by
calling foremen in the area who have worked for it previously and
letting them assemble a crew through their own contacts.
All this serves to show that the role of the union and the
hiring hall may not be as great as supposed. Informal processes of
referral may predominate in many, if not all, trades. In open shop
construction there is, of course, not even a formal structure of the
union referral system. As a consequence, open shop contractors should
be free to hire whoever they please. A comparative documentation
will show if and how hiring processes differ. It may also demonstrate
comparable needs for similar structures, such as a central referral
system or "hiring hall", in both union and nonunion sectors of the
industry.
Survey Findings
There were very few significant differences reported in
hiring practices between different types of firms, either union or
open shop. Union firms, either general or subcontractor, most often
hired by word of mouth through their foremen or present employees.
When they did hire through a hiring hall they often requested journeymen
by name: thus avoiding the personnel assignment function of the
business agent. The exceptions to this "informal" approach to hiring
came from two circumstances. First, when a large number of journeymen
in a particular trade was needed for a project (and/or the project
was in a different area of the main office of the firm) the union
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business agent or hiring hall played the major role in recruitment
and referral. These were found by contractors to be adequate mechanisms
to assemble large crews quickly. The only problem was the variation
in quality, particularly in times of peak demand. One contractor
said that at times of low unemployment the hall could only furnish
"warm bodies" and not skilled journeymen.
Second, in times of high unemployment in construction, the
hiring hall was not needed. Men continually came to the offices or
gates of projects looking for work and the needed crews could be
obtained through these men or through referrals by employed journeyman
to friends who were not working.
The methods used by open shop contractors were similarly
informal. Most men were hired by word of mouth through present
employees. Some recruited directly from local vocational schools.
Other found that men came to the main office or gate. When larger
numbers were needed, recruitment was supplemented by newspaper ads or
using the local public employment service. Open shop contractors
also varied their recruitment strategies with the state of the labor
market: in troughs, men came to them; in peaks, continual, aggressive
efforts using all information channels were needed to find anyone
remotely capable of construction work.
Since the hiring occurs in a similar fashion in both union
and open shop sides of the industry, the impact of the union can only
be judged to be slight. It does play a role in referral of large
numbers of journeyman when needed by a contractor, but otherwise is
relatively passive. Open shop contractors often spoke of the problems
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they might have in doing larger scale work without access to a labor
pool. Union contractors obviously had this access, but with two
limitations. The union acted as a straight referral agency without,
contractors claimed, adequately screening workers for quality or
capabilities. In addition, in times of peak employment the union was
not anymore capable of furnishing qualified workers than any other
source.
In most cases, open shop contractors found themselves
recruiting as well as screening workers. Men were hired on the basis
of their verbal statement of their abilities. After a short try out
of a day or a week, they were either let go or kept on at a slightly
higher wage. Open shop contractors did not mention this hiring and
screening process as costly, but there are some obvious costs in
management time and lost output in testing workers this way. Yet,
since the union contractors also had to screen workers through on-site
trials, the costs of screening were similar.
In sum, the main difference--and advantage--in hiring and
screening process between union and nonunion contractors was the
ability of the former to man large projects quickly through referrals
by a local union business agent. However, the varied quality of these
referrals, particularly at a time of peak demand, made additional
recruitment and screening efforts necessary. Open shop contractors
felt severely constrained, in most cases, without this access to a
common labor pool. Apparently, they would not bid on larger contracts
due to the risk of not being able to obtain men: conversely, they
could not keep too many skilled men on the payroll for fear of not
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having contracts to employ them. As a result, associations of nonunion
contractors have begun experiments in operating their own referral
systems on a centralized, multi-trade basis. These systems are
expected to serve the dual purpose of referring men to the contractor
upon demand and placing men temporarily laid off by some firms.
One association of nonunion contractors, the Associated
Builders and Contractors, has begun a referral system in Tampa open
to its members and all workers. The Associated General Contractors,
an association of both union and open shop general contractors only,
has experimented with referral systems in Houston and Forth Worth,
Texas. Under the AGC system, which is financed by the local chapter
of the association, construction workers call the registry and leave
their name and qualifications. When any employer needs workers, it
can call and obtain a list of registrants whom it then can contact
and interview. However, the referral system makes no guarantee as to
the skill or qualifications of persons seeking employment. The
referral system's aim, according to the AGC chapter, is "to create a
labor pool of both skilled and unskilled, union labor and nonunion
workers."13 The manager of the system notes though that the nonunion
contractors, who do not have access to the building trade hiring
halls, derive greater benefits from such a system is somewhat
experimental, it has already been attacked by the local Building
Trades Council. The executive secretary of the Council was quoted as
saying that he considers that AGC registry a "divide and conquer"
13 Bureau of National Affairs, Construction Labor Reports, June 18, 1977.
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tactic, with a two-fold purpose: "To supply the rate with his people
and to divide the union journeyman from his union, telling him he
doesn't need the union hiring hall." He continued, "Mostly, it's the
open shoppers who have come to town that need the referral. They've
adopted this program out of desperation, trying to secure qualified
employees. With most of the crafts working, all they can get is rats
and nail-benders."
4.6 Training and Apprenticeship
In the literature on building trades unions, apprenticeship
has usually been described less as a training system for construction
workers than as a union mechanism for limiting entry into a craft.
For example, Barbash asserts that apprenticeship "serves two inter-
pendent sets of interests for the craft union: (1) the maintenance
of a high wage position and of employment opportunities for its
permanent membership, and (2) the conservation of the union's power
as an institution to advance these ends."1 4 The view that apprentice-
ship serves only to maintain the monopoly power of the union has,
however, never been substantiated. Recent field research by Marshall
and others shown that apprenticeship is only one of the forms of
entry into journeyman status.1 5 While it is the predominant route
for many of the mechanical trades, like plumbers and electricians,
14 Jack Barbarsh, "Union Interests in Apprenticeship and Other
Training Forms," Journal of Human Resources, Vol. III, 1968.
15 Roy Marshall, et al., Training and Entry Into Union Construction,
U.S. DOL, Manpower Administration Monograph #39 (U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1975).
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most of the journeymen in the basic trades were never formally
apprenticed; they developed skills through on-the-job training in
union and nonunion work and were admitted to journeyman status during
times of high labor demand. Statistical studies of trends in
apprenticeship enrollment, first by Mills and later by Mattila, have
also shown that the numbers of apprentices are more responsive than
believed to construction labor demand.1 6  Both of these findings
indicate that apprenticeship systems are much more open and responsive
to market forces than a pure monopoly model would predict.
The focus on the "restrictive" role of apprenticeships has
relatively obscured a realization, found in the earlier literature,
that the structure of apprentice training plays an important role in
the definition of occupation content in craft labor market. As Motley
wrote in 1906, apprenticeship justifies a uniform wage rate for
employers since uniform training reduces "inequalities as to individual
workmanship" and assures "a force of workmen of uniform abilities." 17
A commonly accepted definition of occupational content, embodied in
apprenticeship standards and curriculum, also strengthens a worker's
employment security. A journeyman can qualify for employment in his
16 D.Q. Mills, Chapter 8, "The Numerical Adequacy of Apprenticeship
Programs," in Industrial Relations and Manpower in Construction,
(MIT Press, 1972), and John Mattila and Peter Mattila, "Construction
Apprenticeship in the Detroit Labor Market," Industrial Relations,
February 1976.
17 James Motley, "Apprenticeship in the Building Trades," in J.
Hollander and G. Barnett (eds.) Studies in American Trade Unionism
(New York, 1906).
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craft in a labor market which ranges over numerous firms. In contrast,
a factory worker moves with comparative mobility only within the
internal labor market of the enterprise. As Kerr wrote in the 1950's,
"Once fully in the market the craft worker can move anywhere within it...
The worker gets his security not from the individual employer but
from his skill."1 8 In contemporary "human capital" terms, apprentice-
ship provides general training for workers in an industry where they
may be little or no specific training for different firms.
Survey Findings
Subcontractors
Both union and open shop subcontractors use formal apprentice
systems to train workers. In the union sector, as Marshall found,
apprentice training is particularly prevalent among the mechanical
trades employed by subcontractors in electrical, plumbing and HVAC
work. These same types of subcontractors who are nonunion also have
formal training schemes. Many of these are apprentice programs
certified for government funding by either a state apprenticeship
council or the local office of the Department of Labor's Bureau of
Apprenticeship and Training. Since the criteria for certification
are usually drawn from existing union programs, open shop apprentice
programs in Boston and Denver are virtually identical to the union
system.
18 Clark Kerr, "The Balkanization of Labor Markets," in E. W. Bakke
et. al. (eds.) Labor Mobility and Economic Opportunity (MIT Press, 1954).
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The management of union subcontracting firms had very few
complaints or problems with the apprenticeship system. As members of
the local joint apprenticeship committee which administered the
program, they also felt involved and responsible for the operation of
the programs. There were no claims that the union unduly restricted
entry into the training process; rather, there was more concern that
many subcontractors were not willing enough to employ apprentices and
contribute to the on-the-job aspect of the program. All the union
subcontractors felt that apprenticeship training of the present
variety and length was necessary to train a highly skilled, experienced,
and well-rounded journeyman in the trade.
Nonunion subcontractors also supported the apprenticeship
system in the mechanical trades. Their programs were operated
unilaterally by a few members of the ABC's local apprenticeship
committee; there was no formal worker participation on the committees.
Also, there was very little evidence that in the nonunion sector
workers rotated among firms for both employment and training. Open
shop apprentices appeared to be committed to work in the firm and the
apprenticeship system only served to bring them together once or
twice a week for related, after hours instruction. The rest of the
time their on-the-job training and experience were limited to whatever
work the firm had under contract. The major complaint of the
subcontractors was that the union-like curriculum was too restrictive
in terms of skills. Many open shop subcontractors moved men across
jurisdictional lines as needs dictated, and, as a consequence, wanted
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broader training for some of their men. One or two firms undertook
in-house training to supplement the skills of their journeymen for
the occupational duties specific to the firm.
General Contractors
Most of the complaints about the apprenticeship system came
from both union and nonunion contractors employing the basic trades.
Union general contractors felt that apprenticeship programs were
usually too long for most of their men. The skills and tasks of most
carpenters, ironworkers, painters, and cement masons were not complex
enough to require a lengthy (three years or more) apprenticeship.
Most of the basic trades were highly specialized workmen doing a few
relatively simple, routine tasks. Many of the skills that apprentices
learned in related training or were supposed to be exposed to on the
job were, in fact, irrelevant to their work. At the same time, some
men were being hired directly as journeyman and put to work at the
full hourly rate doing semi-skilled, routine work in carpentry,
painting, etc. This contrast was said to explain the high drop-out
rate from the basic trades apprentice programs - a rate that exceeded
fifty percent a year in some cases. The main function of apprenticeship
in the basic trades was said to be training of future foreman; as a
result, only men with a commitment and ability to go on to supervisory
work were said to stay in these programs.
Open shop general contractors were less involved in formal
apprenticeship programs. They often hired men with limited skills or
experience for a few specific tasks in the firm. These workers were
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usually classified as "helpers" and occasionally progressed to
journeyman status solely through informal on-the-job training within
the firm itself. Most of the open shop general contractors felt that
this informal training was quite sufficient. Their comments, such
as "It doesn't take three years to train a carpenter," reflected the
limited range of skills expected from most of their workforce.
There were two major exceptions, however, to these patterns
of informal training in the basic trades. Open shop general contractors
in California associated with the AGC have been trying to create a
new occupational classification, "general building mechanic", and
have developed a two-year apprentice curriculum for it. The occupation
responds to the need of the general contractor to have a multi-skilled
journeyman to supplement the work of the specialized subcontractors
on the site. Government certification, which permits some public
funding of related training and use of apprentices at lower wages on
public construction projects, has been denied by the California State
Apprenticeship Council. The reason is that the occupation is not one
"traditionally" recognized in construction. The AEC is now suing the
SAC in order to certify the program.
The other major exception to the pattern of informal training
has been the development of "task training" systems by the large open
shop contractors. These task training methods are designed to ture
new hires, largely unskilled, into rudimentary carpenters, pipefitters,
electricians and the like so that they can perform routine work under
supervision on large scale industrial and heavy construction. Under
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the tasks training system, the contractor first subdivides the work
into a series of relatively routine steps or tasks and then trains
workers on-site to perform those tasks. The costs of training and of
curriculum development are borne by the firm or in some cases are
contributed by the project owner as a "public service". The ABC is
in the process of adapting the training systems developed by Brown
and Root and by Daniels for use by its members in various cities.
The idea is that firms will be able to choose particular training
modules to prepare their workforce to use specific skills on particular
construction projects. Thus, workers can be trained for the specific
needs of the firm on an as-needed basis. No attempt need be made, in
theory, to train "well rounded" journeymen since the range of skills
in a standard apprentice program may be irrelevant to a particular
firm's type of work or internal occupational structure.
4.7 Other Survey Findings
During the course fo the interviews, several other topics
or issues were raised which did not fall into any of the categories
of nonwage impacts discussed above. They are discussed separately
here.
Wages and Labor Supply
The monopoly view of craft unions in construction supposes
that unions act directly to limit the labor supply in order to maintain
the high hourly wage. No direct evidence of such limitation was found:
the union certainly tries to control the labor supply to ensure that all
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employers signatory to a contract adhere to the wage, benefit and, to
a lesser extent, the work rule provisions of the contract. But
control did not mean limit; on the contrary, the unions appeared
willing to furnish an very elastic supply of workers at the fixed
hourly rate. Indeed, in many cases, the union was seen as the only
source of skilled men available for temporary work at a pre-determined
wage. The only incidence of labor shortages which were mentioned
were those which occurred in the late 1960's during an unprecedented
boom in construction in Boston and Denver. The union does restrict
the supply of labor to union contractors, of course, in the sense
that workers cannot directly compete by working for lower money wages.
Yet the hiring process appears open enough that workers can and do
compete in terms of individual productivity. This variation in
effective wages (or labor cost to the firm per unit of output) is
recognized by firms so that productive workers can be rewarded by
faster referrals and even permanent attachment to a firm. Thus, the
union firm faces a fairly elastic supply of heterogenous labor at a
fixed wage. Self-selection and competition among workers for jobs
works to equilibrate the market in all but the peak periods of demand.
In contrast, the open shop firm could vary wages in order
to hire workers of different skills. Most contractors found that
labor at the lower end of the wage scale was readily obtainable when
needed, and appreciated the flexibility of paying each man "what he
was worth." In most nonunion firms both the entry wage and succeeding
increments were bargained out individually with workers. At the
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opposite end of the wage scale were the firm's lead journeymen and
foremen who received the highest hourly wages (at time comparable to
union scale), benefits, and bonuses. In between these two extremes
was a range of journeyman and helpers at different hourly wages. The
only problem with this organization was the uncertainty the firm
faced in hiring more skilled men. Although the firm could draw on
entry-level unskilled and semi-skilled men fairly easily, they could
not be certain of assembling a crew of more skilled men at a
predictable wage. This was particularly true if the employment was
to be temporary and the men could not be rewarded with more permanent
employment. As a result, most open shop firms spoke of not being
above to do "larger work" or compete with union contractors on many
projects. The implication was that there was so much uncertainty as
to whether these jobs could be manned and at what wage, that it was
nearly impossible to construct a reasonable bid. Therefore, the
firms only undertook work they could man internally - supplementing
their permanent crew with a few outside helpers or laborers - and
were only very slowly accumulating enough experience, manpower, and
stability to bid on larger projects.
Technology, Prefabrication, and Skills
The construction of buildings, although it is an industry
once described as "the industry the industrial revolution forgot,"
is a process increasingly dominated by advanced technology. One of
the forms which technological change has taken is the increased
prefabrication and standardization of building components. While
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complete factory assembly of residential units or other structures
has not advanced markedly, the use of labor-saving materials in many
types of buildings has increased. Doors, which were once entirely
cut and machined for locks, knobs, hinges, louvers, and glass windows
by jobsite carpenters now arrive at the site precut, premachined for
hardware, and usually prehung in standard frames. Piping systems on
boilers and heating and cooling units in the past were built to order
from raw pipe onsite, and are now often fabricated at a factory as
part of a standardized component system. Even entire buildings,
usually of low-rise metal frame construction, can be ordered from
catalog components and quickly bolted together on a simple concrete
slab foundation.
These advances in building technology, which unfortunately
have never been recorded comprehensively, have reduced some types of
construction to virtually an on-site assembly process. As a result,
the need for highly skilled craftsmen, capable of solving detailed
technical problems in the construction of unique buildings from raw
and unfinished materials has diminished. Many open shop contractors
saw these technological developments as having contributed to their
success. This was not because they could use the new materials and
technology while the unions resisted them. It was simply because the
union skill level and wage scale appeared to be oriented towards a
type and scale of construction where prefabrication did not dominate.
In Boston and Denver, the unions controlled work on high-rise buildings,
hospitals, airline terminals, and industrial plants; all large,
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unique contracts calling for the newest in structural steel framing,
concrete form work, or complex electrical and mechanical sub-systems.
The open shop contractors were limited to smaller buildings, repeti-
tively built (gas stations, warehouses, shopping center) or built
from standard components (small office buildings, schools, or garden
apartments). On this scale and type of construction, they could
substitute materials for skilled labor. As a consequence, their
larger number of helpers and specialized, semi-skilled journeyman
could be employed at an hourly wage below the union scale.
"Atmosphere"
Both Boston and Denver are metropolitan areas which presently
have substantial percentages of construction operating open shop.
Yet the attitudes of the unions and the general atmosphere of labor-
management relations was vastly different in the two cities. In
Denver, the building trades were most often described as "rational",
"moderate", and "flexible". This attitude was usually attributed to
the fact that the union were less well entrenched in Colorado than
in the East. Outside Denver, open shop activity is quite strong in
heavy and highway construction and in small-scale commercial building
in smaller cities. As a presumed result of these competitive pressures,
the building trades were viewed by management as being both cooperative
and innovative. As an example of the former, the AGC had begun, in
conjunction with the Building Trades Council and specialty subcontractor
associations, a marketing campaign to promote the quality and efficiency
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of union construction. As an example of the latter, some unions were
beginning to adopt innovative training techniques, relying on more
initial classroom instruction for apprentices before they started on-
the-job training. The employers viewed this as a step towards making
beginning apprentices more productive and, hence, more employable.
This atmosphere of cooperation, tempered, of course, with
resentment carried over from collective bargaining about wages and
work rules, was almost exactly the opposite of the climate in Boston.
The Boston metropolitan area, indeed the whole state of Massachusetts,
had always been a very strong union area. However, over the last
decade a considerable amount of open shop activity had grown up in
the suburban ring round Boston and in the older cities and mill towns
forty or fifty miles away. At the same time, the dramatic increase
in high-rise and public building in the inner cities of the metropolitan
area provided considerable work for union firms and union members.
Then, the very abrupt decline in construction activity in the mid-
1970's reduced work available to both the union and open shop sectro
alike and forced much more competition between them for the existing
jobs. In this context, management of union firms saw the building
trades as very unwilling or unable to compromise on wages or work
rules in order to compete. There was a sense that the unions had
enjoyed a monopoly over certain types of work for so long that they
were unable to compromise and compete. From what could be gleaned
about the union attitude from interviews with management and some
business agents, it appeared that the unions perceived less competition
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and more residual monopoly power. Their response was, on the one
hand, to portray the employers' talk of "open shop competition" as
merely a bargaining ploy to change wages and conditions in contracts
and, on the other hand, to attack the open shop firms for "unfair
competition", claiming that they hired illegal immigrants, paid below
the prevailing wage, and the like. In response, many smaller union
firms were simply giving up bargaining for changes and were going
open shop or, at the least, setting up an open shop subsidiary as an
experiment to remain competitive for some types of work. By 1976,
the local chapter of AGC, hitherto entirely union in membership for
over fifty years, had begun an open shop division in Boston to serve
its nonunion contractors. However, despite these tensions, larger
contractors in the Boston area, remained more or less content with
their status as union firms. Despite their continuing difficulties
with some work rules or jurisdictional disputes, they recognized that
they had no alternative pool of manpower to do this kind of construction.
Finally, what was most remarkable about the attitudes of
construction management was that despite any or all of the adversary
issues between them and the unions, very few union contractors could
be described as "anti-union." On the contrary, most spoke of the
important role the unions played in structuring the labor market and
in maintaining a pool of skilled workers they could draw on for
temporary work as needed. In both Boston and Denver, all of the large
contractors - and some of the small firms - felt they could compete
with the open shop sector because the skills and productivity of the
union mechanics more than offset the higher wages.
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4.8 Nonwage Impacts: Summary and Implications
Both in the first section of this chapter and in the
introductions to the description of the different impacts, two
continuing themes have emerged. Economists and labor relations
experts usually view the nonwage activity of unions as (1) restrictive,
in the sense that they are used to maintain both the organizational
and labor market power of unions by limiting the labor supply; and
(2) exogenous, in the sense that they are imposed entirey by unions
to serve their goals and the goals of their membership. A section
from Barbash's article on apprenticeship best summarized this point
of view:
In order for the craft union to be effective in
asserting the interests of its constituents, it
must be concerned with its power as an organiza-
tion. In fact, the power of the craft union
as an organization is probably indispensable in
maintaining an occupation as a craft. Without
the craft union, most craft occupations would
cease being crafts; that is, the skill content
of the craft would be diluted and standards of
entry weakened. The converse is also true. If
an occupation is diminished in its craft qualities
by a lowering of standards, the union based on
the craft is diminished in power as a craft union.
Absent the union interest, most employers would
not on their own retain apprenticeship and other
standards of entry that go into the making of
a craft. 19
The comparative research on union and nonunion labor management
practices does not substantiate these views of nonwage impacts.
The general findings of the interviews can best be
summarized as:
19 Jack Barbash, op. cit.
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(1) the nonwage activities of building trades unions appear
to be more functional than restrictive. Though the rules regarding
jurisdictions, skill definitions, hiring and so forth do restrict
management behavior so as to assume work on particular conditions for
union members, these rules also act to structure labor relations
between a mobile group of skilled workers and a large number of firms.
In addition, the rules seem less to be imposed by unions than to be
inherent in the industrial organization and technology of the larger
firms in the industry.
(2) the building trades unions do not appear to have such
an unvarying degree of market power that they can rigidly adhere to
rules which serve only their own interests. Rather, they have adopted
new technologies and do adapt work rules and conditions to fit
different circumstances.
(3) many of the nonwage impacts, such as jurisdictional
lines and hiring halls, directly serve some employers' interests.
The strength of some union institutions and rules appears to be less
a function of market or bargaining power and more a function of
working in harmony with management's needs.
(4) labor management relations and rules in nonunion firms
are different in many important respects from union construction prac-
tices. However, the most important differences (in occupations and
in fixed skill and wage levels) appear to be caused, at least in part,
by the substantial differences in firm size, product type, and project
size between the union and nonunion sectors. Thus, unionization as
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well as job and labor market characteristics appear to be simultaneously
determined along with project size and type.
(5) union activity, when it does adversely affect on-site
management, appears to be dominated by political concerns of stewards
and business agents. These concerns, though politically rational
(if votes are won by being 'tough on management') are economically
very costly, in terms of lost output and work time in disputes. This
behavior, endemic to construction, is a continuation of collective
bargaining after the contracts have been signed - a syndrome most
labor agreements try to avoid through no-strike agreements. What is
important to note here is that this nonwage impact of the unions was
both the most disturbing to management and the least related (apparently)
to 'rational' union nonwage goals of restricting labor supply.
In sum, the survey findings clearly do not substantiate the
view that many of the nonwage attributes of construction craft unions
are purely exogenous. More often, they appear rooted in the particular
character of some types of production in the industry. On the other
hand, the implications of the findings for the monopoly model are
less clear; no apparent restriction on labor supply as such was found.
Firm Size, Product Market, and Unionization
One can envision, on the basis of the survey, a schematic
picture of the organization of the construction industry which relates
the degree of unionization to the dimensions of firm size and product
type noted above. In Boston and Denver, union activity dominates
the large scale commercial and heavy and highway sectors. Nonunion
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activity is largely confined to smaller scale residential and commercial
work. (It should be noted that any neat divisions in this schematic
view are muddied considerably by subcontracting. Some union subcon-
tractors may be employed by nonunion general contractors on otherwise
open shop project. Conversely, some nonunion subcontractors may
work on small parts of large-scale union projects.)
The type of construction which is dominated by the unions
is characterized by a labor market where large numbers of skilled
journeymen, defined along craft lines, rotate between projects and
firms. Nonunion construction is dominated by smaller firms with firm-
specific occupations and small "internal" labor markets. These firms
hire unskilled and semi-skilled workers to supplement their permanent
crew. The nonunion sector of the industry appears to be characterized
by small product-oriented (i.e. highly specialized) firms with firm-
specific skills and occupations. However, there are a few very large
firms like Brown and Root which use numbers of semi-skilled workers
in sub-divided work on large projects. The union sector contains
larger, more diversified general and subcontractors which undertake
a range of projects with varying workloads and large crews, although
at least a few union firms are as small and as specialized as some of
the nonunion companies. (See the list of firm sizes and other data
in Appendix I to Chapter 4.)
Over the past several years, there has been an apparent
expansion in the type of construction activity controlled by nonunion
contractors. Recently, there has been a severe contraction in the
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large scale work which is still almost entirely union. As a result
of these trends, the middle section of the chart, medium scale
commercial and industrial building, is increasingly an area of direct
competition between union and open-shop firms. The result of this
competition is creating some move towards convergence of labor market
institutions. Unions are under pressure to be even more flexible
about work rules and to adapt them consistently to smaller scale
construction. They are being pressured to institute helper categories
in many trades to do routine work. At the same time, nonunion firms
are showing more interest in creating many labor market institutions
which are similar to union companies'. Among these are referral systems;
apprenticeship training programs (both in traditional and in new
occupations); and even common occupational classifications and wage
rates for those training programs.
Given this growing convergence in many types of labor-
management institutions, it is apparent that 'what unions do' is
operate - or at least aid - some important aspects of the employment
relation which firms would have to undertake themselves. In
manufacturing and services, individual firms are large and stable
enough to provide an internal labor market which can provide many of
the services furnished by unions. In the construction industry,
however, firms have to cooperate in order to structure an "external"
labor market which can sustain a pool of skilled workers attached to
the industry and not to any particular firm. Craft unions may play
not only a vital, but an essential, role in that inter-firm cooperation.
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Whether open shop construction firms can, in fact, cooperate to create
and maintain common labor market institutions peculiar to large scale
complex construction activity is not yet known. Thus, the nature and
contributions of craft unions in structuring an "external" labor
market are explored further in Chapter 5.
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Appendix I:
CHARACTERISTICS OF CONSTRUCTION FIRMS
INTERVIEWED IN BOSTON AND DENVER
Total: Sixty-two firms -- Thirty-eight nonunion
Twenty-four union
BOSTON
Median Size: Union General Contractors
Nonunion Generals
Union Subcontractors
Nonunion Subs
-- 40 field employees
-- 20 field employees
-- 20 field employees
-- 10 field employees
Age: Union firms
Nonunion firms
DENVER
Median Size: Union General Contractors
Nonunion General Contractors
Union Subcontractors
Nonunion Subs
Age: Union firms
Nonunion firms
-- 35 field
-- 15 field
-- 6 field
-- 15 field
Mean:
Mean:
17 years
9 years
Mean:
Mean:
27 years
11 years
employees
employees
employees
employees
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5. CRAFT UNIONS: ROLE AND IMPACT
The survey results reported and analyzed in Chapters Three
and Four present some particular views of the impact of unions on
management and on wage structure in the industry. In the course of
that survey no direct attempt was made to analyze these issues from
the point of view of the unions themselves. Rather, the survey
information is to be seen as a necessary prelude to research on the
building trades' goals and behavior. Nonetheless, some attempt can
be made to integrate the survey results into a coherent, although
still hypothetical, description of industry structure and union
impact. As a prelude to that description, a final note is warranted
on the economic literature on union behavior.
5.1 Models of Union Behavior
The Ross-Dunlop debate in the early 1950's centered on
differing interpretations of union goals and behavior. 1 Even though
that debate was never resolved, economists have continued to adopt
Dunlop's early approach. Unions, acting as largely economic insti-
tutions, are assumed to have an objective function and maximize that
subject to constraints. A common assumption is that they maximize
the monopolistic bent of their members. As Rosen descibes it, "Assume
1. For a recent review, see D.B. Mitchell, "Union Wage Policies:
The Ross-Dunlop Debate Reopened," Industrial Relations, February
1972.
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the main objective of a union is to maximize income of employed members
over and above what they could earn in alternative pursuits and net
of all other nonwage costs accruing to the union." 2 Then, in this
maximization process, unions are expected to take account of constraints
on their behavior due to such factors as the degree of product monopoly
in the industry; the extent of organization by the union; the elasticity
of demand for productions of union firms; the elasticity of labor
supply and so forth.
There are several problems with this interpretation of
union behavior. First, the theory has never really been tested.
Case studies of union behavior are rare to nonexistent; aggregate
studies of union/nonunion wage differentials ignore both product and
labor market structure and identification of union goals. If case
studies were undertaken, they might show that unions maximize along
other market dimensions -- the wage bill, total employment, or even
nonwage attributes of work. Second, two of the few case studies of
union behavior which have been undertaken show that the degree of
union impact is more a function of the self-serving acquiescence of
management than it is of pure power in the labor market. Williamson's
economic analysis of United Mine Workers v. Pennington demonstrates
the conditions under which it is beneficial to large mining
companies to accept high union wages.3 Hayden, in a recent study
2. Sherwin Rosen, "Unionism and the Occupational Wage Structure in
the United States," International Economic Review, June 1970.
3 Oliver Williamson, "Wage Rates as a Barrier to Entry: The Pennington
Case in Perspective," Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1968.
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of the Teamsters union, shows that in a regulated industry employers
may even encourage union wage increases: the union wage scale
in trucking serves to limit entry (as in mining); provide a basis for
coordinated price increases; and, under certain regulatory rules and
other conditions, even raise profits. 4
Third, though the economic view of unions as maximizing
monopolists is capable of integrating a variety of goals into the
formulation of the objective function, this view does overlook the
institutional role of unions in a labor market. For example, Cox
describes a collective bargaining agreement as an instrument of
government as well as an instrument of exchange. "The collective
agreement governs complex, many-sided reltions between large-numbers
of people in a going concern for very substantial periods of time." 5
Unions may serve both to voice and channel conflict in an organization
and to support and participate in a continuous system of personnel
management. These roles may be just as important to workers (and
management) as the union's contribution to economic rent. It is
important to stress that this institutional role of unions is not the
same as its impact on the nonwage attributes of work. That impact may
change the outcome of the employment relation; as an "instrument of
government" the union may be necessary for a particular employment
relation to exist at all. Unions may fulfill crucial non-pecuniary
4 James Hayden, "Collective Bargaining and Cartelization: An Analysis
of Teamster Power in the Regulated Trucking Industry," Harvard College
Senior Economics Thesis, 1977.
5 Archibald Cox, "The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements,"
Michigan Law Review, November 1958.
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aspirations of workers -- for status, participation, and control --
that are not captured by the calculative assumptions of economic
rationality.
In sum, if the study of unions is to be renewed as an
intellectual endeavor, it will have to be advanced beyond the sim-
plistic and partial approach of the usual economic theory. Unions
certainly are economic agents to some degree; more attention simply
has to be paid to the market and management contexts in which they
operate. At the same time, unions are political and governmental
institutions which may reflect both economic and non-economic
organizational and membership goals. And unions, as a collective
voice of workers in the labor market, may make some unique attributes
of work and employment possible.
In the following, craft unions in construction are analyzed
from these perspectives. First, a simple market model of the industry
is presented which attempts to integrate the wage and nonwage impacts
described above into a coherent interpretation of union behavior.
Second, the role of union institutions in structuring an "external"
labor market for skilled workers in construction is contrasted with
open shop employers' attempts to accomplish similar objectives.
5.2 Market Structure and Union Behavior
The following describes, in a schematic way, a simple market
model and a description of union behavior which is compatible with
the empirical findings of the survey.
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Assume the construction industry in a large metropolitan area
(like those in the survey) has three distinct sectors. These sectors
are distinguished by different elasticities and levels of product
demand for particular types of construction: Sector I is composed of
large-scale commercial and industrial building for private and public
clients; and Sector III is entirely residential, but in single-family
home building. Assume that due to economies of scale in project
management and design, median firm size is largest in Sector I. This
implies that there are barriers to entry, but the product market is
still competitive as the existing firms in Sector I compete through
secret bidding, for construction contracts. In contrast, in Sectors
II and III, there are few if any economies of scale and as a result
firms are small, numerous, and highly competitive.
On the factor supply side, assume first that all firms buy
material inputs from competitive suppliers. Second, assume that
there are two different skill classes of labor: a highly skilled,
broadly-trained group necessary for the complex and unique work in
Sector I and a less skilled, more specialized group sufficient for
the more routine work in Sectors II and III. At the outset, there is
competition in the labor market and thus there are only two labor
supply curves representing the different social opportunity costs of
labor to each sector. (See Figure 5.2.1).
The combination of these supply and demand attributes in
three sectors gives a status equilibrium for labor demand and supply
pictured in Figure 5.2.1. The derived demand for labor is assumed to
Figure 5.2.1
THE LABOR MARKET STRUCTURE IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
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be roughly inelastic and more elastic in Sectors I and Sectors II/III
respectively in keeping with the elasticities of product demand in
those sectors and the small share of labor as a percentage of total
construction costs. The labor supply curves have, explicitly, dif-
ferent levels due to skill differences and also may have different
elasticities if alternate employment for the more skilled group in
Section I is highly productive. The resulting inter-sectoral wage
differential, W/W2 , is a pure skill premium.
Now suppose there are two time periods, Phase I and Phase
II, characterized first by union activity and then by changes in
demand and technology. In Phase I, a union tries to organize workers
in all sectors but finds, due to the variety of market conditions,
that different wage and non-wage goals may be suitable for each
sector. The inelasticities of labor demand and suppply in Sector I
make a policy of high wages and non-wage benefits relatively easy to
enforce and sustain. Yet, this same policy in Sectors II and III
may bring substantial unemployment (moving up a more elastic demand
curve) and competition (from the elastic labor supply). Assume that
the union, rather than adopting a separate wage/non-wage package for
each sector, attempts to bargain out a compromise solution.
If the union is somewhat attentive to the more competitive
supply of labor in Sectors II and III, the union may settle for a
wage/non-wage package only slightly above Wl. This gives it some
gains in economic rent without great loss in employment. Since Wl
alone exceeds the competitive wage in the other sectors, the union
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cannot impose the same package on those sectors without facing initial
unemployment and, if it cannot restrict entry of additional labor,
eventual decline due to competition from lower cost, nonunion firms.
However, the union could increase employment in Sector II by acting
like a discriminating monopolist and relaxing, on an informal basis,
some nonwage aspects of the agreement. These changes would lower
production costs for union firms in Sector II and expand union employ-
ment towards QJIx
With this type of union behavior, the outcome in terms of
efficiency and distribution are fairly straightforward. The union,
acting somewhat like a discriminating monopolist, can achieve some
gains in rent in one sector and some gains in employment in another.
This union policy is relatively easy to sustain since it approximates
the competitive solution; there is very little distortion of factor
prices and hence little deadweight loss. Of course, the union is not
acting like a pure discriminating monopolist: it is not maximizing
rent in all sectors. Yet, given some constraints on union power -
particularly the competitive environment in Sectors II and III - and
some other union goals, which may be non-economic, this type of union
policy is reasonable.
Now, assume in Phase II, two major changes occur: First,
demand increases in all sectors, but particularly in Sector I,
and, second, there is an evolution in construction technology which
permits the substitution of prefabricated materials for skilled labor,
particularly in Sectors II and III. The union might respond to the
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increase in demand in Sector I by some increases in the wage/nonwage
package, say to W'. The increase in demand offsets the static losses
which might occur given this wage increase alone. Nonetheless, this
package is now very difficult to sustain in Sectors II and III.
Although the derived demand for labor has increased in those sectors,
it has also become more elastic due to the increase in the elasticity
of substitution of labor for materials. At the same time the decrease
in skills demanded has shifted the labor supply curve to the right:
firms now face an even lower opportunity cost of less skilled labor.
Although the union might still try to compete in Sectors II and III,
it may find that the informal, ad hoc relaxation of part of its
wage/nonwage package less effective in meeting competition. In this
predicament, two of its options would be either to give up union
employment in Sectors II and III entirely and concentrate on gains
in Sector I or to act more formally as a discriminating monopolist
and bargain separate contracts with lower wages and different
work-rules for these other types of construction work.
Union Goals
What this market structure tells us about union behavior is
the following:
1) unions can and may approximate a competitive solution if
and when they adjust their policy across different market segments.
This behavior implies that a union, attentive to employment goals in a
competitive submarket, may modify its 'economic rent' goals in a sub-
market in which it has more market power.
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2) In a competitive industry, any increases in factor
costs will be passed through to consumers. Depending on the
elasticity of demand in different sub-markets these increased costs
will have differing impacts on production demand and on derived
demand for labor. Employers in different sub-markets, facing dif-
ferent demand elasticities, may have different price preferences.
As a result, there may be greater or lesser sensitivity among employers
to union wage gains. This difference in sensitivity may make employer
coalitions which bargain with the union very unstable. For example,
employers in Sector I may be very willing, with an inelastic demand,
to 'give the union what it wants.' Employers in Sector II would
tend to be more resistant.
3) In addition to the question of wage levels, employers
may also have an interest in cooperating with the union over wage
uniformity. If the union "takes wages out of competition" by bar-
gaining uniform rates for the whole local industry, the union also
reduces competition among firms. Firms then can compete only on the
basis of management ability, profit levels, and overhead costs.
4) Any government intervention in the industry, such as
prevailing wage laws, which impose elements of the union agreement on
all firms in the industry doing public construction obviously lessens
competitive pressures on the union. In fact, such government inter-
vention is probably more effective than the union ever could be in
translating terms and conditions of employment bargained for Sector
I into other types and scales of construction activity.
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5) If the union approximates a competitive solution in
terms of wages and employment, it may rely on its nonwage and
non-pecuniary impacts as incentives to workers to remain members.
In many cases, these impacts may be appreciated by employers since
they might have to provide them or an approximation of them, to hold
skilled workers in an open shop, competitive market environment.
6) The main difficulty the union faces is not a variation
on the static problem of maximization, but a dynamic version of this
problem. As supply and demand conditions change in different markets,
the union may have to substantially redefine its policies in order to
accomplish similar wage and employment goals. The process of reforming
policies under some uncertainty as to the real extent of market
changes and with different factions in the union disagreeing over
strategy, is obviously fraught with political problems for the union
leadership.
Actual Trends in Construction
In a not very disguised form, the two "phases" described above
are meant to illustrate the major changes in the construction industry
in the last thirty years. This period encompasses the post-WWII
boom in construction and the building peak in the late 1960's. (The
story ends before the recent deep recession in the industry which began
in 1974).
Phase I is meant to correspond to a time in the 1950's and
early 1960's when the union role in the industry appeared to have
stabilized. Union construction predominated in both large and small
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scale commercial building in most areas of the country. (It should
be noted that prior to this period, up to the late 1940's and early
1950's, the unions apparently controlled some single-family home-
building and other residential work. They either lost or opted out
of this in 1950, except for California and some areas in the mid-West.)
The presumed stability in the industry (there are, of
course, no time series of the percentage of construction work or
employment that is union) is signalled by the apparent lack of major
open shop competition and the relatively slow rise in union wages.
Although construction wage and benefit levels have always been
comparatively high on an hourly basis, wages in the nineteen fifties
were not increasing faster than wages in comparably skilled, heavily
union industries. (See Table 5.2.1)
This stability (which implicitly allows for a wide
variation in local market conditions and union behavior due to the
geographic diversity of the industry) was shattered by the rapid
expansion in construction in the late 1960's. For the first time in
the post-war period, unemployment in construction went down to six
percent and stayed below ten percent for five consecutive years, from
1965 to 1970. At the same time, the mix of construction activity
changed: the volume of both public and private commercial and indus-
trial work rose as a percentage of total volume. The combination of
this period of low unemployment and high, inelastic demand apparently
caused a rapid change in the relative power of the unions in some
sectors of the industry. The signs of this were the number of strikes
and the large wage settlements which really began in 1965 and 1966
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in some areas but which escalated and became widespread by 1968 and
1969.
What the analysis of Phase II suggests is that once the old
equilibrium had broken down, the unions had a difficult time estab-
lishing a new wage policy in a different market context. In essence,
due to technological change and perhaps also to geographic dispersion
(the growth of small-scale commercial activity in suburban areas),
the market segments of the construction industry were pulling apart.
The unions chose initially (by design or mistake) to stay with the
high sector of the industry and bargained wages and other contract
attributes in that context. Although this level of union benefits
became increasingly difficult to sustain in other sectors of the
industry, the tremendous volume of large-scale work may have made up
for employment losses in small-scale construction. Membership data
for the building trade unions is scarce, unreliable, and biased
(since a considerable but unknown amount of non-construction employ-
ment is included), but the data which do exist show small increases
in union size throughout the late sixties and early 1970's. (See
Table 5.2.2) As long as employment was growing in the richer end of
the market, unions (and some employers) may have been willing to
give up competing for other work.
In the meantime, the technological changes and increased
volume of other work permitted entry by open shop firms. Although
this competition was largely limited to small-scale work, some large
firms were making inroads in a few types of traditionally union
activity. In addition, substitution of some open shop labor was taking
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Table 5.2.1
AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS IN CONSTRUCTION AND
MANUFACTURING DURABLE GOODS
Construction
$ 70
91
113
138
195
284
Durables
$ 60
82
97
117
143
225
Differential
13%
11%
16%
18%
36%
26%
Year
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1976
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Report of
the President 1977, Table C-3, pg. 222.
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Table 5.2.2
CONSTRUCTION UNION MEMBERSHIP LEVELS, AND PERCENT OF ALL
UNION MEMBERSHIP AND OF TOTAL CONSTRUCTION EMPLOYMENT
Percent of All AFL-CIO
Union Membership
Percent of Contract
Construction Employment1
2,122,000.
2,256,000.
2,203,000.
2,339,000.
2,248,000.
2,452,000.
2,476,000.
Year Members
1956
19582
1960
1962
1964
1968
1970
12.8
15.2
14.7
15.8
14.9
15.8
15.6
1 Employment is of non-supervisory workers on payrolls.
2 After 1958, data include Alaska and Hawaii.
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place within (and on) largely union projects. For example, the work
of many of the basic trades on large-scale construction could be
undertaken quite cheaply by open shop firms (in painting, landscaping,
carpentry) while the more complex mechanical work was subcontracted
to union firms. This inter-mixing of union and nonunion labor on
job sites was permitted by the Denver Building Trades decision of
1953. As a result, by the mid-1970's, it was becoming difficult to
characterize projects as either "union" or not.
At the time of the 1976 survey on wages and other issues,
the industry was in turmoil due to both the union/nonunion tensions
and to the unprecedented downturn in construction activity. Due to
the coincidence of these changes, it was often difficult to interpret
whether the behavior of unions and union firms was influenced by open
shop competition as such or by the relative lack of work or, most
likely, by both. In the current market context, the unions in Boston,
Denver, and nationally - depending on particular local conditions -
seemed to be following a variety of strategies. Among these are:
* no formal concessions in wages or other measures
coupled with informal relaxation of all contract
stipulations except the wage and benefit levels;
* structural changes in work rules or other conditions
in agreements for specific projects; some lower wage
rates for particular projects or sectors;
# sporadic, but isolated, attacks on open shop firms
and job-sites; some general picketing and harassment.
* legislative attempts to overturn the Denver Building
trades decision in order to use picketing to enforce
a "common labor policy" on job-sites: i.e. to make
projects which are partially union, all union.
-224-
At the same time, employer associations have attempted to
rebuild and restructure local bargaining in order to survive in the
industry as union firms. Also, since the wage escalation in the late
1960's, some large construction user groups have become more directly
involved in the industry. This signifies an awareness on behalf of
industrialists that their own inelasticity of demand has been a major
cause of some of the problems in the industry.
At present, it is not clear what the resolution of these
different trends will be. A resurgence in volume in the industry is
probably necessary for the existing tendencies to be sorted out. At
the least, both the union and the open shop sector face major chal-
lenges in the near future. The unions may be forced, if there is not
a recovery in large-scale construction, to make major concessions in
order to survive in small-scale work. On the other hand, the open
shop sector still needs to prove that it can supplant the union in
the type of work in which the latter now dominates. The key difficulty
that the nonunion sector may have in understanding this is the problem
of organizing a labor market where skilled workers become variable
costs - and not, as in manufacturing, quasi-fixed factors - to large-
scale firms.
5.3 Craft Unions and External Labor Markets
According to Freeman, industrial unions provide services to
workers and employers alike in acting as a collective "voice" for
workers in shaping the employment relation. As a consequence, the
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quit rate is reduced, while expressed dissatisfaction is raised, in
unionized industries.6 For workers in many craft unions, employment
instability is an inherent aspect of the labor market: in construction,
in particular, many craftsmen tend to move between firms and projects
and demand dictates. Thus, it is not likely that craft unions will
play an equivalent role in stabilizing the attachment of journeymen to
a firm. On the contrary, they should play an important role in
permitting mobility between firms in the context of the skilled workers'
attachment to the industry. Before analyzing the particular structures
which building trades unions and firms operate in construction labor
markets, it would be well to review the empirical findings presented
in the chapters above.
Union and Open Shop Construction
The picture that emerges from the data on union wages and
work practices presented above is roughly the following: in Boston
and Denver, union firms are larger than their counterparts, and
completely dominate the large-scale ($2m. projects and up) commercial
building sector. All high-risk offices; hospitals; hotels; high-
rise housing; and large industrial plant construction is union work in
both cities. Until recently, nearly all of the large-scale heavy and
highway work was also union in those metropolitan areas. The union
firms report that one of their major advantages is access to a skilled
labor pool: either directly through the hall or indirectly through
6 Richard Freeman, "Non-wage Effects of Trade Unions on the Labor Market,"
(Harvard University Department of Economics mimeo, February 1976).
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an informal network of referrals. The occupational definition of
this pool and its pre-determined wage permits them to estimate labor
costs and make competitive bids on projects over a two or three year
time period. In general, union "restrictions" in jurisdictions,
technology and the like are not onerous; by and large, they fit both
the organization of firms in the industry and the technology and
division of labor on large-scale work. Unions can and do cause
disruptions over details of contract language and management practice:
the cost of these disruptions, their seemingly sporadic and irrational
nature; and the uncertainty they introduce into construction activity
is perceived as one of the major burdens of operating as a union
contractor. Other difficulties are the variation in quality of
journeymen (with a fixed wage); the problems of coordination of work
and rules between eighteen different and independent unions; the
inefficiency of some jurisdictional and work rules; and the occasional
misfit between jurisdictionally defined occupations and changing
needs of particular firms. Overall, the union craft institutions,
developed with the employer associations in bargaining and, in many
cases, operated jointly by both management and labor provide important
services to the industry. The formal structure of these institutions,
however, is often adjusted informally to fit the particular needs of
different size contractors and product types. Small contractors, for
example, are rarely held to the details of work agreements that fit
naturally in large-scale construction.
Open shop firms, in contrast, are smaller and concentrated
in residential and small-scale work. They tend to rely on a work
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force that is permanently employed by the firm (as do small union
contractors), hiring mainly unskilled and semi-skilled men from the
outside for seasonal peaks. Open shop firms dominate the construction
of single story and low-rise commercial and residential buildings,
particularly in suburban areas. Service stations, warehouse, single
story steel frame buildings for small factories, garden apartments,
small restaurants, etc., are traditionally non-union work. Open
shop contractors rely on specialization of their firm and work
force to compete for particular kinds of work. Skills and occupations
are often firm-specific and relate to the joint activities of a
permanent work-crew in the firm. Larger open shop firms - those who
have grown rapidly in the past five years - find that their continued
growth is constrained by an inability to man, temporarily, large
projects.
For example, open shop firms cannot find, hire, and fire
twenty journeymen plumbers for work on a sizable contract. Without
this kind of labor pool, they cannot estimate and bid on large,
long-range work. So small firms work on a "spot" basis: small
construction or in alteration and repairs where their specialization
and flexibility is an asset. Although there are non-union apprentice
programs (which, owing to government regulations have to be virtually
identical to union programs) considerable training occurs informally
in non-union firms, on an on-the-job basis. Due to the specialization
of a firm's work, this training is also firm-specific; firms can
rarely bear the costs of producing "well-rounded" journeymen if this
diversity of skills is not needed by the firm. Journeymen themselves
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have little or no incentive to invest in "general" training (i.e.,
a range of skills used in the industry as a whole) if their major
employment opportunities lie in permanent attachment to small
specialized firms. Without hiring halls or extensive, formal OJT
programs there are very few opportunities for skilled workers to
rotate through different jobs with different firms in the industry.
Thus, any investment individual journeymen want to make in broadening
their skills would have to come in private, after-hours training.
Given this general overview of the differences and similar-
ities of union and open-shop construction, the peculiar role that
"craft" labor market institutions play can be analyzed. This analysis
must describe the possible constributions to labor market (and,
hence, productive) efficiency that these institutions make. The
construction industry, particularly large-scale commercial building,
presents unique difficulties in organizing large pools of skilled
labor in an environment where uncertainty and mobility are paramount
factors. Craft labor market institutions may be one way of structuring
this market so as to minimize common organizational failures. Para-
doxically, the same institutions which contribute to efficiency in
the industry may also be used by unions as "distributive" mechanisms.
This obviously creates tension between labor and management over the
nature and control of issues like jurisdictional rules; training;
etc. The specific elements of that tension are described below.
Open shop construction may be another way to organize the industry,
along lines of firm-specific specialization and employment, supple-
mented by a pool of unskilled and semi-skilled labor. Whether this
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alternative is really applicable (or cost-effective) in other than
small-scale or large, but routine work is unresolved, but the specific
institutional alternatives open shop construction may create are
intriguing.
5.3.1 Labor Market Institutions: The 'Organizational Failures' Approach
"...task idiosyncracies are common, these give
rise to small-number exchange conditions, and
market contracting is supplemented by an employ-
ment relation principally for this reason."
0. Williamson7
Williamson's analysis of internal labor markets provides
another starting point for describing and evaluating industrial
relations' rules and institutions. Williamson begins by describing
alternate institutional forms of the employment relation. Two can-
didates, contingent claims contracting and sequential spot contracting,
are eliminated early on due to the excessive demands the former makes
on rational decision-making under uncertainty and the latter makes on
good faith bargaining. Williamson describes an economic world of idio-
syncratic jobs; of uncertainty; and of actors characterized by bounded
rationality and opportunism. In this world, normal market relations
are either difficult or impossible to sustain and, more importantly, are
less efficient than "institutional" employment relations. Williamson
demonstrates this, somewhat opaquely, by showing the efficiency or
"system-maintaining" properties inherent in the internal labor markets
described by Piore and Doeringer. He writes,
7 Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies, (Free Press, 1975), p. 62.
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internal labor markets serve to promote effi-
ciency. Job evaluation attached wages to jobs,
rather than to individuals, thereby foreclosing
individual bargaining. The resulting wage
structure reflects objective long-term job values
rather than current bargaining exigencies.
Internal promotion ladders encourage a positive
worker attitude toward on-the-job training and
enable the firm to reward cooperative behavior.
A grievance procedure, with impartial arbitration
as the usual final step, allows the firm and the
workers to deal with continually changing
conditions in a relatively nonlitigious manner.
Contract revision and renewal take place in an
atmosphere of mutual restraint in which the
parties are committed to continuing accommoda-
tion. Unionization commonly facilitates the
orderly achievement of these results, though it
is not strictl necessary, especially in small
organizations.
In sum, Williamson's analysis of the relative inefficiency
of different employment relations stems from an emphasis on:
# uncertainty
e task idiosyncracies
* bounded rationality
* opportunity
Because of the prevalence of these in labor markets, transactions
costs are reduced by institutional structures and by labor-management
rules governing the employment relation (i.e., hierarchy).
Construction Industry: Production Processes and Labor Markets
Williamson's analysis, while realistic in many respects, is
also curiously abstract. "Transactions costs," which are at the center
of his analysis of institutional structures, are illusive in definition
and nearly impossible to quantify. And for labor market applications,
his only concrete references are to those described by Piore and
8 Williamson, Ibid., p. 81.
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Doeringer: internal markets in manufacturing firms. In many ways,
however, Williamson's approach is helpful in understanding the
"external" labor markets organized by craft unions in construction.
In order to justify this approach, considerable famil-
iarity with the production process in the construction industry is
needed. The keys to understanding that process are noting the role
played by flexibility in the skills and output characteristics of
firms and instability of skilled workers' relation to firms and of
firms to each other. Firms in the industry are required to bid on
and build projects to individual specifications of different clients.
Though there is some standardization and prefabrication in the
industry, most large-scale projects are unique in many ways. This
uniqueness creates major "idiosyncracies" in tasks to a degree
unimagined by Williamson's or Piore and Doeringer's description of
task or job specific skills in manufacturing. In the latter, the
idiosyncracies may be marginal adjustments to a routine task; in
construction, the peculiarity of work is central to the completion
of the specified, unique product. For this reason, considerable
flexibility in skills is needed by workers in the industry. Indeed,
one of the dimensions of skill for a journeyman is breadth of com-
petence in different skills and with different materials.
Construction is so complex an activity that no single
craftsman or group of diversified craftsmen joined as a firm could
hope to be master of all the range of skills needed. Table 4.2
presented a list of over forty different specializations used in
constructing a moderately large building. For the most part, this
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range of tasks is accomplished by different subcontractors who work
on the project site for short periods of time. The instability of
the industry comes in part from these temporary associations of a
multitude of different firms. In turn, each of these firms will
employ some members of one to several of the eighteen different
building trades unions. If the project is of any substantial size,
most of the subcontractors will temporarily draw on a skilled labor
pool external to the firm for temporary workers. For example,
mechanical subs doing the heating, ventilating, and cooling systems
will hire from five to thirty skilled journeymen to accomplish the
particular tasks of the project during a period of several weeks'
employment. To this dual nature of the instability in the industry
- relatively small firms contracting and recontracting with one
another and large numbers of skilled workers working for a variety
of firms on a temporary basis - is added yet another type of insta-
bility: competition. Most construction projects are of fairly short
duration, from six months to two years for small and medium scale
building. Firms usually have to bid on work for each project. In
this kind of competitive environment, with very short "production
runs," firms are necessarily myopic: there is no guarantee of a
fixed market share beyond the work that is under contract. This
uncertainty severely constrains the firms' ability to invest in
fixed capital machinery or in "quasi-fixed" factors like skilled
labor. This uncertainty also prompts the diversity and limited
specialiation of subcontrctors and skilled workers. No one
-233-
construction project can sustain them for long; they must be fit to
move along and between projects as demand dictates. To the extent
that some specialization will improve their productivity, lower
costs and their bids, it is valued. However, extreme specialization
is usually constrained by the natural diversity of output in the
industry. Some degree of flexibility and skill breadth is needed to
continue to work regularly.
Thus, the organization and operation of construction projects
consists in two functions: one is the on-site coordination of firms,
machinery, and manpower to produce a complex product efficiently.
This function has been extensively developed by engineers using CPM
and PERT methods. The other management function in the industry is
simply bringing together, from the outside market, existing firms and
existing skilled workers for temporary employment. Few construction
projects are so large and so long as to permit extensive on-the-job
training for either management or labor. As a result, the construction
industry as a whole must sustain specialized firms and highly skilled
workers so that they can be shifted through temporary projects as
demand dictates. How this pool of skilled workers is maintained
external to any one firm is the central problem facing both the
industrial organization and the labor force in the industry.
Unlike the manufacturing examples in Williamson's analysis,
there are no substantial internal labor markets in contract construction.
No labor market has to solve problems of internal allocation of labor
within a firm. Rather, it must solve problems of continually allocating
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and reallocating labor between firms. And it must do this so that
both skilled workers have some certainty of employment and firms
have some certainty of obtaining qualified workers at known wages.
Craft union institutions work to structure this external labor market
in ways which reduce transaction costs, by providing common rules
for all firms and workers, and, more importantly, provide occupational
identity and stability for skilled workers. For example:
# Jurisdictional boundaries and rigid skill classifications
with fixed wages provide, for workers, a certainty in both range of
skills required and a return for those skills, independent of par-
ticular, temporary employment conditions. It is unlikely that workers
would (or could) invest in general training for employment in the
industry without the protection that jurisdictions and a fixed wage
structure give. For employers, these structures also have a function:
they permit firms to allocate work by trade and skill category and
estimate the costs of the work, before bidding on contracts. Without
clear skill delimitations and fixed wages, the inherent variety of
construction work would become "a bloomin', buzzin' confusion." As
Williamson notes, "In comparison with the firm, markets lack a rich
and common rating language." Where, as in the construction industry,
internal labor markets of one firm cannot be substituted for market
transactions, the external market must be so structured to provide
common signals to all firms and workers.
* Formal apprentice training programs rely on the industry
as a whole to provide on-the-job training which any one firm may be
unable to undertake. Apprentice programs are structural so as to
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rotate men through a variety of tasks within a building trade
occupation. This guarantees them some divesity in skills needed to
ensure relatively stable employment. Individual firms, limited by
present work, cannot provide such varied experience or afford
opportunities to invest in other than immediately productive skills.
Limits on apprentices, while guaranteeing more jobs for journeymen,
also ensure that some OJT can be guided by more experienced journeymen
and that employees do not attempt to substitute cheaper labor or
limited skills for journeymen at times when that would be "efficient."
* Work rules provide protection for journeymen and firms
against hazardous or exploitative practices of firms seeking to gain
competitive advantages. The short duration of construction work and
the temporary contracts between firms provide ample opportunities
for temporary exploitation, under some conditions, of workers by
firms or of firms by workers. This is what Williamson calls the
danger of "opportunism" which arises in small numbers bargaining
problems. Common work rules, like common wages, do away with con-
tinual, fractious bargaining in favor of common rules arrived at
through contractual agreement.
s Hiring halls exist as supplementary sources of job
information and referral to provide easy and low-cost access to jobs
by workers and to provide easy and low-cost access to jobs by workers
and to workers by firms. In an industry where turnover is high,
reliance on individual job search or firm recruitment may be very
costly and too risky.
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These craft labor market institutions are remarkably only
in contrast to the alternative market structures. For the employment
relation in the firm, Williamson discounts two market alternatives to
internal labor markets: contingent claims contracting and sequential
spot contracting. The former fails to be viable due to uncertainty:
no contract can comprehensively deal with all future possibilities.
Due to bounded rationality, any contract which attempted to encompass
all eventualities would be either incomprehensible or incomplete. It
would either be, ex ante, difficult to write or, ex post, impossible
to enforce. The latter alternative, sequential spot contracting,
fails due to opportunism: "the idiosyncratic nature of the work
experience effectively destroys parity at the contract renewal
interval." Without this parity, either workers or employers are able
to exploit temporary advantages in small numbers bargaining with the
resulting inefficiencies in allocation. Due to the variety and
instability of work and the employment relation in construction,
these two alternate forms of labor market structure are also
inapplicable. First, due to the variety of construction work - the
lack of homogeneity in either working conditions and materials, or
products - contingent claims contractng for other than very temporary
labor services is impossible.
Second, due to the uncertainty as to demand conditions
facing the firm and its need to bid fixed cost contracts for work,
sequential spot contracting is unfeasible: temporary shortages of
labor or key steps in the construction process could be used to
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appropriate nearly all returns to firms by its workers. Conversely,
firms could exploit temporary advantages over workers for short-run
profit gains. In general, with either of these contractual alter-
natives, considerable transactions costs can be envisioned, forcing
a need to recontract or interpret past contracts as production
conditions change or are altered by circumstance. However, the common
rules provided for the external labor market by craft union rules
avoid these transactions costs. While the implications of the rules
may, at any one time, appear to cause inefficiencies, the operation
of the system as a whole should be more efficient in comparison to
the alternative. It is unlikely that highly skilled workers could
be attached to an industry and not to a firm or that firms could
continually recontract with other firms and with groups of workers
without some common agreement on wages, occupational structure, and
work conditions. It is precisely these rules and institutions
which permit the maintenance of an external pool of skilled workers
and of specialized firms which can be continuously drawn on for
temporary production within the industry.
Two institutional alternatives may exist though to the
craft union structure in the external labor market in construction.
One of these is the creation of the same institutions (occupational
identity; apprentice training; work rules; and hiring or referral
systems) by an association of nonunion or open shop firms. The other
is to change the industrial organization of the industry so that
firms are either small enough or large enough to do without an external
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skilled labor pool. Both of these alternatives, with examples of
their manifestation in the construction industry, are explored below.
First, however, each of the distinctly "union" institutions is des-
cribed and analyzed in greater detail. Throughout this description,
it should be emphasized that the characteristics of the structures
or institutions being discussed are quite idealized. The descriptions
represent ideal or model types of union behavior particularly charac-
teristic of large-scale commercial and industrial building. In
addition, it must be stressed that although the institutions are
described as "union" this is meant in the sense that they characterize
labor market operations in large-scale construction covered by collec-
tive bargaining agreements. The "union" characterization is not
meant to imply that the institutions are unilaterally imposed by the
building trades on management in the industry. To the contrary, manage-
ment plays a major role in creating and sustaining these institutions
in collective bargaining and employer representatives usually partici-
pate in the operation of many of the resulting committees and
associations. For example, management representatives are always
represented on joint apprenticeship committees and have been involved
at times in both defining jurisdictions and resolving disputes. For
this reason, management is implicated, as it were, in both the character
and the operation of the "union" institutions themselves.
5.3.2 Occupational Definition: Towards a Theory of Jurisdictions
Economists have given very little consideration to the
analysis of occupational structure and change. Outside some brief
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comments by Arrow and an article by Houthakker, Scoville is the only
one to develop a theory of job design on the basis of neoclassical
analysis of costs and productivity. 9  Scoville begins by defining
"jobs" as groups of "tasks" where tasks are the smallest skill or
activity elements. Unlike authors who assume that the task combinations
which comprise jobs are simply given by technology, as in Adam Smith's
famous pin-making examples, Scoville shows that jobs may arise out of
interaction between employers' and workers' preferences and economic
incentives. He notes,
"...the apparent fixed relationship between
means of production and specific jobs, which
impresses itself upon observers of work in
highly capitalized industries, is either
illusory or a short-run phenomenon...Tasks and
duties can be reshuffled among jobs in several
ways - by altering the horizontal time and
functions sequence involved, by incorporating
or deleting vertical (supervisory and quality
control) functions, by inclusion or separation
of maintenance, repair and supply functions...
Moreover, that which appears fixed at a point
in time may be quite variable in the face of
options presentedl y continual technological
advance (Piore)."
Scoville chooses "narrowness" versus "breadth" as the
crucial dimension in job (or occupational) definition. The subdivision
of labor, as described by Smith and then Taylor, has increasingly
permitted the increased specialization of workers to the point where
9 K. Arrow, "The Theory of Discrimination," in 0. Ashenfelter and A.
Rees, Discrimination in Labor Markets (Princeton University Press,
1973); James Scoville, "A Theory of Jobs and Training," Industrial
Relations, Vol. 9, 1969, pp. 36-53; and H. Houthakker, Economics and
Biology: Specialization and Speciation," Kyklos, 1956.
10 Scoville, op. cit., p. 47.
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many perform only a few routine tasks. This specialization has been
pursued due to the belief that labor productivity continues to rise
as the divison of labor becomes finer and finer. Recently, worker
dissatisfaction has raised the costs of this specialization and
routinization of work to the point where job redesign now aimed at
"enlargement," is again an issue. In this context Scoville proposes
a model of employers' and workers' economic behavior related to the
relative "narrowness" of a job.
For employers, the determinants of optimal job breadth are
four cost curves, which combine to form a conveniently convex total
cost curve (see Figure 5.3.1). The minimum point of the total cost
curve determines the relative narrowness of a job. Scoville
hypothesizes that:
(1) supervisory costs fall as the supervisory function
is incorporated with production work by job enlargement;
(2) materials, wastage and quality control costs are high in
narrow jobs (due to low motivation of workers); decline
and then rise in broad jobs (because of the loss in
skill specialization);
(3) capital costs rise continuously due to the increase in
inventory costs of goods in process;
(4) net wage costs are high for narrow jobs (owing to cost
of turnover); decline; and then rise as training costs
increase in broad jobs.
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Figure 5.3.1
EMPLOYERS' MODEL OF OPTIMAL JOB BREADTH
total costs
capital costs
wage costs
materials
wastage and
quality
control costs
broad
job breadth
Source: J. Scoville, op. cit., p. 42.
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With these curves defined (hypothetically) in the graph, a
determinate solution as to job breadth emerges: the minimum of the
total cost curve. It is, of course, easy to criticize the exact
shape of any of these curves or to test qualitatively the impact of a
change in shape of any one curve on the minimum of the total cost
curve. More important, the exact shape of the curves empirically
will depend on the technology and labor market structure of a particular
industry. Scoville's analysis is apparently oriented toward industrial
firms engaged in continuous process production (e.g., pin making).
For a construction firm, engaged in production of the relatively unique
good for a short period of time, the curves may have a substantially
different appearance. If the firm is myopic - and, in construction it
is likely to be so because of the cash flow constraints of discontinuous
payment only for work completed - it may stress immediate production
gains achieved through specialization over supposed benefits attainable
by job breadth. Due to the relatively short time workers are employed
on construction jobs, the costs of turnover arising from dissatisfaction
with routine tasks is likely to be low. Supervisory costs may decline
slightly if workers are "well-rounded" but relatively little supervision
may be needed on a particular project if most tasks on that project,
though unique to the project, are repetitive. Thus the supervisory
cost curve may be nearly flat. Capital costs may not rise abruptly:
this rise is largely a function of speed in production and there is no
reason, a priori, to assume "narrow" jobs reduce project completion
time. Quite the opposite may be true. Finally, the net wage cost curve
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may also be flatter due to the lower costs of turnover at one end and
the (indeterminate or project-specific) training costs at the other.
The difficulty of applying this model to employers in the
construction industry is that the exact shape of the curves, and hence,
the optimal job breadth, will vary by project type at one point in
time. In addition, the curves will shift over time because of change
in product composition and technology. Overall, one might hazard the
generalization that employers will find relatively "narrow" jobs more
economical. They may be solely interested in skills and output specific
to a particular project and thus adopt, as firms, a narrow view of
construction jobs and occupations. However, employers will be aware
that project types will vary over time and, therefore, different kinds
of tasks skills will be needed from workers in the future. Nonethe-
less, there will be considerable uncertainty as to what skills will
be needed and when. This uncertainty is likely to reduce any one
employer's incentive to develop and train most men in broad occupations.
The firm is more likely to retain a few highly skilled men on a per-
manent basis and supplement these with temporary hires from an external
labor pool. Given the nature and complexity of the particular con-
struction project, and a range of skilled men available from this
labor pool, the firm will have to bear the costs of hiring, screening,
and training. If the temporary jobs are routine, these hiring tran-
saction costs are likely to be low, and the firm can rely on fitting
"unskilled" workers into narrow, temporary jobs. If the temporary
jobs are unique and/or complex, the transactions and training costs
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are likely to be quite high. But a firm, acting alone, will have no
incentive (or resources) to develop hiring and training systems which
are applicable to more than the specific needs of the project. At
most, it might be willing to invest in some specific training of a
few workers attached to the firm to prepare them for different work
the firm might undertake in the future. It is highly unlikely that
any firm would invest in specific training for a large number of
workers ex ante - that is, before the specific construction project
is under contract. Ex post, there may be limited time available for
training, particularly if jobs are complex and training costs, due to
demand for OJT, experience, and practice, is costly and difficult. In
sum, the "production run" for a construction firm is limited to only
one or a few projects. This short period does not allow for extensive
investment by the firm in quasi-fixed factors like skilled construction
labor.
For workers, Scoville also presents a cost model of optimal
occupational breadth. Workers' interests, in terms of breadth, are
potentially different from employers'. Scoville sees workers concerned
with three types of costs (see Figure 5.3.2):
(1) worker-borne training costs, which should rise as
jobs broaden;
(2) probability of employment, which should increase
as workers skilled are broadened:
(3) "wage-productivity nexus" which represents the
workers' perceived trade-off in earning ability
in narrow versus broad jobs.
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Graph 5.3.2
WORKERS' MODEL OF OPTIMAL JOB BREADTH
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Figure 5.3.3
WORKERS' PREFERENCES ON JOB BREADTH
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Source: J. Scoville, op. cit., pp. 44, 45.
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These cost curves are not as clearly defined as Scoville's
view of employers' interest. Yet their qualitative implication is
clear: workers' economic interest in broader jobs, which raise the
probability of employment, are tempered by the increased costs of
training and the potential loss in productivity due to being "too
broad" (i.e., the 'jack-of-all-trade, master-of-none' syndrome). The
result will be a concave net earnings curve which will define the
pure economic benefits. Scoville then hypothesizes that the actual
choice of job breadth will result from the combination of net economic
benefits and workers' preferences (i.e., psychic costs) as to job
diversity (see Figure 5.3.3).
For construction workers, cost curves are likely to imply
net economic benefits in broader jobs or occupations. In an industry
characterized by the movement of many men from firm to firm, the
probability of employment will increase the more diverse the worker's
skills. If jobs on different projects are relatively unique and
require some degree of flexibility, innovation, and self-supervision
to accomplish, then the wage-productivity nexus should be relatively
flat. (In other words, in a world of diverse and uncertain tasks, a
jack-of-all-trades is more of an optimal worker.) However, worker-
borne training costs will rise as jobs broaden and this alone will
cause the discounted net earnings function to decline as jobs broaden.
Finally, it is not clear what psychic costs are involved in choosing
between breadth of construction jobs. It would be hard to differentiate
these costs from pure economic preferences. The net earnings function
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alone, then, may be sufficient to define optimal job breadth from the
workers' point of view. (Also, if status or prestige is attached to
broad jobs, independent of the economic value of diverse skills, then
lower psychic costs may be associated with job breadth.)
Scoville's model of job design gives a context in which to
evaluate the role and influence of craft unions, in construction, on
the organization of work. As indicated above, the short-run, small-
firm, uncertain, project-specific nature of construction activity
creates a tension between the immediate occupational needs of firms
and the job desires of workers. Firms may be able to reward only
immediate, limited productivity; workers will desire broader jobs and
training to increase employment probability in moving between firms
and projects. At the same time, firms may realize that access to a
broadly trained labor pool may decrease their project costs. Yet
individual firms may not have resources to create such an external
pool and associations of firms may risk attracting "free riders" (as
well as anti-trust action) if they pool resources to train and manage
"external" employees. In construction, craft unions resolve both the
tension between broad and narrow jobs and the dilemma over collective
action.
The craft union concepts of a jurisdiction and of a journey-
man define broad occupations at a relatively high level of skill.
This definition, in the context of the organization of much of the
construction industry (small firms and mobile workers) serves several
coincident purposes:
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(1) it reflects workers' desires for a diversity of
skills which increase probability of employment
and may imply high wages and status;
(2) it reflects employers' implicit needs for a
skilled labor pool external to the firm; a pool
which can in part be created and managed by a
number of workers and firms as a "collective good;"
(3) it provides some occupational structure and iden-
tity which permits (a) hiring and screening with
lower transactions costs and (b) some certainty
to workers to invest in general training which will
be saleable to a variety of firms in the industry;
(4) it provides a common job definition to which a common
wage level can be attached, thus eliminating the costs
of monopolistic bargaining (opportunism) from every
hiring process.
An example of a craft-defined occupation may make these
purposes clearer and more complete. The skill (or task) components
of the occupation carpenter as it is "traditionally" defined in U.S.
construction covers over thirty different subspecialties. Obviously,
from this range of tasks it is a broadly defined occupation. Yet it
is clear that any one task might become the specialization of one or
a number of men if there were enough work to justify that fine a
division of labor. Presumably, construction work is so varied and so
uncertain in its composition that such a high degree of specialization
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is risky. Craft jurisdictions and apprentice training programs
incorporate all these tasks into one occupation and thus provide the
diversity or breadth that serves both workers and firms.
The apprentice system in construction structures the on-the-
job training process in a way which guarantees the workers diverse
skills within a defined and protected jurisdiction while also rotating
an apprentice through jobs and firms in a defined program and at fixed
wages. It would be virtually impossible to expect individual workers
to be able to arrange such a program. Given opportunism, the tran-
sactions costs would be insurmountable for all but the most persistent.
However, craft unions and associations acting jointly to govern the OJT
training process can provide the structure necessary. Within the
structure, workers can then invest themselves, through lower wages
and foregone leisure, in those skills specific to a firm or project
which comprise, in sum, general training for the industry as a whole.
In static terms, then, the craft labor market institution
of "jurisdictions" and "journeymen" contribute to the efficiency of
the industry. They permit, in combination with other institutions
analyzed below, relatively low-cost system maintaining solutions to
managing a skilled labor pool connected to a large number of firms.
If workers are risk-adverse, then to the extent these institutions
reduce uncertainty in occupational employment and earnings, they work
to lower the mean wage or earnings necessary in an industry to maintain
a skilled labor force. At any given time, the operations of these
institutions may appear to be inefficient (e.g. petty jurisdictional
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squabbles or use of skilled journeymen to do routine work). And the
continuous economic pressures on employers to narrowly define jobs,
or to economize in the short-run, may cause disruptive tensions with
unions committed to broader jobs or on-going institutional structures.
In addition, the unions themselves, particularly under monopoly
conditions may use these structures to force distributive gains from
employers. Unions can use jurisdictions to control work or require
journeymen on jobs to inflate employment levels. Additional costs
from this activity may be borne by employers or passed on to consumers.
It is up to the unions, pressured by the employers, to permit
flexibility in the application of institutional norms to a variety of
situations. Not surprisingly, this need for flexibility coupled with
uncertainty on behalf of both unions and employers as to the real
purpose of the variation can cause disruption. Unions may always be
suspicious that flexibility means management retraction of rights;
employers fear adherence to detail in all rules means productive
inefficiency. The deciding factor which resolves the issue and
permits either cooperation for flexibility or inhibits it is a
combination of "atmosphere" and competitive pressures.
The relative efficiency of the craft union occupational
structure can be challenged in at least two ways. First, demand may
increase in volume and/or constancy to permit and sustain a finer
division of labor. With high demand, the advantage of specialization,
greater productivity in narrow tasks, outweigh the disadvantage, uncer-
tainty of employment. Such specialization would tend to break down
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the labor pool of broadly trained craftsmen into task-oriented workers
many of whom might be more permanently attached to specialized sub-
contractors or move between a few specialized firms. Second,
technological change in production can change the derived demand for
skilled labor. To the extent that offsite processing of materials or
standardization of building components can substitute for skilled
on-site labor, the skill demands of contractors will be reduced.
Over the last seven years, construction technology has
evolved from an industry in which most work was undertaken on-site to
meet the specific requirements of a unique building to an industry
characterized more by the local assembly of prefabricated components.
This "assembly" process substitutes on-site skills for off-site
capital-intensive technology. It also implies a demand from unskilled
or semi-skilled labor (in routine, limited tasks) that can be met by
hiring from an undifferentiated labor pool. Both of these trends,
particularly in combination, provide potential advantages for the open
shop contractor. They permit an alternative institutional organization
of the industry based on firm specialization and semi-skilled labor.
Two examples of these trends are the organization of residential
construction, particularly single-family home-building, and some large-
scale heavy construction, such as power plants and highways. Residential
work is usually small-scale, very standardized, and relies heavily on
the installation of pre-fabricated components. Homebuilders act less
as general contractors than as developers: they finance the construction
of houses and manage the building process but most of the construction
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work is done by highly specialized subcontractors. These subs are
usually very small firms which work on a variety of projects on a
fixed-cost basis. At the other extreme are large projects, like
nuclear power plants, which last for five to ten years and cost
hundreds of millions of dollars. Construction work on this scale is
so large and so stable that it permits both extreme specialization
of labor in repetitive tasks and considerable on-site training in
those tasks. For example, in large-scale power or chemical plants,
workmen may do nothing except cut and weld pipe for two years. This
kind of stability in a particular type of work permits specific
training of semi-skilled labor.
5.3.3 Training and Apprenticeship
The nature of training in construction is largely determined
by the occupational structure and skill demands in the industry as a
whole. Union apprenticeship programs emphasize broad training across
many tasks in an occupation. There is a heavy, though not exclusive
reliance on on-the-job training and considerable stress on experience:
the programs last from two to five years.
Over the last ten to fifteen years, there has been some
dissatisfaction expressed by construction management and, implicitly,
by apprentices themselves with the structure and operation of union
programs. Some prefabrication has reduced skill demands in the industry
but apprentice programs have been slow to recognize this and change
the training process. Increased specialization by subcontractors in
various construction operations, like drywall or cement form work, has
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reduced the need for broadly trained craftsmen. Informal entry to
journeymen status without completion of full apprentice programs, a
process that predominates in some trades, has also reduced incentives
for invstment in training. This fact, in addition to other difficulties
in program operation, has led to substantial drop-out rates in union
programs.
Nonunion training in construction is both similar and
substantially different from the union system. Many open shop programs
are initially the same in structure and content to union plans. This
is due to the government regulation: in order for apprentices to be
officially recognized as such the programs must be certified.
Government agencies, like the Federal BAT and State SACs, usually
adopt union plans as standards for certification. The substantial
differences in nonunion programs are either (1) reliance on in-house
training by some firms or (2) the design of new occupations and
training plans, such as "general building mechanics," by some firms
and associations.
In general, there appear to be two key differences between
the union and the open shop approach to training. One of these
involves the structure of the program and has implications for the
efficiency of the training process. The other relates to distributive
issues as to who bears the cost of training.
The union apprenticeship exemplifies a structure of training
and job progression in an "external" labor market. Broadly trained,
highly skilled workers who are attached to the industry (and not a
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firm) can be produced by a formal system of job rotation. In this
process, many firms contribute opportunities for specific training.
Access to the wide range of experience and skills of foremen and
journeymen in a variety of firms is assured. At the same time, the
danger of workers becoming "too broadly" trained is avoided through
the structuring of the training within one jurisdiction. The structure
of the program guarantees to workers a fixed wage across firms and a
progression of increases in the wage as their experience and skills
increase. The transactions costs and uncertainty involved in any
alternative to this structured approach are clearly enormous. Individual
workers are unlikely to be able to bargain and recontract continuously
in order to work their way around the industry broadening their skills.
Even if they did so, they would have little sense of what returns
there would be to such broad, but industry-specific, training since
the returns would be idiosyncratic: unique to the skill composition
and bargaining power of each individual.
In contrast, non-union firms undertake informal training of
semi-skilled men only in the limited range of tasks needed by the firm
- substituting, in effect, an internal labor market for an external
one. Workers' skills may become mixed across traditional (i.e., union)
craft lines. New occupations of greater generality (building mechanic)
or specificity (instrument fitter) are created and trained for low-
skilled, entry-level hires. Some large-scale non-union contractors have
developed, at their own expense, in-house training materials to create
a semi-skilled, specifically trained labor pool where and when needed.
Flexibility in training, combined with advanced technology, firm
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specialization, and a fine division of labor allows these open-shop
firms to maintain large numbers of productive, yet semi-skilled,
mechanics. Yet the result of most open-shop training is not a large,
external labor of skilled men but a smaller group, attached to firms,
with perhaps a narrower range of skills. And this lack of an external
source of skilled labor supply severely constrains the firms' ability
to take on large-scale projects. When and if they do so, extra
training costs are involved.
This leads to the second implication of the union/nonunion
differences in training: the distribution of costs. Under formal
apprenticeship systems, individual workers bear much of the cost of
OJT through prescribed lower hourly wages. In addition, all employers
in the industry pay a small "tax," on the basis of hours worked by
their journeymen, to support the activities of the Joint Apprenticeship
Committee. Finally, most of the after-hours training is paid for by
government vocational education programs. But, over all, the major
costs of training are borne by the workers in the form of lower
wages and foregone leisure in attending after hours classes. This
is not surprising since, if the training is "general training" for
the industry as a whole, it is the workers and not the firms which
should pay for most of it. Most of the training in the open shop
sector, however, is firm-specific. As a result, its costs should
be borne by the firm. In fact, this is largely the case. Small
firms undertake limited training at their own expense; large firms
pay for the development of training material, instruction, and equipment.
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Some of these costs are borne by the firm as general overhead and
should be reflected in its prices; occasionally, direct costs for a
single project's training are assumed completely by the owner. In
terms of final costs to the consumer, in a competitive industry it
should make no difference whether firms or workers bear training
costs. If training is general, workers should recoup their investment
through higher wages. If training is specific, firms must recapture
their investment through higher prices.
What is crucial, though is whether open shop firms in
construction could cooperate to organize a general training system
for skilled workers if they ever found this to be necessary. Arrow,
in a brief comment in his essay The Limits of Organization, argues
that it may be difficult for firms to do so. He writes:
"...a significant part of accumulation of human
capital consists of training specific to the
needs of a firm, an input of information to the
worker which increases his value to the firm but
not to other firms. If the function of labor is
to cooperate in production with capital goods
which are held widely by different firms, it would
appear that virtually all training is general.
But learning the information channels within a firm
and the codes for transmitting information through
them is indeed a skill of value only internally.
One might ask, as one does frequently
in the theory of the firm, why all firms do not
have the same codes, so that training in the
code is transferable? In the first place, in
this combinatorial situation, there may easily
be many optimal codes, all equally good, but
to be useful in a firm it is important to know
the right code. The situation here is very
much that of the games of coordination which
have been stressed so much by Schelling.1 i
11 K. Arrow, The Limits of Organization, (Norton, 1974), p. 62.
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Besides the costs and difficulty of coordination to create common
"codes," Arrow asserts that different firms may necessarily have
different codes. He notes that,
"...history matters. The code is determined
in accordance with the best expectations at
the time of the firm's creation. Since the
code is part of the firm's or more generally
the organization's capital, as already
argued, the code of a given organization will
be modified only slowly over time. Hence,
the codes of organizations starting at
different times will in general be different
even if they are competitive firms. Indeed,
individuals starting firms at the same time
may well have different a priori distributions
and therefore different codes." 12
But, in construction, the union apprenticeship system does act as a
code of skills and work organization that structure general training
for the industry. New union firms adopt their mode of operation to
fit this industry-wide code. Even if firms and workers come and go,
the general structure remains and is useful for training new entrants
to the stock of skilled workers. Again, it may be difficult, if not
impossible, for open shop firms to duplicate this type of training
system.
5.3.4 Hiring and Referral: Networks and Halls
"What is the alternative to the hiring hall?
Is it profitable to go down the corner and
have a shape-up like they used to have on the
waterfront? Have 500 workers show up at
some candy store or something? And then have
the employers go down in their trucks and
say, 'You, you, you, you and you are
carpenters. Hop in the truck!"
12 Arrow, Ibid., p. 78.
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The hiring hall provides the people with
the competency and the skills to perform a
certain type of work. It brings them
together, so that a contractor can grab a
phone and say, 'i ey, I need 40 guys on myjob tomorrow.'"
Union hiring halls in construction are usually considered
to be essential in maintaining a "closed shop" and restricting entry
to a trade so as to sustain the union's monopoly wage. In fact,
evidence shows that restrictive hiring halls, in terms of formal
collective bargaining agreements, are not predominant in the industry
and, informally, that most workers and employers rarely rely on the
hall for work referral. In addition, any use of a hall by a union to
maintain a closed shop is an unfair labor practice and workers not
referred for "discriminatory" reasons, such as not being a member of a
labor organization, can, and occasionally do, sue.
If hiring halls do not function as restrictive mechanisms,
it may not be too far-fetched to assume that they do function as
hiring halls. They act as a supplementary source of information and
referral for at least some workers in the industry. And in an
industry characterized by instability of employment heterogeneity of
workers and jobs; and high cost of time delays - both to workers and
firms - the existence of halls, as referral systems, can contribute
to the efficient allocation of labor. Of course, in most cases,
13 Painters Union President Raferty quoted in H. Johnson and N. Kotz,
The Unions, (Washington Post Report, 1972), p. 145.
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the maintenance by workers of informal contact networks (otherwise
known as "friends") and the exchange of information between contacts
and employers (otherwise known as "talking shop") may be sufficient
to inform workers continually about job openings. Yet the extreme
heterogeneity of construction work and the geographic diversity in
its location may make the maintenance of an information network costly
or cause occassional breakdowns in its usefulness. Given the short
construction season and the high hourly wage, search costs after
unemployment are likely to be high.
In essence, hiring halls act as "information brokers."
Information theory is not so well advanced as to define under what
market circumstances "brokers" will occur. Certaintly they are prom-
inent in housing and labor markets (from employment services to
executive recruiters) and not in retail sales or personal services.
Apparently, it is the heterogeneity of buyers and sellers, coupled
with high search costs (due, in part, to geographic dispersion) that
make brokers feasible. Brokers act as joint agents for many sellers
or buyers and can only survive as long as sellers or buyers bear the
cost of their services and feel fairly equally treated. If, as Arrow
shows, information has some characteristics of a collective good,
brokers may also act to internalize externalities and achieve optimum
production. For example, every seller of labor services might
prefer that only his availability be known, but the costs of distri-
buting this information widely might be prohibitive. If there are
economies of scale in information processing, sellers have an incentive
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to combine and use brokers. The same holds true for buyers. In
addition, Boorman shows that there are costs to maintaining networks
of contacts, even "weak" ones (otherwise known as "acquaintances")
which may furnish job information.1 4 The ex ante willingness to
bear these costs (before unemployment) will depend on the probability
of unemployment. If the probability is high and network maintenance
costs are great, then the ex ante costs of network maintenance may be
so high that the ex post reliance on a labor broker may be more
efficient.
All of this serves to rationalize a simple phenomenon: the
occasional to frequent use by construction firms and workers of referral
systems. These systems provide a service and the craft union supports
them, on the basis of a dues tax, as a collective good available to all.
If the referral systems are operated well, optimal information should be
present. The importance of some type of referral system in construction
is shown by recent attempts by non-union contractors to create them.
In fact, the major open shop contractor association is franchising a
referral system package to local chapters. These systems operate in a
similar manner to a union hiring hall. Whether they can be maintained
on an association-sponsored or a cash payment basis remains to be seen.
14 Scott Boorman, "A Combinatorial Optimization Model for Transmission
of Job Information Through Contact Networks," Bell Journal of Economics,
Spring 1975.
-261-
At present, the open shop referral systems in Tampa and in
Houston are operated and paid for by contractors' associations. Workers
register with the system listing principal trade and experience; they
are referred to jobs called in by contractors by the office manager of
the system. Very little screening is apparently done by the referral
agency. Wages are set upon hiring by the contractor.
In contrast, the union hiring halls are paid for by union dues
and, although the referral process works in the same manner, the hall is
nominally responsible for screening workers. Contractors can supposedly
order homogeneous labor at a given wage. (In fact, quality of workers
available from a union hall may vary substantially.) In theory, though,
the union hall serves to finance the costs of referral and screening
on the basis of payments by the sellers, the workers in the trade. In
the open shop context, the costs are borne by the buyers, the contractors,
and the services provided are narrower in scope.
5.3.5 Work Rules: Common Labor Standards
One of the major themes of collective bargaining in construction,
as in many other industries, is to "take wages and labor standards out
of competition." In seeking to negotiate a commons set of standards for
an industry, unions seek to protect workers from capricious or systemic
actions by firms whose competitive environment may force them to adopt
various strategies to cut direct labor costs. The result of these
negotiations, embodied in a web of work and other rules in a collective
bargaining agreement, form a structure of governance for the employee
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relation. In many industries, and perhaps particularly in construction,
the resulting web of rules is often viewed as too rigid and inflexible.
Indeed, the resistance of management to unions is usually motivated
more by fear of interference with "management rights" than it is by
unwillingness to grant higher wages. This resistance has been reflected
in a biased portrayal of the nature and role of work rules.
One way to consider the function of common work rules is to
imagine the employment relation in construction without them. Two
alternatives are obvious. The first is to have every worker bargain
individually with each firm over their particular desires for rules
regarding output, mobility, breaks, safety, etc. If the bargained
results were not satisfactory, workers would recontract by re-opening
bargaining with that firm or another. Thus, if firms have an incentive
to lower turnover costs, there should be some margin to acquiesce to
workers' desires. The second alternative is to have firms set rules
and standards unilaterally and hire workers on a "take it or leave it"
basis. Again, competition between firms to lower both direct labor
costs (through lower worker-oriented rules) and indirect labor costs
(through more regulated "benefits" to reduce turnover) should result in
some rough equilibrium with different firms choosing different rule
packages and workers distibuting themselves among them. In the con-
struction industry, however, neither of these alternatives may be
viable or efficient in comparison to the agreement on common rules.
Individual bargaining with skilled workers, in the context of
varied construction activity and over terms of a very short employment
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relations, will result in very high transactions costs. It may also
create numerous interpersonal inequities, as some workers may gain
particular benefits in work conditions due to the market conditions
under which they were hired. These differences in rules may only cause
continual individual bargaining over the terms of employment, a process
which can be time-consuming and expensive for management. Given the
"small numbers bargaining" context in which these work conditions would
be defined, either part to the agreement, may ex post, have good cause
to be dissatisfied. The alternative to individual bargaining, is the
unilateral determination of work rules, sometimes on an ad hoc basis, by
construction management. This system would allow firms to differentiate
themselves by quality of work conditions and attract workers on the
basis of non-wage benefits of employment. The extremely varied nature
of work in construction would force continual adjustments or interpretation
of these rules. If workers felt that these changes were working against
their interests, individual bargaining (or quits) would reappear, with
the resulting costs.
A resolution of this problem in construction is to provide
common rules for all workers and all employers. This structure serves an
important purpose in several ways. First, it permits bargaining over
the conditions of employment in a situation apart from the on-site
management of labor. As a consequence, no "small-numbers" problems of
question of temporary market power (opportunism) can arise. The results
which result should reflect the average balance of power and interest
between the two parties. For workers, these rules guarantee some
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certainty as to emplyment conditions across firms. This lowers the
costs of mobility and permits rotation of workers between firms with
much less friction. For employers, the rules also serve at least one,
and probably two, important roles. They also guarantee to management
the access to workers at common terms and predictable conditions.
Thus, on-site operations can be scheduled and costed out with fixed
standards of labor use. At the same time, firms are protected
from competition by other firms which might be able to exploit workers
temporarily to gain a cost advantage. If work rules do take certain
aspects of labor cost "out of competition" employers as well as workers
gain from the resulting uniformity of conditions.
5.3.6 Sum: Efficiency Contributions of Craft Institutions
The efficiency contributions of the construction labor market
institutions can be summarized by stressing three key roles they play.
First, the wage, skill, and occupational structures manifested by craft
unions in the building trades make it possible to sustain a skilled labor
pool attached to an industry and not to a firm. By reducing uncertainty
over the terms and conditions of the employment relation, the institutions
work to lower the wage levels necessary to attract workers to the
industry. They may also reduce a risk premium which contractors would
have to include in prices if they did not have access to a labor pool
at a pre-determined wage and skill level.
Second, these structures, supplemented by hiring halls and
work rules, lower the transactions costs of labor mobility for both
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workers and firms. Ideally, they also help limit bargaining over the
employment relations to fixed intervals of contract renegotiation rather
than have it continually reoccur within the changing context of every-day
work.
Third, the union, as a workers' collective, pressures firms to
coordinate the individual contributions the firms make in training and
in employment experience into a consistent, general training program
for the industry. In this way, both workers and management in the
industry cooperate in the renewal of the stock of skilled craftsmen.
Apparently, the need for this kind of craft labor market
institutions is limited to a particular segment of the market where the
scale, variety, and variability of construction work necessitates a
continual turnover of skilled workers. As nonunion firms attempt this
type of work, they begin to duplicate on an open shop basis, many of
the structure and institutions previously unique to union construction.
In part, this process of duplication simply mean the organization and
financing of some "union" institutions, like training or hiring, within a
single large firm or among an association of many firms. In a competitive
industry, it should make no difference in market price whether the cost
of these labor services is born initially by workers or firms. In
either case, they will be passed through to the consumer.
The real issue is whether open shop firms can cooperate to
create these institutions and, once they are in operation, work to maintain
them. In economic theory, there is probably no very strong reason why
they cannot. In actuality, however, there may be many barriers - among
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them being governmental regulation, anti-trust problems, union opposition,
and simple costs of organizing a fragmented, competitive industry -
which are hard to overcome. Yet the initial organization of craft and
industrial unions had to surmount analogous obstacles and, in so doing,
not only survived but prospered. Employers, after considerable turmoil,
may enjoy the same success.
Yet, ironically, that very success may bring eventual, or
even rapid, unionization. Once employers re-create an external labor
market, they may find that skilled workers so value participation in, and
some control over, labor market institutions that they will be relatively
easy to organize. Indeed, if employer cooperation is so successful
that some potential for monopsony power is evident, workers will have an
additional incentive for the creation of a countervailing organization.
The historical endurance of the building trades' unions, in the face
of occasional employer attacks and without consistent government support,
as in the pre-Wagner Act days, is some evidence of their natural strength.
This strengthe lies both in the inherent market power and preferences
of skilled workers and in the nature of the labor market. The building
trades are, in effect, endogenous unions.
On the other hand, the character of the labor market in
construction may be changing. Due to trends in technology and the
composition of demand, firm size distribution and skill levels in the
industry will continue to evolve. Some open shop firms may become very
large and make it possible to substitute a form of internal labor market
for craft institutions. Other nonunion firms may remain very small
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and specialized, making them very difficult and costly to organize. If
these trends predominate in the future, the building trade unions may
have to make radical changes in their structure and operations in order
to survive.
5.4 The Study of Unions
Neither the analysis of union behavior and market structure
nor the examination of craft labor market institutions completely
resolves the question of what unions do. In particular, the issue of
the magnitude of the union wage premium (if any) is unresolved. Also,
without more information from the unions themselves, little light can be
shed on the relative weight the building trades' unions give to economic,
institutional, and non-pecuniary goals. Nonetheless, it should be
obvious that attention only to the adversary or rent-maximizing behavior
of unions is a very partial view. Yet, while these other perspectives
give a richer view of union behavior, market structure, and management
reactions, they still do not add up to a completely consistent or coherent
alternative theory of unions.
Perhaps the central problem in creating such a new theory can
be expressed as a paradox: Unions seem to make, at the same time,
significant contributions to both distribution and efficiency in labor
markets. This paradox is manifested in the ambivalence many employers
feel, at least in construction, toward the role and impact of the unions.
For the building trades themselves, it is found in a tension between
adversary bargaining goals and cooperation with management for the
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benefit of the industry as a whole. It could be that this paradox or
tension is nothing more than the necessary compromises of economic
desires facing market constraints. Yet, there is a sense in some sectors
of the construction industry that distribution and efficiency are
inextricably intertwined and that the union is the pivotal element
in that inter-connection. Indeed, it may be that distribution an
efficiency are necessarily complementary goals of unions: the efficiency
function they fulfill in labor market institutions may be crucial in
supporting their role in distributive bargaining. Of course, this view
is contrary to the common idea that union labor market goals are solely
oriented toward restricting the supply of labor to raise the wage. But
in fact just the opposite may be the case: the union may contribute to
resolving market disfunctions in order to earn a higher wage. Although
employers may implicitly recognize this when they attempt to duplicate
many union institutions in an open shop setting, it is not clear that
these structures can be sustained without union pressure. To resolve
this issue empirically, direct studies need to be made on an industry
by industry basis of the union impact on productivity and unit labor
costs. The contributions unions may make in these areas has been
overlooked in the concentration on wage differentials alone.
In sum, in the study of unions most economists have failed to
recognize two crucial factors which bear on the understanding and eval-
uation of the union role. The first of these is the labor market context:
union outcomes are always compared to a perfectly competitive labor
market. In this hypothetical world, unions are always a "distortion."
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If, as Williamson shows, real labor markets and real workers are char-
acterized by uncertainty and bounded rationality unions, or at least
some union-like institutions, may enhance efficiency and welfare.
Second, economists have overlooked both how worker preferences toward
unionization are formed and what is the range and ranking of these
preferences. If the view is taken that "unionism is unionism" -- an
exogenous force -- the interaction between skill levels, labor market
context, and worker reactions is lost. In construction, at least,
craft unions might best be seen as an organization of those with inherent
market power who seek, through collective action, not primarily to
raise wages but to achieve some status in and control of particular
labor market institutions.
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